FİNANSAL KRİZLERİN ÖNLENEMEMESİNDE ASİMETRİK BİLGİNİN ROLÜ

Ali Şen

doi:10.54860/beyder.1309864

FİNANSAL KRİZLERİN ÖNLENEMEMESİNDE ASİMETRİK BİLGİNİN ROLÜ

Öz

Asimetrik bilgi, finansal krizleri açıklayan yaklaşımlardan birisidir. Asimetrik bilgi yaklaşımına göre, kredi veren ve alan arasındaki bilgi asimetrisi finansal krizlerin temel nedenidir. Bilgi asimetrisinin varlığında ekonomiye enjekte edilen kaynaklar etkin olarak kullanılamayan alanlara akar. Bu çalışma, bu yaklaşımdan farklı olarak, finansal piyasalarda düzenleyici-denetleyici otorite ile düzenlenen-denetlenen aktörler arasındaki bilgi farklılığına dikkat çekmektedir. Çalışma, finansal krizlerin önlenememesinin en temel nedeninin bu bilgi asimetrisi olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Çalışmaya göre, düzenleyici otoritenin sahip olduğu eksik bilgi düzeyi, finansal piyasaların krize yol açabilecek riskli faaliyetleri için önlem alınmasını zorlaştırmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, alınan önlemlerin etkinsizliği, 2008’deki gibi, finansal krizlerin tekrarlanmasına neden olmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

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Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil

Türkçe

Konular

Uluslararası Finans

Bölüm

Araştırma Makalesi

Yazarlar

Ali Şen ^*
0000-0001-9359-3367
Türkiye

Erken Görünüm Tarihi

26 Haziran 2023

Yayımlanma Tarihi

14 Temmuz 2023

Gönderilme Tarihi

5 Haziran 2023

Kabul Tarihi

26 Haziran 2023

Yayımlandığı Sayı

Yıl 2023 Cilt: 18 Sayı: 1

DOI

https://doi.org/10.54860/beyder.1309864

IZ

https://izlik.org/JA89TS67WX

Kaynak Göster

RIS / Bibtex

APA

Şen, A. (2023). FİNANSAL KRİZLERİN ÖNLENEMEMESİNDE ASİMETRİK BİLGİNİN ROLÜ. Bilgi Ekonomisi ve Yönetimi Dergisi, 18(1), 21-32. https://doi.org/10.54860/beyder.1309864

AMA

1.Şen A. FİNANSAL KRİZLERİN ÖNLENEMEMESİNDE ASİMETRİK BİLGİNİN ROLÜ. BEYDER. 2023;18(1):21-32. doi:10.54860/beyder.1309864

Chicago

Şen, Ali. 2023. “FİNANSAL KRİZLERİN ÖNLENEMEMESİNDE ASİMETRİK BİLGİNİN ROLÜ”. Bilgi Ekonomisi ve Yönetimi Dergisi 18 (1): 21-32. https://doi.org/10.54860/beyder.1309864.

EndNote

Şen A (01 Temmuz 2023) FİNANSAL KRİZLERİN ÖNLENEMEMESİNDE ASİMETRİK BİLGİNİN ROLÜ. Bilgi Ekonomisi ve Yönetimi Dergisi 18 1 21–32.

IEEE

[1]A. Şen, “FİNANSAL KRİZLERİN ÖNLENEMEMESİNDE ASİMETRİK BİLGİNİN ROLÜ”, BEYDER, c. 18, sy 1, ss. 21–32, Tem. 2023, doi: 10.54860/beyder.1309864.

ISNAD

Şen, Ali. “FİNANSAL KRİZLERİN ÖNLENEMEMESİNDE ASİMETRİK BİLGİNİN ROLÜ”. Bilgi Ekonomisi ve Yönetimi Dergisi 18/1 (01 Temmuz 2023): 21-32. https://doi.org/10.54860/beyder.1309864.

JAMA

1.Şen A. FİNANSAL KRİZLERİN ÖNLENEMEMESİNDE ASİMETRİK BİLGİNİN ROLÜ. BEYDER. 2023;18:21–32.

MLA

Şen, Ali. “FİNANSAL KRİZLERİN ÖNLENEMEMESİNDE ASİMETRİK BİLGİNİN ROLÜ”. Bilgi Ekonomisi ve Yönetimi Dergisi, c. 18, sy 1, Temmuz 2023, ss. 21-32, doi:10.54860/beyder.1309864.

Vancouver

1.Ali Şen. FİNANSAL KRİZLERİN ÖNLENEMEMESİNDE ASİMETRİK BİLGİNİN ROLÜ. BEYDER. 01 Temmuz 2023;18(1):21-32. doi:10.54860/beyder.1309864