Liderlerin Geçmiş İsyan Deneyimi ve Bu Deneyimin Kişi Dokunulmazlığı Hakkı Üzerindeki Etkisi

Öz

Önceki araştırmalar, liderlerin önceki deneyimlerinin, onların siyasi kararlarını etkilediğini göstermektedir. Mevcut insan hakları literatürü, hak ihlallerinin nedenlerini, temel olarak ekonomik gelişme, rejim tipi ve çatışma durumları gibi ülke düzeyindeki etkenler ile açıklamaktadır. Bu araştırma, liderlerin önceki deneyimlerinin, onların kişinin dokunulmazlığı hakkını ihlal etme eğilimini neden ve nasıl etkilediğini açıklama ve liderlerin bu hakları korumadaki rolüne ilişkin olarak gelişen literatüre katkı sağlama hedefi gütmektedir. Bu makale, isyan deneyimine sahip ve isyanda zafer kazanmış liderlerin insan haklarına saygı gösterme olasılıklarının daha düşük olduğu, buna karşın yenilgiye uğramış olanların bunu yapma olasılığının daha yüksek olduğu hipotezini savunmaktadır. Makale bu hipotezi şuna dayandırmaktadır; her iki lider türü de risk almaya yönelik isteklilik göstermiş iken, muhtemel olarak, ilk durumda zafer, risk alma inancını pekiştirerek onları risk almaya devam etmeye yönlendirirken, ikinci durumda yenilgi, liderlere riskten kaçınmayı öğretmektedir. İnsan haklarının ihlali risk taşıyıp, potansiyel olarak itibarın zedelenmesi, hesap verme sorumluluğu ve toplumsal kargaşa gibi olumsuz sonuçlara yol açabilir. Makalenin bulguları şunları göstermektedir; tek başına isyan deneyimine sahip olmak bir liderin insan haklarıyla ilgili davranışını esasen etkilememektedir, fakat etkili olan isyan deneyiminin sonucudur. Haklara saygı gösterme olasılığı, bir isyan kazanıldığında azalırken, daha önce bir isyanda kayıp verildiğinde artmaktadır. Bu araştırma, bazı ülkelerde neden insan hakları ihlallerinin işlendiğini açıklamak için, bir analiz birimi olarak devletlerden ziyade liderleri kullanmanın önemine vurgu yapmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Liderler
• İsyan Deneyimi
• İnsan Hakları
• Kişinin Dokunulmazlığı Hakkı

Prior Rebel Experience of Leaders and Its Influence on Physical Integrity Rights

Öz

Previous research shows that leaders’ prior experiences influence their policy decisions. The existing human rights literature focuses mainly on country-level factors, such as economic development, regime type and the conflict situations to explain violations of rights. This research contributes to a flourishing literature on leaders’ role in upholding rights by theorizing why and how the prior experiences of leaders affect the propensity to violate physical integrity rights. It is argued in this article that leaders with a rebel experience, and who have experienced victory in rebellion are less likely to respect human rights, while those who have suffered defeat are more likely to do so. Both types of leaders have demonstrated a willingness to take risks, but in the former case, victory reinforces their belief in taking risks, leading them to keep risk-taking, whereas in the latter, defeat teaches leaders to become more risk averse. Infringing on human rights is indeed risky, potentially leading to negative consequences such as a damaged reputation, accountability, and social upheaval. The empirical analysis of the research demonstrates that having a rebel background alone does not inherently influence a leader's behavior regarding human rights; what matters is the outcome of the rebellion. The probability of showing respect for rights decreases when a rebellion is won, while it increases when there has been a previous loss in rebellion. The article highlights the importance of using leaders, rather than just states, as a unit of analysis to explain why certain countries commit human rights violations.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Leaders
• Rebel Experience
• Human Rights
• Physical Integrity Rights

Kaynakça

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