Birleşmiş Milletlerin (BM) Barışı Koruma Misyonları Çerçevesinde Özel Güvenlik Şirketlerinin (ÖGŞ) Kullanımının Analizi

Öz

Özel güvenlik şirketlerinin (ÖGŞ) çatışma alanlarındaki faaliyetleri ve ‘müşterilerine’ sağladıkları hizmetler, 2014 sonrası Rusya’nın Wagner şirketi veya 2003 sonrası Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD)’nin Blackwater gibi şirketlerle geliştirdikleri ilişkiler üzerinden tartışılsa da güvenliğin özelleşmesinin etkileri, küresel barış ve güvenlik için en önemli uluslararası örgüt olan Birleşmiş Milletleri (BM) de etkilemiştir. Bu çalışma, BM satın alma biriminin 2019-2024 yılları arasındaki resmi istatistiklerini inceleyerek ÖGŞ’lerden hangi hizmetlerin satın alındığı ve satın alınan hizmetlerin nasıl sınıflandırılabileceği sorularına cevap aramaktadır. Adı geçen istatistikler incelendiğinde BM’nin en fazla satın alma faaliyetinde bulunduğu alanın barışı koruma misyonları olduğu görülmektedir. Barışı koruma misyonları çerçevesinde satın alınan mal ve hizmetlerde ise güvenlik kategorisinde yapılan satın almalar öncelikli olmamakla birlikte ÖGŞ’lerle farklı alanlarda sözleşmeler imzalandığı görülmektedir. 2019-2024 yılları arasında BM barışı koruma misyonları için güvenlik kategorisi altında imzalanan sözleşmeler incelendiğinde BM’nin ÖGŞ’lerden koruma hizmetleri gibi geleneksel olarak devletlerin kolluk kuvvetlerinin sağladığı hizmetleri (1), danışmanlık, eğitim veya istihbarat hizmetleri gibi yine geleneksel olarak devletlerin sağladığı destek hizmetlerini (2) ve sağlık hizmetleri veya hammadde tedariği gibi geleneksel olarak sivil aktörlerin de sağladığı hizmet destek sınıfı hizmetlerini (3) satın aldığı tespit edilmiştir. BM, barışı koruma misyonlarının ihtiyaçları çerçevesinde hem koruma hizmetleri gibi tarihsel olarak devletlere ait olan temel hem de sağlık ve havacılık hizmetleri gibi tarihsel olarak sivil aktörler tarafından da sağlanabilen temel olmayan güvenlik hizmetlerini ÖGŞ’lerden satın almaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Birleşmiş Milletler
• Barışı Koruma Misyonu
• Özel Güvenlik Şirketleri
• Uluslararası Barış
• Uluslararası Güvenlik

Analysis of the Use of Private Security Companies (PSCs) within the Framework of United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Missions

Öz

The activities of private security companies (PSCs) in conflict zones, and the services they provide to their 'customers', have been the subject of debate in the context of Russia's relations with the Wagner Group after 2014, and the United States' (US) relations with PSCs such as Blackwater after 2003. However, the privatization of security has also impacted the United Nations (UN), the foremost international organization responsible for global peace and security. This study examines official UN procurement statistics from 2019 to 2024 to answer questions about which security services have been purchased from PSCs and how these services can be classified. Examination of the statistics reveals that the area in which the UN has the most procurement activities is peacekeeping missions. While procurement in the security category is not a priority within the framework of peacekeeping missions, contracts with PSCs are signed for various types of services in different fields. Examining the contracts signed under the security category for UN peacekeeping missions between 2019 and 2024 reveals that the UN procures protection/security services traditionally provided by state units and agencies (1); consultancy, training, or intelligence services, also traditionally provided by states (2); and health services or material supply, traditionally provided by civilian actors (3), from PSCs. According to the needs of peacekeeping missions, the UN purchases both core security services, such as protection services, which have historically been the responsibility of states, and non-core security services, such as health and aviation services, which can be provided by civilian actors, from PSCs.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• United Nations
• Peacekeeping Mission
• Private Security Companies
• International Peace
• International Security

Kaynakça

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