HİBRİT SAVAŞ KAVRAMI VE RUSYA’NIN UKRAYNA’YA YÖNELİK HİBRİT SAVAŞ UYGULAMALARI

Öz

Bu çalışmanın amacı, hibrit savaş kavramını teorik ve pratik boyutlarıyla inceleyerek Rusya’nın Ukrayna’ya yönelik uygulamalarını analiz etmektir. Hibrit savaş; konvansiyonel askeri yöntemlerin siber saldırılar, dezenformasyon, ekonomik baskı ve psikolojik unsurlarla birlikte kullanıldığı, belirsizlik yaratmayı amaçlayan çok boyutlu bir stratejidir. Bu yönüyle 21. yüzyıl çatışmalarını anlamada önemli bir kavramsal çerçeve sunmaktadır. Çalışmada öncelikle hibrit savaşın teorik temelleri ele alınmış, ardından Rusya’nın Ukrayna’ya yönelik 2014 ve 2022 müdahaleleri örnek olay olarak incelenmiştir. Nitel araştırma yöntemi benimsenmiş ve örnek olay incelemesi tekniği kullanılmıştır. Analiz, askeri unsurlar, bilgi savaşı ve dezenformasyon, siber operasyonlar, ekonomik baskı ve vekil aktör kullanımı gibi boyutlar üzerinden yürütülmüştür. Bulgular, 2014 müdahalesinde Rusya’nın örtülü askeri güç, ayrılıkçı gruplar, propaganda ve siber saldırılar aracılığıyla belirsizlik yaratmayı hedeflediğini göstermektedir. 2022 müdahalesinde ise hibrit unsurlar devam etmekle birlikte konvansiyonel askeri gücün daha baskın hale geldiği, bilgi savaşı ve siber faaliyetlerin Ukrayna’nın artan direnci ve Batı desteği nedeniyle daha sınırlı etki yarattığı görülmüştür. Araştırmada Rusya’nın hibrit savaş stratejisinin sabit bir modelden ziyade değişen koşullara uyum sağlayan dinamik bir yapı sergilediği ortaya konulmuştur. Çalışmanın, gelecekte benzer çatışmaların yönetimi ve önlenmesi adına politika yapıcılar için yol gösterici olması ve ilgili akademik literatüre katkı sağlaması hedeflenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Hibrit Savaş
• Rusya
• Ukrayna
• Güvenlik.

THE CONCEPT OF HYBRID WARFARE AND RUSSIA’S HYBRID WARFARE PRACTICES TOWARDS UKRAINE

Öz

The aim of this study is to examine the concept of hybrid warfare from both theoretical and practical perspectives and to analyze Russia’s practices toward Ukraine. Hybrid warfare is defined as a multidimensional strategy that seeks to create ambiguity through the integrated use of conventional military methods alongside cyber attacks, disinformation, economic pressure, and psychological instruments. In this respect, it provides an important conceptual framework for understanding the nature of 21st-century conflicts. The study first addresses the theoretical foundations of hybrid warfare and subsequently examines Russia’s interventions in Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 as case studies. A qualitative research approach is adopted, and the case study method is employed. The analysis is conducted across several dimensions, including military elements, information warfare and disinformation, cyber operations, economic coercion, and the use of proxy actors. The findings indicate that in the 2014 intervention, Russia aimed to generate ambiguity through the use of covert military forces, support for separatist groups, propaganda activities, and cyber attacks. In contrast, while hybrid elements persisted in the 2022 intervention, conventional military power became more dominant, and information warfare and cyber activities produced more limited effects due to Ukraine’s increasing resilience and support from Western actors. The study concludes that Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy does not constitute a fixed model but rather exhibits a dynamic structure adaptable to changing conditions. It is intended that this study will contribute to the relevant academic literature and provide guidance for policymakers in the management and prevention of similar conflicts in the future.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Hybrid Warfare
• Russia
• Ukraine
• Security.

Kaynakça

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