Caydırıcılık Teorisi Bağlamında Çin’in Kuzey Kore Nükleer Politikalarına Bakışı

Yıl 2023, Cilt: 11 Sayı: 34, 260 - 282, 20.03.2023

Özlem Zerrin Keyvan

https://doi.org/10.33692/avrasyad.1200578

Öz

Son 30 yılda, Kuzey Kore'nin nükleer sorunu, Kuzeydoğu Asya'daki güvenlik, kalkınma ve istikrara yönelik en önemli ve doğrudan tehditlerden birini oluşturmuştur. Üçlü ve altılı görüşmeler, yaptırımlar, diplomatik çabalar ve daha yakın tarihli Singapur ve Hanoi Zirveleri dahil olmak üzere uluslararası toplumun çabaları, şimdiye kadar herhangi somut bir sonuç üretememiştir. Kuzey Kore'nin temel amacı nükleer programını geliştirmek ve açıkça nükleer silah üretmek olmuştur. Uluslararası toplum, Çin'in Kuzey Kore'ye baskı yapma ve nükleer sorunu kolayca çözme yeteneğine aşırı derecede güvenmiştir. Çin, Kuzey Kore'yi nükleer programının geliştirilmesinden vazgeçirmeye çalışırken, Kuzey Kore'nin nükleer bir güç olmasına da yardımcı olmuştur. Bu makale, Çin'in caydırıcılık stratejisinin bir müttefik olarak Kuzey Kore üzerinde güvenilir olup olmadığını incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Çin caydırıcılık stratejisi kapsamında birinci ve ikinci vuruşları gerçekleştirmeme ilkesine bağlı kalmaktadır. Rakipleri bu garantiyi müttefiklerine sağlarken, Çin Kuzey Kore'ye herhangi bir nükleer garanti sunmamıştır. ABD-Çin rekabeti bağlamında Çin, Tayvan, Güney Kore ve Güney Çin Denizi'ndeki çıkarlarından endişe duymaktadır. Çin için Kuzey Kore nükleer krizi hiçbir zaman birinci öncelik olmamıştır. İki ülke arasındaki ittifak ilişkisindeki güven eksikliği, Çin'in Kuzey Kore'yi nükleer silahlardan arındırma sürecini tamamlamaya ikna etmesini imkânsız hale getirmiştir. Bu nedenle, Çin'in caydırıcı gücü sonuçsuz kalmıştır. Bu güven eksikliği, Kuzey Kore'nin nükleer programını geliştirme motivasyonunu daha net olarak açıklamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

ABD, Kuzey Kore, Çin, Güney Kore, Caydırıcılık Teorisi

China's Perspective on North Korean Nuclear Policies in The Context of Deterrence Theory

Öz

Over the past 30 years, North Korea’s nuclear problem has posed one of the most significant and direct threats to the security, development, and stability in Northeast Asia. The efforts of the international community, including trilateral and six-party talks, sanctions, diplomatic efforts, and the more recent Singapore and Hanoi Summits, have so far failed to produce any tangible outcomes. The main objective of North Korea is to develop its nuclear program and openly produce nuclear weapons. The international community has placed undue reliance on China's ability to put pressure on North Korea and easily resolve the nuclear issue. To this end, while trying to get North Korea to forgo the development of its nuclear program, China also helped North Korea become a nuclear power. This article seeks to examine whether China’s deterrence strategy is reliable for North Korea. Under the Chinese deterrence strategy, China adheres to the principle of not launching the first and second strikes. While its rivals have provided it to its allies, China has not offered any nuclear guarantees to North Korea. In the context of the US-China rivalry, China is concerned about its interests in Taiwan, South Korea, and the South China Sea. For China, the North Korea nuclear crisis has never been a top priority. The lack of credibility in the alliance relationship between the two countries has made it impossible for China to convince North Korea to complete its denuclearization. Therefore, China's deterrent power has been inconclusive. This lack of credibility more clearly explains North Korea's motivation to develop its nuclear program.

Anahtar Kelimeler

The US, North Korea, China, UN, South Korea, Deterrence Theory

Kaynakça

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