Muhammad Husayn Tabatabai’s Demonstrations For Invalidating The Idea Of Vicious Circle And Infinite Regress

Yıl 2019, Cilt: 2019 Sayı: 37, 509 - 534, 30.04.2019

Fevzi Yiğit

https://doi.org/10.28949/bilimname.502389

Öz

One of the most important issues of philosophy is the problem of vicious cycle and infinite regress. As far as I could have found there are two studies, howover, in these two studies, the issue is approached more in terms of the science of Kalam. The problem of vicious circle and infinite regress is a part of the issue of causality. Because of the importance of the subject in the books written after al-Rāzî, the problem has been examined in independent chapters. Molla Sadrâ, in his Asfâr, examines the problem in detail by giving a large place to the demonstrations (burhân) used by the mutakallimûn (theologians).
The aim of the article is to draw attention to Tabatabaî and the issue of causality. Mutakallimûn have developed many demonstrations against the possibility of infinite regress. Among them is the burhan al-tatbiq that infinite both sides of a line and only one infinite side of a line are not equal to one another when the both lines are matched. These two directions are applied to each other in the direction of descending and ascending. Thus, the impossibility of the infinite direction is evident. As for the burhan al- tazayuf, it is based on the fact that the concepts of cause and effect are relative. If the causes and effects extend forever, they cannot end up in a first cause. If there is no existence of the first and last cause, the relative existence of the individuals as causes and effects in between cannot be realized. Another demonstration is that of burhan al-haysiyah. The fundamental thought of this demonstration is that the cause is prior to the effect. If one chain is that of causes and the other is that of effects and both are assumed to be two identical chains and then the both chains are considered in terms of their causes and effects, the first link of the chain of causes should be plus.
The leading thinkers of Sufi metaphysics were not interested in this issue as the concept of wahdat al-wujud is greying the distinction between illah and ma’lul and argues that there is no fundamental aspect other than the relative structure of multiplicity. Accordingly, the chain formed by the contingent ones would fall from a whole view that appears as the interconnection of discrete chain of elements to the level of the one’s substantial and accidental appearances. In this case, there is no need to go backwards in order to form the chain of existent and reach the first cause, since the cause of eternity within the eternity and the cause of the all existent now and in all times is the existent itself.
According to the definition of vicious circle adopted by Tabatabaî – understood as taken from Jurjani – that the existent of a thing depends on the existent of the thing itself. The vicious circle requires the existence of the thing to be based on itself and prioritize itself with its existence, since the existent of the cause is necessarily prior to the effect. The impossibility of vicious circle is close to the badihi (explicit) knowledge, since the vicious circle requires that the thing to exist before it exists. The impossibility of such a concept is obvious.
Tabatabaî, in his important philosophical books, investigates the issue under independent headings. In his Usûl al-falsafah wa al-manhaj al-wâqiyya, he refers to the demonstration adopted by Tûsî. He narrates the demonstration, called as “the shortest and the strongest demonstration”, adopted by al-Farabi and the bilateral demonstration build by Aristotle and developed by Ibn Sina. Besides, he develops a new demonstration, which was developed by Sadrâ, based on the principles of al-Hikma al-Muta’aliya (The Transcendental Wisdom).
The results obtained from these demonstrations briefly are as follow: al-Farabî's demonstration is based on the principle that the elements of the chain will not be able to come into existence without ground on a first cause. It is the first caused that is the basis of this demonstration which can also be called as a different interpretation of the principle of “from one comes out only one”. The existent of the first caused is the evidence for the existent of the first cause. Therefore, not every link can come into existence without the presence of a previous link. Consequently, since the chain is present, the existent of the first cause is necessary. Otherwise, it would be impossible for something to come into existence. The demonstration adopted by Ibn Sînâ’s can be interpreted as follows: It is not possible for all the chains that are lined up within the causal link and united in the existence and acquire the quality of reality in actuality to come into existence without having two sides.
Tabatabaî has developed the following demonstration: The existent of the caused one is connected to its cause and cannot exist on its own without the existent of its cause. The first cause has an independent existent and cause the effect to come into existence. If the cause is the caused of another third element, it loses its independence in proportion to the element above itself. If the chain continues so that it does not end in an independent cause on its own, it will be condemned to a level of a dependent existent. In other words, if a chain composed of causes and effects does not end in uncaused cause, it would not be possible for such a chain to come into existence, since it does not depend on independent cause.
This demonstration is, in one sense, a developed version of the distinction between necessary and contingent existents, while in another sense it includes al-Farabi’s demonstration. In this respect, if the first link in a chain that is within the causal link is dropped, such a chain would be scattered, since the whole chain clings to the rope of the first cause.

Muhammed Hüseyin Tabâtabâî’nin Kısır Döngü Ve Teselsülün İptalinde Kullandığı Burhanlar

Öz

Kısır döngü ve teselsül meselesi nedensellik konusunun bir parçasıdır. Bu iki mesele hakkında yazılan makale sayısı birkaç taneyle sınırlı olup bu çalışmalarda meseleye daha çok kelam ilmi açısından yaklaşılmıştır. Konunun öneminden dolayı Râzî’den sonra yazılan kelam kitaplarında bu konu bağımsız fasıllar içerisinde incelenmiştir. Tabâtabâî’nin felsefi olarak mensup olduğu ekolün kurucusu Molla Sadrâ, bu iki meseleyi Esfâr isimli eserinde kelamcıların burhanlarına da geniş yer vererek derinlemesine incelemiştir.
Makalenin amacı Tabâtabâî üzerinden nedensellik konusuna dikkatleri çekmektir. Tabatabaî, Usûl-i felsefetü vel-menhecü’l-vâkııyye, adlı eserinde konuyla ilgili olarak Tûsî’nin burhanına da işaret etmiştir. Tabatabaî; Bidâyetü’l-hikmet ve Nihâyetü’l-hikmet adlı eserlerinde, Farabî’nin ortaya koyduğu “en kısa ve sağlam” burhan diye isimlendirilen burhan ile Aristoteles’in inşa ettiği ve İbn Sînâ’nın geliştirdiği iki taraf burhanını nakletmiştir. Bununla beraber kendisi de Sadrâ’nın geliştirdiği el-Hikmetü’l Müteâliye (Aşkın Hikmet) kaidelerine dayanarak yeni bir burhan geliştirmiştir.
Tabatabaî’nin geliştirdiği burhan şöyledir: Malulün vücudu illetine nispetle bağıl (rabıt) bir vücut olup illeti olmaksızın kendi başına var olamaz. İllet ise bağımsız bir varlığa sahip olup malulü kaim kılıcıdır. Eğer ilk illet başka bir illetin malulü olursa bağımsızlığını kaybeder. Yani zincir kendi başına var olan bağımsız bir nedende sona ermezse bağımlı bir varoluş seviyesine mahkûm olur. Başka bir ifadeyle, illet ve malullerden oluşan bir zincir, kendisi malul olmayan bir illette sona ermezse varlığı bağımsız olup zinciri kaim kılacak bir nedene dayanmadığından var olamaz.

Anahtar Kelimeler

İslam Felsefesi, Tabâtabâî, Nedensellik, Kısır Döngü, Teselsül

Kaynakça

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