Offshore Balancing Stratejisi Bağlamında Trump Yönetiminin Güney Kore'ye Yönelik Politikaları (2017–2021)

Öz

Bu çalışmanın amacı, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin (ABD) Donald Trump'ın ilk başkanlık dönemi (2017–2021) boyunca Güney Kore'ye yönelik politikalarını offshore balancing stratejisi çerçevesinde incelemektir. ABD ile Çin arasında giderek belirginleşen stratejik rekabet, Asya-Pasifik bölgesinin jeopolitik önemini artırmış ve bu durum, ABD'nin bölgedeki en önemli müttefiklerinden biri olan Güney Kore ile ilişkilerini daha da ön plana çıkarmıştır. Bu doğrultuda Washington yönetiminin Asya-Pasifik'e yönelen stratejik yaklaşımı, iki ülke arasındaki siyasi ve güvenlik iş birliğinin güçlenmesine katkı sağlamıştır. Bu kapsamda çalışmada, Trump yönetiminin Güney Kore'ye yönelik politikaları ve bu politikaların bölgesel etkileri offshore balancing stratejisinin temel varsayımları çerçevesinde analiz edilmektedir. Araştırma bulguları, ABD-Güney Kore ittifakının stratejik önemi, tarafların karşılıklı güvenlik çıkarları ve Asya-Pasifik bölgesinin mevcut jeopolitik koşulları nedeniyle offshore balancing stratejisinin tüm unsurlarıyla uygulanmasının mümkün olmadığını göstermektedir. Bununla birlikte, Trump yönetimi döneminde izlenen bazı politikaların stratejinin temel ilkeleriyle büyük ölçüde örtüştüğü, buna karşılık bazı uygulamaların ise offshore balancing yaklaşımının öngörüleriyle çeliştiği tespit edilmiştir. Bu doğrultuda çalışma, Trump yönetiminin Güney Kore'ye yönelik politikasını bölgesel güç dengesi ile potansiyel bölgesel hegemonun ortaya çıkmasının engellenmesi perspektifinden değerlendirmekte ve söz konusu politikaların Asya-Pasifik güvenlik mimarisi üzerindeki etkilerini bölgesel düzeyde analiz etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Amerika Birleşik Devletleri
• Güney Kore
• Offshore Balancing
• Asya-Pasifik
• Çin

Trump Administration Policies Toward South Korea in the Context of Offshore Balancing (2017–2021)

Öz

This study analyzes United States (U.S.) policy toward South Korea during Donald Trump's first presidential term through the analytical framework of offshore balancing. The emergence of strategic competition between the United States and China has further increased the geopolitical importance of the Asia-Pacific region, making South Korea an increasingly significant U.S. partner in the region. Consequently, the U.S. strategic reorientation toward the Asia-Pacific has strengthened bilateral relations between Washington and Seoul. Within this context, the study examines the policies pursued by the Trump administration toward South Korea and evaluates their regional implications from the perspective of offshore balancing. Although the strategic importance of the U.S.–South Korea alliance, its mutual benefits, and the regional security environment have limited the full implementation of offshore balancing, several policies adopted during the Trump administration were broadly consistent with the strategy. At the same time, other policies diverged from its principal assumptions. Accordingly, the study evaluates U.S. policy by focusing on regional balances of power and the prevention of the emergence of a potential regional hegemon while incorporating regional-level analysis to assess the strategic implications of these policies.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• United States
• South Korea
• Offshore Balancing
• Asia-Pacific
• China

Kaynakça

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