Mullā Sadrā’s Philosophical Responses To Iblīs’s Doubts

Öz

In this article, the doubts that allegedly belonged to Iblīs, which was written by the author of “al-Milal wa al-Nihāl”, i.e. Shaharastānī, (d. 548/1153) was become subject of a small treatise written by Mullā Sadrā (ö. 1051/1640). In relation to Iblīs’s doubts, Tabātabāī made philosophical statements in his exegesis, al-Mizān. It is known that he did philosophy mostly in the line of Mullā Sadrā.

Iblīs, in the doubts it voiced, questions the purpose of his creation and the purpose in testing the creature. It also raises the challenges in the issue of free will. Iblīs also uses its ignorance as an excuse. It, concealing the necessary causal connections in the universal existence, argues that the obligation of sajda (prostration) might not have been imposed on him and so Adam might not have been expelled from heaven. According to it, if what it had said would have come true, we would have lived in a more perfect universe. God knows everything, and He is the Almighty. If Allah had willed, He would not create evil. Then there was no reason for the creation of Adam. In this case -according to him- the cause of evil in the world is Adam. However, if the cause of the evil were it itself, this would had been avoided by not imposing on it the obligation of sajda or by not creating it. Moreover, it was a clear injustice that it was left weak against Adam and his sons.

Mullā Sadrā stated that these doubts of Iblīs -contrary to the famous one– were clear evidence of its ignorance. First of all, Iblīs did not understand the current causality law in the universe. Since Iblīs did not know the place occupied by Adam in the pyramid of existence, it perceived him as “someone who was given a duty from outside to fulfill”. For this reason, Iblīs, who opposed all the prophets, was unaware of the ontological reflections of the issues of khilafah and walayah. This is because Iblīs –as the philosophers assert– expresses the particulars and the level of being able to achieve some relative benefits. However, Adam’s being taught names shows that he is a being who can reach the level of the intellect (al-mustafād) and know the truth of the existence. For this reason, even someone who has reached mid-level in the wisdom can answer doubts of Iblīs. 

In response to Iblīs’s doubts, Mullā Sadrā first states that the cause of creation is the essence of God and that no other goals can be imposed on God other than Himself. Accordingly, Iblīs also existed as a requirement of the divine grace. Secondly, the phenomenon of the test refers to the stages that existing beings went through while arising to the level of actual knowledge from the level of potential knowledge. In this sense, even if there are some negative results, what they gain is better than the fact that they remain in potential. Furthermore, the legal orders are relative situations involved in this process. This participation depends on preference of the beings possessing the power will. In other words, the positions of the responsible beings in the world and the Hereafter depend on their gains by the principle of causality. In addition, the emergence of dualities such as good and evil, in the conditions of the world, is a necessity of the nature of the world. For the life of the world requires the opposites of things in the material level. Additionally, evil, ignorance and the like are part of the order of the goodness and are the means to obtain many good deeds.

We know obviously that the arrogance Iblīs has fallen into is possible to happen to all the beings that has a self. Therefore, Iblīs looked at Adam with an ignorant look smashing the unity under the intoxicating attraction of being. For this reason, he could not comprehend the unity of existence and therefore he was arrogant by neglecting the existence of its interlocutor. This is an indication of its existence to be in the lower levels of existence. Iblīs could not comprehend the truth of matter in terms of its existent as a limited and created being. So Iblīs is not worthy to be in the highest levels of the pyramid of existence. That should be the cause of its being expelled. Actually, the arrogance that Iblīs is suffering from is the disease of those who do not understand the unity, dignity and kindness of existence.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Islamic Philosophy,Mullā Sadrā,adam,iblis,causality

İblis’in Şüphelerine Molla Sadrâ’nın Felsefî Cevapları

Öz

Bu makalede Şehristânî’nin (ö. 548/1153) el-Milel ve’n-Nihal adlı eserinde naklettiği İblis’e ait olduğu iddia edilen şüpheler, Molla Sadrâ’nın (ö. 1051/1640) yazdığı bir risale üzerinden konu edilecektir. Makaleyi önemli kılan şey, metafiziksel ilkelerin kelâm sahasında uygulanmasının bir örneğini incelemiş olmasıdır. İblis’in şüpheleri güncelliğini koruduğundan cevaplarının da güncellenmesi gerekmektedir. Sadrâ teist seviyede sorulan sorulara ancak metafizik çerçevede cevaplar verilmesi gerektiğini ima etmektedir. Sadrâ, İblis’in -meşhur olanın aksine- bilgisizliğinin kurbanı olduğunu dile getirmiştir. Ayrıca İblis, evrende cari olan nedensellik yasasını ve mevcudâtın varlık piramidindeki sıralanış prensibini kavrayamamıştır. Bu şüpheler âlemin niçin var olduğuna ve başlangıcına dairdir.  Bu şüphelere Molla Sadrâ’nın verdiği cevaplar; yaratılışın zorunluluğu, anlamı ve niçinliğini ele verebilecek mahiyettedir. “Niçin” sorusu, insanın anlam arayışını sağladığından din ve felsefenin de çıkış sorusudur. İblis’in sorduğu “niçin” soruları daha çok duyusal ve duygusal kökenliyken insanoğlunun “niçin” sorusu ise rasyonel kökenlidir. Bu makalede ileri sürülen temel sav, Zorunlu Varlık fikrinin idrakiyle âlemin keyfe keder bir takdirin sonucu değil de İlahi Zat’a bağlı zorunluluğun, aklın ve bilginin eseri olarak yaratıldığının kolayca anlaşıldığıdır. Ayrıca Âdem’in varlık piramidindeki üstün konumu ve bilgisinin fazlalığından dolayı halife olduğu da söylenebilir. İblis’in varlık mertebelerinin hepsini kuşatabilecek şümule sahip olmaması dolayısıyla İlahi Zat’ı tam olarak temsil etmesi mümkün değildir. Ve yine sadece vehme dayalı hükümler vermesi dolayısıyla İblis, yaratılışın sırrına erememiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• İslam Felsefesi,Molla Sadrâ,Âdem,İblis,Nedensellik

Kaynakça

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