Asimetrik Bilgi Çerçevesinde 2008 Küresel Krizinin İncelenmesi

Öz

In this study, the relation between asymmetric information approach and the 2008 global crisis is analyzed. In this context, the role of asymmetric information on the factors that caused the global crisis is analyzed. According to the asymmetric information approach, global crisis is a situation that financial markets can not fully function due to the disruption of the information flow in the financial markets. According to the results of the analyzes, economical agents couldn't fully recognize that the global crisis had started because of the asymmetric information. Asymmetric information problem is observed in the factors that caused the global crisis such as governments bonds (guaranties), the monetary policy of the US Central Bank Fed, the belief of “too big to fail”, financial innovations and in the spreading of the crisis all over the world. Thus, it is important to analyze the global crisis in terms of asymmetric information in order not to have such an intensive global crisis again. When we especially consider the central role of the moral hazard on the factors that led to the financial crisis, the importance of regulations that can decrease the moral hazarI during the reconstruction process comes forward. Although asymmetric information approach is an important argument for describing the 2008 global crisis, it is also another finding that it is not capable of explaining the nature of the global crisis by itself alone.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Asymetric Information, Global Crisis, 2008 Global Crisis

ASİMETRİK BİLGİ ÇERÇEVESİNDE 2008 KÜRESEL KRİZİNİN İNCELENMESİ

Öz

Bu çalışmada asimetrik bilgi yaklaşımı ile 2008 küresel krizi arasındaki ilişki analiz edilmektedir. Bu bağlamda küresel krize neden olan faktörlerde asimetrik bilginin rolü incelenmektedir. Asimetrik bilgi yaklaşımına göre finansal kriz, finansal piyasalardaki bilgi akışının aksaması nedeniyle finansal piyasaların işlevini tam olarak yerine getiremediği bir durumdur. İnceleme sonuçlarına göre, ekonomik ajanlar tüm dünyayı etkisine alacak krizin başladığını asimetrik bilgi nedeniyle anlayamamışlardır. Asimetrik bilgi problemi hükümet garantileri, ABD Merkez Bankası Fed'in para politikası, batmayacak kadar büyük inanışı, finansal inovasyonlar gibi küresel krize yol açan faktörlerde ve krizin tüm dünyaya yayılmasında gözlemlenmektedir. Dolayısıyla küresel krizin asimetrik bilgi açısından değerlendirilmesi bir daha bu yoğunlukta bir krizin yaşanmaması açısından önemli olmaktadır. Özellikle krize yönlendiren faktörlerde ahlaki tehlikenin oynadığı merkezi rolü göz önüne aldığımızda, yeniden yapılanma sürecinde ahlaki tehlikeyi azaltacak düzenlemelerin önemi ortaya çıkmaktadır. Asimetrik bilgi yaklaşımı 2008 küresel krizin açıklanmasında önemli bir argüman olmakla beraber, küresel krizin doğasını açıklamada tek başına yeterli olmadığı da diğer bulgular arasındadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Asimetrik Bilgi, Küresel Kriz

Kaynakça

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