Ekonomik Yaptırımlar ve Uluslararası Ticaretin Silahlaştırılması: Küresel Aktörlerden Örnekler

Öz

Küreselleşme ile birlikte bağlantılılık düzeyi artan toplumlar, uluslararası ticarette birbirine daha bağımlı hale gelmişlerdir. Bu bağımlılık düzeyi dünya barışına katkı sağlarken aynı zamanda uluslararası ticareti kırılgan hale getirmiştir. Günümüzde ülkelerin uluslararası ticarette birbirine asimetrik olarak bağımlı olması, ticaretin dış politikada bir araç olarak kullanılmasına da yol açmıştır. Bu araçlardan biri olan yaptırımların tarihi eski Yunan medeniyetlerine kadar uzansa da son yıllarda dünya kamuoyunun gündeminde çok daha sık şekilde yer almaya başlamıştır. Geleneksel yaptırımlardan ve ticaret savaşlarından farklı olarak, ülkelerin hedef ülkeye karşı avantajlı olduğu ticareti silahlaştırarak hem ticari hem de siyasi ilişkilerinde araç olarak kullanması günümüz uluslararası ticaretinin en önemli konularından biri haline gelmiştir. Ticarete konu herhangi bir alanda üstün olan devlet diğer devletlerin kararlarını etkilemek amacıyla ekonomik zorlamaya başvurabilmektedir. Bu çalışmada öncelikle yaptırımların ekonomik ve finansal alanlarda yoğunlaşarak, daha fazla dış politika aracı olarak kullanılması incelenmiştir. Yaptırımlardan istenilen sonuç alınmış olsa da, ilerleyen süreçte hedef aktörler yaptırımlara karşı duyarsız hale gelebilecektir. Ayrıca yaptırımlar her zaman başarıyla sonuçlanmayacaktır. Başarısız olan yaptırımlar istenmeyen durumun daha da şiddetlenmesine yol açabilecektir. İkinci olarak ise karşılıklı ekonomik bağımlılıkların güçlü ticarete sahip ülkeler tarafından ekonomik zorlama yoluyla politika amaçlarına kaldıraç olarak kullanılması incelenmiştir. Karşılıklı bağımlılık küresel ticaretin artmasına ve endüstrilerin uzmanlaşmasına yol açmıştır. Ancak riskleri de beraberinde getirmiştir. Yaptırımlar ve ekonomik zorlamalar, hedef ülkeleri bu riskleri azaltmaya yönlendirmekte ve bu eğilim serbest ticarete zarar vererek ülkeleri korumacılık politikalarına sevk etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Yaptırım
• Ekonomik Yaptırım
• Ekonomik Baskı
• Ticaretin Silahlaştırılması

Economic Sanctions and Weaponization of International Trade: Examples from Global Actors

Öz

With globalization, the interconnectedness of societies has increased, but they have become more interdependent in international trade. While this level of dependency contributed to world peace, it also made international trade fragile. Today, the asymmetric dependence of countries on each other in international trade has led to the use of trade as a tool in foreign policy. Although the history of sanctions, which is one of these tools, dates back to ancient Greek civilizations, it has started to take place on the agenda of world public opinion more frequently in recent years. Unlike traditional sanctions and trade wars, it has become one of the most important issues of today’s international trade, which countries use as a tool in both commercial and political relations by weaponizing the trade that is advantageous against the target country. The state, which is superior in any area subject to trade, can resort to economic coercion in order to influence the decisions of other states. In this study, the use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool, focusing primarily on economic and financial areas, is examined. Even though the desired results have been obtained from the sanctions, target actors may become insensitive to the sanctions in the future. Moreover, sanctions will not always result in success. Failed sanctions may lead to further exacerbation of the undesirable situation. Secondly, the use of mutual economic dependencies by countries with strong trade as leverage for policy purposes through economic coercion was examined. Interdependency has led to increased global trade and specialization of industries. However, it also brought risks. Sanctions and economic pressures direct target countries to reduce these risks, and this tendency harms free trade and leads countries to protectionist policies.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Sanction
• Economic Sanction
• Economic Coercion
• Weaponization of Trade

Kaynakça

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