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HİNDİSTAN’IN “SOĞUK BAŞLANGIÇ” SİYASETİ VE PAKİSTAN’IN İLK ATAK TEHDİTİ: NUKLEER CAYDIRICILIĞIN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ

Yıl 2023, , 39 - 50, 24.09.2023
https://doi.org/10.58640/asyar.1289413

Öz

Pakistan ve Hindistan, 1947’den beri aralarında bir çatışma olduğu için nukleer caydırıcılıkla karşı karşıya olan iki ülke. Bu, tüm Güney Asya bölgeleri için bir tehdit oluşturuyor. Pakistan, Hindistan'ın konvansiyonel silah üstünlüğünü ve nükleer silah tehlikesini önlemek için nükleer caydırıcılık kullanıyor. Öte yandan, Hindistan, Pakistan ile Keşmir savaşını bitirmek için konvansiyonel silah rekabet avantajına sahip olma niteliğini değiştiremeyeceğinden, 2004 yılında saldırı amaçlı olan Soğuk Başlangıç Doktrini adlı doktrini oluşturmuştur. Bu doktrine göre, Hindistan hızlı bir şekilde askerileşebilir ve Pakistan'ın nükleer kısmına dokunmadan küçük misilleme saldırıları düzenleyebilir. Soğuk Başlangıç doktrini, Hindistan'a Hava Kuvvetleri ile birlikte hareket ederek konvansiyonel seferberlikte daha iyi avantaj sağlıyor. Ancak bu, Hint Alt Kıtasında nükleer savaş riskini artırabilir. Bu yazıda, araştırmacı Pakistan ve Hindistan'ın stratejik dengesini karşılaştırdı. Ayrıca, Hindistan'ın Soğuk Başlangıç Doktrininin Pakistan'ın nükleer silah politikasını nasıl etkilediğini ve Pakistan'ın "İlk Atak" kullanımına nasıl geçtiğini inceliyor. Pakistan-Hindistan nükleer dengesi, Pakistan’ın nükleer silah deposunun ve Hindistan’ın nükleer cephaneliğinin gelişimi değerlendirilerek açıklanmaktadır.

Kaynakça

  • Ahmed, Samina. (1999). “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program. Turning Points and Nuclear Choices”. International Security. 23 (4), 178-204.
  • Betts, Richard K. (2013) “The Lost Logic of Deterrence”, Foreign Affairs, retrieved on 10 April, 2018 from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2013-02-11/lost-logic-deterrence.
  • Chakma, Bhumitra. (July 2006). “Security Challenges”, 2 (2), retrieved from bhumitra.chakma@adelaide.edu.au.
  • Das, Debak. (2012). “Indian Nuclear Policy: A Case of Deliberate Strategic Ambiguity”, PANORAMA of global security environment.
  • HİLALİ, A. Z. (2012) “DIMENSION”, retrieved on 3 of May from sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/A.Z.-Hilali.pdf.
  • Khan, Feroz Hassan. (2005). “Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan Strategic Insights”, 10 (10).
  • Khan, Muhammad Azam. (2011). (R) Commander Pakistan Navy, “India’s Cold Start Is Too Hot”, Proceedings Magazine, Volume 137 (3), 1,297.
  • Ramesh, Thakur. (2014) “The Inconsequential Gains and Lasting Insecurities of India’s Nuclear Weaponization”. International Affairs, 90 (5), 1101-1124, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12159.
  • Tertrais, Bruno. (2012). “Pakistan’s nuklear programme: a net assessment”. Researches and Documents, No: Ç04/2012, FRS.
  • Marwat, Zahor Khan. (2017) “Threat of Nuclear War Against Pakistan”. International the News, retrevied on 14 October 2018 from https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/206076-Threat-of-nuclear-war-against-Pakistan.
  • Mizokami, Kyle. (2014) “The National Interest”, retrevied on 12 April 2019 from https://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-india-pakistan-went-war-5-weapons-pakistan-should-fear-11089?page=0%2C1.
  • Ladwig III, Walter C. (2007-8). “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine”. International Security. 32 (3), 158-190.
  • Ladwig III, Walter C. (2008). “An Overview and assessment of the Indian Army’s Cold Start Strategy”, Merton College, University of Oxford, walter.ladwig@politics.ox.ac.uk.

