ÖZEL GÜVENLİK HİZMETLERİNİN DEMOKRATİK KONTROLÜ: KONTROLÜN DEVLET DIŞINA TAŞINMASI

Öz

Çalışmada, ordunun demokratik kontrolünü inceleyen çalışmalardan farklı olarak, güvenliğin özelleştirilmesi sonucu ortaya çıkan güvenlik sektörü bileşenlerinden, özel güvenlik şirketlerinin sundukları hizmetlerin demokratik kontrolünün sağlanmasına yönelik kontrol mekanizmalarının genel hatlarıyla betimlenmesi amaçlanmıştır. Modern devlet ile güvenlik arasındaki yaşanan değişim ve dönüşüme paralel şekilde, kamusal güvenlik örgütleri üzerinde gerçekleştirilen ve sivil otorite ile hesap verebilirlik ilişkilerine dayanan demokratik kontrolün niteliğinin de değiştiği anlaşılmıştır. Bu bakımdan çalışmada, demokratik kontrol öznesinin devlet dışındaki tarafları da içerecek şekilde genişlemesinin yanında, kontrol konusunun da ordunun yanında özel güvenlik şirketlerini de içerecek şekilde çeşitlendiği görülmüştür. Kontrolün özelleşmesi olarak nitelenebilecek bu durum, demokratik kontrolü incelerken, devlet yanında devlet aygıtı dışında yer alan tarafların ve kamusal güvenlik örgütlenmeleri yanında kamusal olmayan güvenlik sağlayıcılarının da ele alınması gerekliliğini ortaya koymaktadır. Bu nedenle kavram, kamu-özel ortaklığını içermektedir. Ancak genelde ordu üzerinden gelişen demokratik kontrol kavramının, devlet aygıtı dışında yer alan ve piyasa kurallarına tabi olan özel güvenlik şirketlerine doğrudan uygulanamayacağı anlaşılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Özel Güvenlik Hizmetleri,Sivil Kontrol,Demokratik Kontrol,Hesap Verebilirlik,Şeffaflık

Kaynakça

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