The Effect of Audit Committee Characteristics on Firm Conservatism Level: An Application in BIST

Öz

In this study, the relationship between the conservatism levels of companies determined as an indicator of financial reporting quality and the 5 basic audit committee characteristics (independence, financial expertise, size, tenure, number of meetings) is examined. In this context, panel data analysis is applied using 1180 observations obtained from 263 publicly-traded company between 2012 and 2016, and the audit committee characteristics are tested in relation to the companies' conservatism levels. As the research method, Basu Model, the most preferred method in the literature, is used. Findings show that while the audit committee size is positively related to conservatism, the number of meetings is negatively related to conservatism. The results show that if the number of members of the audit committee increases, it becomes more effective and increases the level of conservatism, thus raising the quality of financial reporting. On the other hand, if the audit committee meets more frequently during the period, the level of conservatism decreases and the quality of financial reporting decreases accordingly.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Audit Committee,Conservatism,Basu Model,Corporate Governance

Denetim Komitesi Özelliklerinin Firma İhtiyatlılık Düzeyine Etkisi: BİST’te Bir Uygulama

Öz

Bu çalışmada, finansal raporlama kalitesinin göstergesi olarak belirlenen şirketlerin ihtiyatlılık düzeyleri ile 5 temel denetim komitesi özelliği (bağımsızlık, finansal uzmanlık, boyut, görev süresi, toplantı sayısı) arasındaki ilişki incelenmiştir. Bu kapsamda, 2012-2016 yılları arasında BİST’te işlem gören 263 şirketten elde edilmiş 1180 adet gözlem kullanılarak panel veri analizi yapılmış ve denetim komitesi özelliklerinin şirketlerin ihtiyatlılık düzeyleri ile ilişkisi test edilmiştir. Araştırma yöntemi olarak literatürde en çok tercih edilen yöntem olan “Kar/Hisse Senedi Getirisi” modeli olarak ifade edilen Basu modeli kullanılmıştır. Bulgular, ihtiyatlılığın denetim komitesi boyutu ile pozitif, toplantı sayısı ile negatif ilişkili olduğunu göstermektedir. Sonuçlar, denetim komitesi üye sayısının artması durumunda, komitelerin daha etkin hale geldiğini ve firma ihtiyatlılık düzeyini arttırarak finansal raporlama kalitesinin yukarıya çektiğini göstermektedir. Buna karşın, denetim komitesinin dönem içinde daha sık toplantı gerçekleştirmesi durumunda firma ihtiyatlılık düzeyi düşmekte ve buna bağlı olarak finansal raporlama kalitesi azalmaktadır. 

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Denetim Komitesi,İhtiyatlılık,Basu Modeli,Kurumsal Yönetim.

Kaynakça

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