Search for an Alternative Method of Measuring Central Bank Credibility - The Case of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) –

Yıl 2021, , 256 - 270, 01.11.2021

Serdar Varlık , Tolga Daglaroglu

https://doi.org/10.25294/auiibfd.895340

Cited By: 2

Öz

The aim of this study is to develop an index-based alternative method in order to measure the CBRT’s credibility. Unlike the previous studies, the original contribution of the method developed in the study is revealed in two points: (i) Inflation targets, which cannot be achieved for a long time, lose the function of anchoring inflation expectations. In this case, developing countries’ central banks prefer to use their own inflation forecasts as an intermediate target in order to manage inflation expectation of private economic agents. Because of this situation, which is also observed in the Turkish economy, the reliability of credibility indices calculated using only the inflation target is open to debate. Therefore, while developing an alternative central bank credibility index in this study, the year-end inflation forecast in the first inflation report of the relevant year besides the central bank’s inflation target are taken into account. (ii) In economies that experience high inflation and/or where inflation exhibits inertia, as using 20% threshold level for the inflation rate like in the previous studies means giving more tolerance to inflation. However, after the CBRT switched to an inflation targeting strategy, the inflation rate fell to single digits, and double-digit inflation rates were considered as a negative psychological level in terms of inflation dynamics. By taking account this situation, in this study, 10% threshold level for the inflation rate is decided to use. Consequently, since the central bank credibility index developed in the study has a more dynamic structure, it is seemed to better explain the CBRT’s credibility level.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Central Bank Credibility, Credibility Index, CBRT

Merkez Bankası Kredibilitesinin Ölçümüne Alternatif Bir Yöntem Arayışı –Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası (TCMB) Örneği–

Öz

Bu çalışmanın amacı, TCMB’nin kredibilitesini ölçmek için endeks tabanlı alternatif bir yöntem geliştirmektir. Önceki çalışmalardan farklı olarak, çalışmada geliştirilen yöntemin orijinal katkısı iki noktada ortaya çıkmaktadır: (i) Uzun süre gerçekleştirilemeyen enflasyon hedefleri, enflasyon beklentilerini çıpalama işlevini kaybetmektedir. Bu durumda, gelişmekte olan ülke merkez bankaları özel iktisadi karar birimlerinin enflasyon beklentilerini yönetebilmek için kendi enflasyon tahminlerini ara hedef olarak kullanmayı tercih etmektedirler. Türkiye ekonomisinde de gözlemlenen bu durum nedeniyle, sadece enflasyon hedefi kullanılarak hesaplanan kredibilite endekslerinin güvenilirliği tartışmaya açıktır. Bu nedenle, bu çalışmada alternatif bir merkez bankası kredibilite endeksi geliştirilirken, merkez bankasının enflasyon hedefinin yanı sıra, ilgili yılın ilk enflasyon raporundaki yılsonu enflasyon tahmini de dikkate alınmaktadır. (ii) Yüksek enflasyon yaşayan ve/veya enflasyonun atalet sergilediği ekonomilerde, önceki çalışmalarda olduğu gibi enflasyon oranı için yüzde 20 eşik düzeyini kullanmak, enflasyona daha fazla tolerans vermek anlamına gelmektedir. Oysa TCMB enflasyon hedeflemesi stratejisine geçtikten sonra, enflasyon oranı tek haneli rakamlara düşmüş ve çift haneli enflasyon oranları enflasyon dinamikleri açısından olumsuz bir psikolojik seviye olarak kabul edilmiştir. Bu durum dikkate alınarak, bu çalışmada enflasyon oranı için %10 eşik düzeyinin kullanılmasına karar verilmiştir. Sonuç olarak, çalışmada geliştirilen merkez bankası kredibilite endeksi daha dinamik bir yapıya sahip olduğu için, TCMB’nin kredibilite düzeyini daha iyi açıkladığı görülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Merkez Bankası Kredibilitesi, Kredibilite Endeksi, TCMB

Kaynakça

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