A few months after he returned to office in
November 1991, Turkey’s then Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel confidently
predicted that the era of military coups in Turkey was over: ‘[F]or the time
being’, he opined, ‘neither the atmosphere of Turkey nor the atmosphere of the
world is suitable for a coup d’état’ (Evans, 1992, p. 106). Demirel’s
prediction turned out to be too optimistic, but it has to be said in his
defence that very few of the many observers of Turkish politics had expected
the traumatic events of the night of 15-16 July 2016. The AKP government
appeared to have made its peace with the generals, while President Erdoğan, in
spite of his quest for personal autocracy, retained substantial public support.
Hence, for most of us, the attempted takeover came like a bolt from the blue,
and still requires explanation. It also offered important comparisons with
previous coups in Turkey, both successful and unsuccessful, as well as with
global trends. In an attempt to address these issues this paper starts by
summarising some general theory on the nature of coups, as suggested in the
academic literature. This is followed by an outline of Turkey’s experiences
with military interventions since 1960. The next two sections, respectively,
relate the events of 15-16 July, as nearly as we currently know them, and try
to offer explanations for the failure of the coup. The final section addresses
some critical remaining questions, and speculates whether Süleyman Demirel’s
prediction has, at long last, been achieved.
Birincil Dil | İngilizce |
---|---|
Konular | Siyaset Bilimi |
Bölüm | Makaleler |
Yazarlar | |
Yayımlanma Tarihi | 3 Haziran 2018 |
Yayımlandığı Sayı | Yıl 2018 Cilt: 2 Sayı: 1 |