Rus stratejik kültürünün analizi ve Kırım'ın ilhakına etkileri

Yıl 2023, Cilt: 10 Sayı: 1, 82 - 97, 31.01.2023

Aslı Şevval Abdik

Öz

Kırım, 1783’te II. Katerina tarafından ilhak edilmesinden 1954’te Ukrayna’ya devredilene kadar, Rusya’nın bir parçası olarak kalmıştır. 1954’teki devir esnasında hem Rusya hem Ukrayna Sovyetler Birliği’nin bir parçasıydı. Ancak 1991 yılında Birlik dağılınca, Kırım’ın kime ait olması gerektiği konusunda anlaşmazlıklar çıktı. Mart 2014’te ise, uluslararası baskılara ve kınamalara rağmen, Rusya Kırım’ı uluslararası hukuka aykırı bir şekilde ilhak ederek topraklarına kattı. Bu makale, Rusya’nın Kırım’ı ilhak kararını Rus stratejik kültürü’nün perspektifinden incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Stratejik kültür çalışmaları nispeten yeni olmasına rağmen, bu makale stratejik kültürel çerçevenin, Rusya’nın bir dış ve güvenlik kararını analiz etmede faydalı olduğunu göstermektedir, özellikle Kırım konusunda. Bu sebeple, makalenin ana araştırma sorusu olan “Rus stratejik kültürü, Rusya’nın Kırım’ı ilhak kararını nasıl etkilemiştir?” cevaplanması amaçlanmaktadır. Makalede, ilhak kararının Rusya’nın stratejik kültürünün bir yansıması olduğu savunulmaktadır. Çünkü, Rus stratejik kültürünü oluşturan kurucu unsurlar (Rus tarihi, elitlerin inançları ve Rus rejiminin özellikleri) Kırım’ın ilhak kararının şekillenmesinde önemli rol oynamıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

stratejik kültür, Rus dış politikası, Kırım'ın ilhakı

THE ANNEXATION OF THE CRIMEA: AN ANALYSIS FROM RUSSIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE’S PERSPECTİVE

Öz

Crimea has been part of Russia from its annexation in 1783 by Catherine II until its transfer to Ukraine in 1954. When the transfer took place, both Ukraine and Russia were part of the Soviet Union. However, when the Union dissolved in 1991, the disputes have risen about “to whom” Crimea should belong. Regardless of international pressures, today Crimean Peninsula has become de facto part of Russia since March 2014. This study aims to analyze the Russian decision to annex Crimea from the perspective of strategic culture. Although strategic cultural studies are relatively new, this article demonstrates that it has utility in analyzing security decision of Russia, especially for the Crimean case. Therefore, this study aims to answer its main research question: How did Russia’s strategic culture effect Russian decision to annex Crimea? It argues that the decision to annex was a reflection of Russia’s strategic culture. Because, the constitutive elements of Russian strategic culture (namely history, Russian elite and their beliefs, and the characteristics of Russian regime) have played an important role to shape the decision to annex Crimea

Anahtar Kelimeler

strategic culture, russian foreign policy, the annexation of Crimea

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