FROM ARMED CONFLICT TO POLITICAL CONFLICT: TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS TRANSFORMED TO POLITICAL PARTIES

Yıl 2023, Cilt: 14 Sayı: 1, 188 - 214, 29.06.2023

Yaşar Pınar Özmen , Ruziye Tali

https://doi.org/10.54688/ayd.1242889

Öz

Terör örgütlerinin ve siyasi partilerin kullandıkları strateji farklı olmasına rağmen en belirgin ortak yanı siyasi bir hedefe sahip olmalarıdır. Terörizmin yaygın olduğu ülkelerde; yoksulluk, yolsuzluk, temsilde adaletsizlik, istikrarsızlık ve siyasal kurumların kapsayıcı olmadığı gözlenmektedir. Bir terör örgütünün şiddet eylemlerini terk edebilmesi için bu nedenlerin belli bir ölçüde ortadan kalkması gerekmektedir. Örgütlerin siyasi partiye dönüşmesi birçok yapısal ve stratejik faktörün bir araya gelmesi ile gerçekleşmektedir. Bu bağlamda, bir terör örgütünün yasal bir siyasi parti kimliğine dönüşmesinin nasıl ve hangi koşullarda gerçekleştiği çalışmanın konusunu oluşturmaktadır. Bunun için uzun bir tarihsel geçmişe ve önemli bir sosyolojik zemine sahip terör örgütleri karşılaştırmalı yöntemle incelenmiştir. Terör örgütlerinden siyasi partilere dönüşümün barış süreçleri ve kendi kendilerini fesih yoluyla gerçekleştiği gözlenmiştir. Terör örgütleriyle müzakerelerin başlaması; şiddetle herhangi bir çözüme varılamayacağının anlaşılması, örgütün zayıflaması, ciddi olarak uzlaşma ihtiyacının doğması, ulusal ve uluslararası kamuoyunun bu uzlaşmaya destek vermesi, çatışmayı motive eden faktörlerin çözümüne odaklanılması gibi benzer unsurların bir araya gelmesi ile mümkün olmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Çatışma, Terör Örgütü, Barış Süreci, Siyasi Parti, Siyasi Katılım, Conflict, Terrorist Organization, Peace Process, Political Party, Political Participation

FROM ARMED CONFLICT TO POLITICAL CONFLICT: TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS TRANSFORMED TO POLITICAL PARTIES

Öz

Although the strategy used by terrorist organizations and political parties is different, the most obvious thing in common is that they have a political goal. In countries where terrorism is widespread, it is observed that there are poverty, corruption, injustice in political representation, and instability, and non-inclusive political institutions. In order for a terrorist organization to abandon acts of violence, these reasons must be eliminated to a certain extent. The transformation of organizations into political parties takes place by combining structural and strategic factors. In this context, how and under what conditions a terrorist organization turns into a legal political party identity is the subject of this study. For this purpose, terrorist organizations with a long history and an important sociological basis are examined comparatively. It has been observed that the transformation to political parties takes place through peace processes and self-dissolution. Negotiations with terrorist organizations can start under a combination of conditions as follows; realizing that no solution can be reached with violence, weakening the organization, the emergence of a serious need for reconciliation, the support of the national and international public opinion for this reconciliation, focusing on the solution of the factors that motivate the conflict.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Conflict, Terrorist Organization, Peace Process, Political Party, Political Participation

Kaynakça

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