Russia’s Military Presence in Syria and Eastern Mediterranean and Its Effect to Middle East, 2000-2018

Öz

The Mediterranean basin, and especially the Eastern Mediterranean, has been evaluated a strategically important region since ancient times. This importance continues today because it is located at the junction of the maritime trade routes. Moreover, the Eastern Mediterranean region in particular is on the approach route to the southern part of the Russian territory, where the strategic depth is the least. Therefore, the Eastern Mediterranean is also militarily crucial for Russia, which wants to start the forward defense from this region in order to protect its lands. This study will examine the Russia’s interest in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Russian Federation
• Eastern Mediterranean
• Near Abroad Policy
• Syria
• Derzhavnost Policy

RUSYA’NIN SURİYE VE DOĞU AKDENİZ’DEKİ MEVCUDİYETİ VE BU DURUMUN ORTADOĞU’YA ETKİSİ, 2000-2018

Öz

Akdeniz havzası ve özellikle de Doğu Akdeniz ilk çağlardan bu yana stratejik açıdan önemli bir bölge olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Bu önem bugün de devam etmektedir zira Doğu Akdeniz, Karadeniz, Kızıldeniz, Hint Okyanusu ve Atlantik’ten gelen deniz ticaret yollarının birleşim noktasında yer almaktadır. Ayrıca özellikle Doğu Akdeniz bölgesi Rus topraklarının stratejik derinliğinin en az olduğu güney kısmına giden yol üzerindedir. Bu yüzden Doğu Akdeniz, topraklarının saldırılardan korunması adına ileri bölge savunmasını bu noktadan başlatmak isteyen Rusya için askerî açıdan da önemlidir. İşte bu çalışmada Rusya Federasyonu’nun Doğu Akdeniz’e olan ilgisi ve bu bölgenin Rusya açısından önemi incelenecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Rusya Federasyonu
• Doğu Akdeniz
• Yakın Çevre Politikası
• Suriye
• Derzhavnost Politikası

Kaynakça

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