INDIA’S “COLD START DOCTRINE” AND PAKISTAN’S FIRST USE THREAT: ASSESING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Yıl 2023, , 39 - 50, 24.09.2023
https://doi.org/10.58640/asyar.1289413

Öz

Pakistan and India are the two countries facing nuclear deterrence from each other as they have had a conflict since 1947. This creates a threat to South Asian regions Pakistan is using nuclear deterrence in order to discourage Indian conventional dominance. On the other hand, as India does not have the ability to change the quality of being at a competitive advantage of it is conventional to finish the Kashmir war with Pakistan, India established the doctrine called –Cold Start Doctrine- in 2004, which is an assaultive doctrine. According to this doctrine, India can militarize in a quick way and use small retaliatory attacks on Pakistan without trespassing into their nuclear part. Cold Start gives an advantage to India for being more capable of a conventional mobilization when acting together with their Air Force. This might escalate the risk of nuclear war in the subcontinent. In this paper, the strategic balance of Pakistan and India is compared. It also examines how the Cold Start doctrine of India affected Pakistan's nuclear weapon policy and Pakistan moved toward 'First Strike Use'. The nuclear balance is explained by assessing the development of Pakistan's atomic weapons store and India's nuclear arsenal.

Kaynakça

  • Ahmed, Samina. (1999). “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program. Turning Points and Nuclear Choices”. International Security. 23 (4), 178-204.
  • Betts, Richard K. (2013) “The Lost Logic of Deterrence”, Foreign Affairs, retrieved on 10 April, 2018 from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2013-02-11/lost-logic-deterrence.
  • Chakma, Bhumitra. (July 2006). “Security Challenges”, 2 (2), retrieved from bhumitra.chakma@adelaide.edu.au.
  • Das, Debak. (2012). “Indian Nuclear Policy: A Case of Deliberate Strategic Ambiguity”, PANORAMA of global security environment.
  • HİLALİ, A. Z. (2012) “DIMENSION”, retrieved on 3 of May from sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/A.Z.-Hilali.pdf.
  • Khan, Feroz Hassan. (2005). “Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan Strategic Insights”, 10 (10).
  • Khan, Muhammad Azam. (2011). (R) Commander Pakistan Navy, “India’s Cold Start Is Too Hot”, Proceedings Magazine, Volume 137 (3), 1,297.
  • Ramesh, Thakur. (2014) “The Inconsequential Gains and Lasting Insecurities of India’s Nuclear Weaponization”. International Affairs, 90 (5), 1101-1124, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12159.
  • Tertrais, Bruno. (2012). “Pakistan’s nuklear programme: a net assessment”. Researches and Documents, No: Ç04/2012, FRS.
  • Marwat, Zahor Khan. (2017) “Threat of Nuclear War Against Pakistan”. International the News, retrevied on 14 October 2018 from https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/206076-Threat-of-nuclear-war-against-Pakistan.
  • Mizokami, Kyle. (2014) “The National Interest”, retrevied on 12 April 2019 from https://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-india-pakistan-went-war-5-weapons-pakistan-should-fear-11089?page=0%2C1.
  • Ladwig III, Walter C. (2007-8). “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine”. International Security. 32 (3), 158-190.
  • Ladwig III, Walter C. (2008). “An Overview and assessment of the Indian Army’s Cold Start Strategy”, Merton College, University of Oxford, walter.ladwig@politics.ox.ac.uk.
Toplam 13 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil İngilizce
Konular Asya Toplumu Çalışmaları
Bölüm Makaleler
Yazarlar

Hasibe Vehbi Şahoğlu 0000-0003-2098-1515

Yayımlanma Tarihi 24 Eylül 2023
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2023

Kaynak Göster

APA Vehbi Şahoğlu, H. (2023). INDIA’S “COLD START DOCTRINE” AND PAKISTAN’S FIRST USE THREAT: ASSESING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. Asya Araştırmaları Uluslararası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 7(1), 39-50. https://doi.org/10.58640/asyar.1289413

30000

Asya Araştırmaları Uluslararası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Creative Commons Atıf-GayriTicari 4.0 (CC BY NC) Uluslararası Lisansı ile lisanslanmıştır.