Strategic Culture and Institution Effects in Deterrence Strategy: Comparison of Barack Obama-Donald Trump Presidencies’ Cyber Security Policies

Öz

Deterrence strategy, as an instrument of coercive diplomacy, played a significant role within the power relations of the Cold War. This led the deterrence studies to be dominated by the defining factors of the era - nuclear weapons and balance of power. However, in order to understand the deterrence strategy against recent cyber threats, it is crucial that internal variables be included in the foreign policy analysis. This study examines the stategic culture and institutions effects in deterrence strategy used against cyber threats. The theoretical framework is neoclassical realism and the methods applied are case analysis and process tracing. US cyber deterrence policies is selected as a case and cyber implementations of Obama and Trump presidencies are compared. The analysis reveals that power distribution and threat perception provide a certain guidance to the security policies of the state, whereas internal variables such as strategic culture and institutions yield to different deterrence applications under similar structural contexts. The findings of the study exemplifies the combined application of internal factors and the structural factors in foreign policy analysis, and makes a theoretical contribution to the field.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Deterrence
• Neoclassical Realism
• Cyber Threats
• Foreign Policy Traditions
• Congress

Stratejik Kültür ve Kurumların Caydırıcılık Stratejisi Üzerindeki Etkileri: Obama ve Trump Yönetimlerinin Siber Güvenlik Politikalarının Karşılaştırmalı Analizi

Öz

Zorlayıcı diplomasinin bir aracı olan caydırıcılık stratejisi, Soğuk Savaş dönemi güç ilişkilerinde belirleyici etkiye sahip olmuştur. Dolayısıyla alana ilişkin çalışmalar, bu döneme dair nükleer silah ve güç dengesi gibi yapısal faktörlerinden önemli ölçüde etkilenmiştir. Bununla birlikte yakın dönemde karşılaşılan siber tehditlere karşı yürütülen caydırıcılık stratejilerini anlamak için güç dengesi ilişkilerine ilaveten devlete ait iç değişkenlerin analize dahil edilmesi gerekmektedir. Bu çalışmada; siber tehditlere karşı yürütülen caydırıcılık stratejisinde stratejik kültür ve kurum etkisi araştırılmıştır. Neoklasik Realizm kuramsal çerçevesine başvurulan çalışmada, vaka analizi ve süreç takibi yöntemleri uygulanmıştır. Örnek vaka olarak ABD siber caydırıcılık politikaları ele alınmış ve Barack Obama ve Donald Trump dönemleri karşılaştırılmıştır. Analiz sonucunda; güç dağılımı ve tehdit algılaması gibi yapısal faktörlerin güvenlik politikalarına belirli bir yön verdiği ancak stratejik kültür ve kurum değişkenlerinin aynı bağlamsal koşullar altında farklı caydırıcılık uygulamalarını doğurduğu bulgusuna varılmıştır. Elde edilen bulgular, dış politika analizinde yapısal faktörler ile birlikte iç değişkenlerin kullanımına örnek teşkil eden kuramsal bir katkı sunmaktadır

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Caydırıcılık
• Neoklasik Realizm
• Siber Tehditler
• Dış Politika Gelenekleri
• Kongre

Kaynakça

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