CONSTRAINED PARLIAMENTARISM VERSUS SEMIPRESIDENTIALISM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

Yıl 2015, Cilt: 15 Sayı: 3, 179 - 200, 15.09.2015

Serhat Altınkök

Öz

This paper “focuses on the
systems of the constrained parliamentarism versus semipresidentialism and
linkage with the principle of the separation of powers. Additionally, what the
genesis of the principle of the separation of powers is and brief survey the
historical development of the theory handled in this article. More
specifically, whether it is possible to achieve successfully the democratic
values advanced by the principle of the separation of powers that prevent from
government tyranny and arbitrary government is the main question of this
inquiry. Furthermore, these core democratic values served by the principle of
the separation of powers be achieved in parliamentary” sys¬tems in the
framework of the theory of constrained parliamentarism and semipresidentialism
have been evaluated.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Separation of Powers, Democratic Values, Constrained Parliamentarism, Semipresidentialism, Juricentric Separation of Powers, Constitutionalized Autonomy, Constitutional Dictatorship

KUVVETLER AYRILIĞI İLKESİ BAĞLAMINDA YARIBAŞKANLIĞA KARŞI SINIRLANDIRILMIŞ PARLAMENTARİZM

Öz

Bu makale, yarı başkanlık
sistemine karşı sınırlandırılmış parlamentarizm sistemi ve bu sistemlerin
kuvvetler ayrılığı prensibi ile ilişkisine odaklanmıştır. Kuvvetler ayrılığı
ilkesinin kaynağı ve bu ilkenin tarihi gelişimi de makalede ayrıca ele
alınmıştır. Daha özelde ise idarenin zorbalığına ve keyfi yönetime karşı koruma
sağlayan kuvvetler ayrılığı prensibince ileri taşınan demokratik değerlerin
başarıyla gerçekleştirilip gerçekleştirilmediğinin incelenmesi bu araştırmanın
esas konusunu oluşturmaktadır. Bununla beraber, parlamenter sistemde kuvvetler
ayrılığı prensibinin hizmet ettiği temel demokratik değerler, sınırlandırılmış
parlamentarizm ve yarı başkanlık teorisi çerçevesinde değerlendirilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Kuvvetler ayrılığı, demokratik değerler, sınırlandırılmış parlamentarizm, yarı başkanlık, yargı odaklı kuvvetler ayrılığı, anayasal otonomi, anayasal diktatörlük

Kaynakça

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