Mısır’daki Temmuz 2013 askeri müdahalesine yönelik Amerikan söylemi ve AB politikasının bir analizi

Öz

Arap İsyanları, Mısır’daki Temmuz 2013 askeri müdahalesiyle bölgesel anlamda durma noktasına geldi. Askeri müdahale küresel aktörler için de onların demokrasi ve insan hakları gibi prensiplere ve normlara bağlılık düzeyi açısından bir meydan okuma teşkil etti. Bu makale, söylem analizi yönetimini kullanarak Mısır’daki askeri müdahaleye yönelik Amerikan söylemini analiz etmektedir. Söylem analizi, söylem ve bağlam arasındaki karşılıklı ve dönüşlü ilişkiye odaklanır, bu nedenle kaotik Mısır bağlamı, Amerikan dış politikası için iyi bir test niteliği taşımaktadır. Buna ek olarak, Arap İsyanları sürecindeki AB politikasından, AB’nin normatif karakteri nedeniyle ABD için bir karşılaştırma noktası olarak söz edilecektir. Söylem düzeyinde demokratik değerlere ve normlara verilen desteğe rağmen Amerikan dış politikası Mısır ve Mısır ordusuyla ortak çıkarlara dayalı uzun süreli ittifakı öncelemiştir. Askeri müdahalenin resmen “darbe” olarak isimlendirilmesinin siyasi sonuçlarının yanında Mısır ordusuna yapılan yardımın kesilmesi gibi hukuki sonuçları olacaktı. Uzun süreli ittifakın yanı sıra darbenin hukuki sonuçları, ABD’nin pozisyonunun Avrupalı ve bölgesel aktörler üzerindeki muhtemel etkileri ve ABD’nin güvenilir bir müttefik olma özelliğini koruma ihtiyacı gibi nedenler, ABD’yi temkinli bir söylem ve çıkar merkezli bir politikaya yöneltti. ABD’nin demokratik düzene dönülmesi yönündeki çağrısı, Mısır’daki askeri müdahalenin sonuçlarını kabul etmekle beraber demokrasi teşviki (promosyonu) söyleminin devam ettirileceği anlamına geliyordu. Diğer taraftan, Arap İsyanları sürecindeki AB politikaları da söylem ve eylem arasındaki bir boşluğu yansıtıyordu ve AB’nin normatif gücünü öne çıkarmasını sağlayacak bir başka fırsatın daha kaçırılmasıyla sonuçlandı. Sonuç olarak, Mısır’daki askeri müdahale Batılı aktörlerin normlar ve prensipler yerine çıkarlarını öncelediğini doğrulamış oldu.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Söylem
• Askeri Müdahale
• Mısır
• AB Politikası
• Demokrasi

An analysis of the US discourse and EU policy towards the July 2013 military intervention in Egypt

Öz

The Arab Uprisings in the regional sense came to a halt with the July 2013 military intervention in Egypt. The military intervention constituted a challenge for the global actors in terms of the level of their commitment to the principles and norms such as democracy and human rights. This article analyzes the US discourse towards the military intervention in Egypt by using the method of discourse analysis. Discourse analysis focuses on the reflexive relationship between discourse and context. Thus, the chaotic Egyptian context offers a good test for the US foreign policy. Furthermore, the EU policy during the Arab Uprisings will be addressed as a point of comparison for the US due to its normative character. Despite the support for democratic values and norms at the discursive level, the US foreign policy prioritized the longstanding alliance with Egypt and the Egyptian military based on shared interests. Naming the military intervention as a “coup” would lead to both political and legal consequences like cutting off the aid to the Egyptian military. In addition to the longstanding alliance, the legal consequences of a coup, possible effects of the US position on the European and regional actors as well as the need for keeping its reputation as a reliable ally contributed to cautious discourse and interest-based policy of the US. The US call for returning to a democratic order meant the acceptance of the results of the military intervention in Egypt and the maintenance of the discourse of “democracy promotion”. On the other hand, the EU policies during the Arab Uprisings also reflected a gap between rhetoric and practice, and they ended in another missed opportunity for asserting its normative power. As a result, the military intervention in Egypt confirmed the primacy of interests rather than norms and principles for the Western actors.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Discourse
• Military Intervention
• Egypt
• EU Policy
• Democracy

Kaynakça

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