Optimal Demogrant: James M. Buchanan’s Constitutional “Social Transfer Expenditure Rule” Based on Generality Principle

Öz

This paper aims to explore James M. Buchanan’s demogrant proposal — a form of universal basic income to applied entire demographic group without discrimination — as a constitutional fiscal rule. Buchanan, the winner of the 1986 Nobel Prize in Economic Science, opposed day-to-day arbitrary political decisions and emphasized the importance of predictable rules that were determined in advance and made available to the public in the literature of “rules versus discretion” discussion. Buchanan argue that the generality principle (equal treatment under the law) should be applied to both taxation and expenditure policies. Buchanan's demogrant proposal is based on the “principle of generality” and this norm is defined together with the “principle of non-discrimination”. Buchanan's non-discriminationory democracy is only possible with the acceptance of general, abstract and binding constitutional rules.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Demogrant
• Universal basic income
• Generality principle
• Nondiscrimination principle
• Buchanan
• Welfare state

Optimal Demogrant: James M. Buchanan’ın Genellik İlkesini İhlal Etmeyen Anayasal “Sosyal Transfer Harcaması Kuralı” Önerisi

Öz

Bu makale James M. Buchanan'ın demogrant önerisini - ayrımcılık yapılmaksızın tüm demografik gruplara uygulanan evrensel temel gelir biçimi - anayasal bir mali kural olarak incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. 1986 Nobel Ekonomi Bilimi Ödülü sahibi Buchanan, günübirlik keyfi siyasi kararlara karşı çıkarak “kurallar karşı kararlar” tartışmalarının yer aldığı literatürde önceden belirlenmiş ve kamuoyuna açıklanmış öngörülebilir kuralların önemine vurgu yapmaktadır. Buchanan, genellik ilkesinin (kanun önünde eşitlik) hem vergilendirme hem de harcama politikalarına uygulanması gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Buchanan'ın demogrant önerisi "genellik ilkesi” dayanmaktadır ve bu norm “ayrımcılık yapmama ilkesi” ile birlikte tanımlanmaktadır. Buchanan'ın ayrımcılık karşıtı demokrasisi ancak genel, soyut ve bağlayıcı anayasal kuralların kabulüyle mümkündür.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Demogrant
• Evrensel temel gelir
• Genellik ilkesi
• Ayrımcılık yapılmaması ilkesi
• Buchanan
• Refah devleti

Kaynakça

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