The Effects of Russia’s Great Power Eminence and Sovereign State Perception on the Balkans

Öz

At the end of the 20th century, all states over the world faced crucial changes and transformations in the perspective of the perception of sovereign state position and great power eminence. The position of sovereignty for a state means the struggle for its citizens’ rights, economic welfares and its fair governance. But, in spite of these changes and transformations, Russian leaders and policymakers have tried to maintain Russia’s position as a sovereign state and great power in the international system in the mind of the 19th century’s absolutist approach. Concurrently, these attitudes and behaviours of the leaders and policymakers have comprised a basis for Russia-the West conflict including China as a third party today. Russia puts forward absolutist regimes as its preference in the perception of its 21st century’s sovereign state and great power with its foreign policy applications and discourses. In this context, the aim of the article is to analyse Russia’s foreign and security policies in the Balkans by underlining its assertive great power and absolutist regime approaches.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Russia
• The Balkans
• Sovereign State
• Great Power

Rusya’nın Büyük Güç ve Egemen Devlet Algısının Balkanlar Üzerine Etkileri

Öz

Devletler, 20. yüzyılın sonlarında uluslararası sistemde egemen devlet ve büyük güç algısı açısından önemli değişim ve dönüşüm yaşamışlardır. Devlet için egemenlik durumu vatandaşların haklarının korunması, ekonomik refahlarının arttırılması ve kendisinin adil yönetimi anlamını taşımaktadır. Ancak söz konusu değişim ve dönüşüme rağmen Rus liderler ve karar alıcılar, Rusya’nın egemen devlet pozisyonunu ve büyük güç algısını uluslararası sistemde 19. yüzyılın mutlakiyetçi yaklaşımı ile korumaya çalışmaktadırlar. Rus liderlerin ve karar alıcıların bu davranışları ve tutumları aynı zamanda Çin’in de üçüncü taraf olarak yer aldığı Rusya-Batı çatışmasına temel oluşturmaktadır. Rusya, 21. yüzyıl egemen devlet ve büyük güç algısında mutlakiyetçi anlayışı tercih ettiğini dış politika söylemleri ve uygulamaları ile ortaya koymaktadır. Bu bağlamda çalışmanın amacı, Rusya’nın Balkanlara yönelik dış ve güvenlik politikalarını egemen devlet ve büyük güç algısı çerçevesinde analiz etmektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Rusya
• Balkanlar
• Egemen Devlet
• Büyük Güç

Kaynakça

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