İşletmelerin Kurumsal Yönetim Uygulamalarının Kâr Yönetimi Üzerindeki Etkisi ve Borsa İstanbul A.Ş. Şirketleri Üzerinde Bir Uygulama

Öz

Yıllardır kâr yönetimi uygulamaları nedeni ile yaşanan muhasebe skandalları, şirketlerin esnek muhasebe politikaları çerçevesinde hazırladıkları finansal raporlara olan güveni sarsmaktadır. Bu çerçevede kâr yönetimi uygulamalarını önlemede ve finansal raporların doğruluğunu teminat altına almada kurumsal yönetim uygulamaları temel unsur olarak görülmektedir. Çalışmanın amacı 2005-2010 yılları arasında BORSA İSTANBUL A.Ş.’ ye kote şirketlerin içsel kurumsal yönetim mekanizmaları ile kâr yönetimi arasındaki ilişkileri incelemektir. Analiz kısmında önce ihtiyari tahakkuklar hesaplanmıştır Bu amaçla kullanılan 4 farklı ihtiyari tahakkuk modelinin değişen varyans sorunları halledildikten sonra modeller dengeli havuzlanmış panel veri analizi tekniği ile tahminlenmiştir ve Türkiye de kâr yönetimini ölçen en iyi tahakkuk modeli “Larcker, Richardson Modeli” olarak tespit edilmiştir. Daha sonra kâr yönetimi katsayıları ile içsel kurumsal yönetim mekanizmaları arasındaki ilişki de panel veri analizi ile tahminlenmiştir. Çalışmanın analiz sonuçlarına göre kâr yönetimi uygulamalarını azaltan kurumsal yönetim mekanizmaları; yönetim kurulu ve denetim komitesindeki icracı olmayan üye sayısının çokluğu ile denetim komitesi üye sayısı olmuştur. Aktif büyüklüğü de kâr yönetimini arttıran bir unsur olarak tespit edilmiştir

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Kâr Yönetimi, Kurumsal Yönetim,İhtiyari Tahak

The Effect of Corporate Governance Applications on Earnings Management: An Application on Istanbul Stock Exchange

Öz

Earnings managements applied for many years in the framework of flexible accounting plocies of the companies has shaken the confidence towards business financial reports. In this framework, earnings management applications are considered as one of the basic factors which prevents earnings management applications and guarantee the accuracy of the business financial reports. This study examines the relationship between earnings management and the internal corporate governance mechanisms of the companies listed at the İstanbul Stock Exchange between the years 2005-2010. First of all, discretionary accruals were calculated. Four different discretionary accrual models have been employed to be able to calculate earnings management. After the fluxional varience problems of these models had been resolved, the models were anticipated by pooled balanced panel data analysis technique. And Larcker Richardson model has been determined as the best accrual model measuring earnings management in Turkey.Afterwords this study were analysed the relationship between earnings management and the internal corporate governance mechanisms According to the analysis results internal corporate governance mechanisms that reduce earnings management applications in company were determined as non-executive members of the board of directors and the audit committee and audit committee size. And asset size has been determined as increase of earnings management applications

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Earnings Management, Corporate Governance, Discretio

Kaynakça

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