Karadeniz’de Güç Mücadelesi: Nato-Rusya Rekabeti ve Türkiye’nin Stratejik Dengeleyici Rolü

Öz

Karadeniz Bölgesi, tarih boyunca Avrasya jeopolitiğinde önemli bir konuma sahip olmuş ve farklı güç merkezlerinin etki mücadelesine sahne olmuştur. Sovyetler Birliği’nin dağılmasının ardından bölge, yeni güvenlik sorunları ve değişen güç dengeleriyle yeniden şekillenmiştir. Bu çalışma, Karadeniz’in tarihsel arka planını ve günümüzdeki jeopolitik önemini ele almakta; NATO’nun bölgedeki güvenlik politikaları ile Rusya’nın dış politika yaklaşımları arasındaki rekabeti incelemektedir. Ayrıca Türkiye’nin bu rekabet içerisindeki konumu ve oynadığı dengeleyici rol değerlendirilmektedir. Türkiye’nin Montrö Sözleşmesi çerçevesindeki sorumlulukları, çok boyutlu dış politika tercihleri ve NATO ile Rusya arasındaki ilişkilerde üstlendiği arabuluculuk işlevi, bölgesel istikrar açısından dikkate değer unsurlar arasında yer almaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Karadeniz
• NATO
• Rusya
• Türkiye
• Jeopolitik Rekabet
• Caydırıcılık Stratejisi

Power Struggle in the Black Sea: NATO–Russia Rivalry and Turkey’s Strategic Balancing Role

Abstract

Historically, the Black Sea region has occupied a pivotal place in Eurasian geopolitics and has long served as a stage for competition among major power centers. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the region has been reshaped by new security challenges and shifting power balances. This study examines the historical background and current geopolitical significance of the Black Sea, analyzing the rivalry between NATO’s security policies and Russia’s foreign policy approaches in the region. Furthermore, it evaluates Turkey’s position and its balancing role within this rivalry. Turkey’s responsibilities under the Montreux Convention, its multi-dimensional foreign policy choices, and its mediating function between NATO and Russia are recognized as critical elements for regional stability.

Keywords

• Black Sea
• NATO
• Russia
• Turkey
• Geopolitical Rivalry
• Deterrence Strategy

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