The Role of the Military in Democratic Transitions: The Cases of Egypt and Tunisia

Yıl 2025, Cilt: 16 Sayı: 1, 300 - 335, 30.06.2025

Ali Sarıhan

https://doi.org/10.54688/ayd.1532153

Öz

The people and protests significantly influence the collapse of autocratic regimes and the subsequent democratic transitions, but ultimately it is the armed structures of the countries, particularly the military, that often determine the outcome. This article aims to illustrate how both the strengths and weaknesses of the military can pose a threat to a successful democratic transition. For instance, in the case of Egypt, a powerful military may view the advent of democracy as a threat to its established authority, leading it to withdraw support from the government and potentially instigate a military coup, thereby obstructing the transition to democracy. Conversely, Tunisia's experience demonstrates that a weak military also presents challenges for democracy. In this context, a feeble military may lack the capacity to intervene or deter anti-democratic developments during the transition process, thereby stalling the democratic transition.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Tunisia , Egypt , Autocracy , Democratization , Civil-Military Relations

ASKERİN DEMOKRATİK GEÇİŞLERDEKİ ROLÜ: MISIR VE TUNUS ÖRNEKLERİ

Öz

Otokrat rejimlerin yıkılmasında ve sonrasında yaşanan demokratik geçişlerde halkın ve protestoların rolü çok büyük olmakla beraber, rejimlerin yıkılmasına veya halk ayaklanmalarının ne şekilde sonuç vereceğine karar veren genelde ülkelerin silahlı yapıları, yani askerler olmaktadır. Bu makalenin ana konusu, askerin güçlü olmasının da, zayıf olmasının da sağlıklı bir demokratik geçiş için tehlike arz ettiğini göstermektir. Mısır örneğiyle açıklandığı gibi güçlü askeri yapılar, demokrasinin gelmesini var olan gücünün elden gitmesi olarak algılayıp, sahip olduğu gücün verdiği güvenle iktidardan desteğini çekip dolaylı olarak veya doğrudan askeri bir darbe gerçekleştirerek, geçişin demokrasiye doğru değil antidemokratik bir yöne doğru evirilmesine neden olabilmektedir. Fakat Mısır’ın tam tersi, zayıf bir askeri yapıya sahip olan Tunus örneği de askerin zayıf olmasının demokrasi adına bir avantaj olmadığını göstermiştir. Çünkü askerin zayıflığı, askerin geçiş sürecindeki antidemokratik gelişmelere karşı müdahale etme veya engelleme yeteneğinden yoksun olmasına, dolayısıyla demokratik geçiş sürecinin durmasına sebep olabilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Tunus , Mısır , Otokrasi , Demokratikleşme , Sivil-Asker İlişkiler

Kaynakça

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