İZMİR’İN İŞGALİNDE İTALYA’NIN ROLÜ
Öz
İtalya, 1911-1912 Trablusgarp Harbi’nin ardından Osmanlı meseleleriyle daha
yakından alakalı olmuştur. Londra Antlaşması’yla İtalya’nın Birinci Dünya Harbi’ne
katılması, Anadolu ve Doğu Akdeniz üzerinde bir İtalyan nüfuz alanı kurma hayalini
cesaretlendirmiştir. Bir İtalyan topluluğuna da ev sahipliği yapan İzmir liman şehri, St
Jean de Maurienne Antlaşması yoluyla İtalyan iddialarının Britanya ve Fransa tarafından
tanınmasını sağlamak için başarılı bir şekilde mücadele eden İtalyan diplomasisinin açık
hedefiydi. Bu makalenin amacı, özellikle 15 Mayıs 1919’da Yunanların liderliğinde İzmir’in
İtilaf Devletler’ce işgaliyle sonuçlanan ve İtalyanların Anadolu planlarının başarısızlığının
başlangıcı olan siyasi olaylara odaklanarak Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun parçalanmasında
İtalya’nın rolü hakkında güncellenmiş tarihsel bir tablo sunmaktır. Çalışmada İtalyan
diplomatik kaynaklardan yararlanarak hem İtalya yayılmacı projeleri kapsamında İzmir’in
yeri hem de İtalyan yöneticilerin işgal algıları değerlendirilecektir.
Anahtar Kelimeler
THE ROLE OF ITALY IN THE OCCUPATION OF IZMIR
Abstract
This essay aims to offer an updated historical account of the Italian
involvement in the partition of the Ottoman Empire focusing specifically on the
events which led to the 15 May 1919 Greek-led interallied occupation of İzmir
and the beginning of the failure of the Italian claims in Anatolia. Through the
reading of the Italian diplomatic sources as well as existing historiography on
the subject, the essay attempts to evaluate the position of Izmir in the Italian
expansionist plans and to reconstruct the Italian leading cadre’s perception of
the occupation of the city.
After the end of the Italo-Turkish war of 1911-1912, Italy became more
directly involved in the Ottoman affairs. The Italian intervention in the Great
War following the signature of the London Pact encouraged the dream of
extending the country’s influence over Eastern Mediterranean and Anatolia.
However, the treaty was extremely vague as regards to Italian future territorial
gains. As the rumors about the Sykes-Picot Treaty reached Italian authorities,
a more incisive diplomatic action supporting Italian expansionism took place.
Moreover, between 1916 and 1917 emerged a broad movement of public
opinion, which included liberals, conservative as well as nationalist writers,
calling for a ‘minimum program’ of colonial claims in the Balkans, in Africa and
Anatolia as well. In this light the so called ‘Franchetti memorandum’, signed
by prominent intellectuals and civil servants, demanded the establishment of
a direct rule on all the port-cities in Southern and Western Anatolia, including
İzmir, which hosted a relevant Italian community. During the hard negotiations
led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sidney Sonnino at St. Jean de Maurienne
on 26th April 1917, Italy obtained the recognition of its claims on Antalya, Konya
and İzmir by Great Britain and France on the condition of Russian approval.
Significantly, after the October Revolution and Russian withdrawal from the
conflict and the end of the war, the Entente refused to recognize the Italian
claims. At the same time, the British plan to assign the administration of İzmir
to Greece, which struggled for the realization of the ‘Megali Idea’ (Great Idea),
provoked a deep resentment and the reorientation of Italian policy toward the
Ottomans. In other words, when it was clear that the Entente Powers would not
support its colonial claims in Anatolia, Italy started a more pro-Turkish policy
which aimed to counter the Greek claims on western Anatolia. The new Italian
Fulvio BERTUCCELLI
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ÇTTAD, XXIII/46, (2023/Bahar)
attitude aimed to legitimize Italy as an ‘impartial’ power, rather than a colonial
one, willing to protect Muslims’ interests against the Greek ambitions. The
occupation of Antalya on 28th March 1919 without getting the approval of the
other Entente powers must be seen in the framework of this independent policy.
However, this Italian unilateral step, along with the controversies regarding the
future of Fiume/Rijeka, led to a downturn in the relation with the allies and
to the retirement of Italy from the Paris Peace Conference on 24th April 1919.
Retrospectively it is indeed clear that the Italian invasion of Antalya faced the
country with the danger of diplomatic isolation and had no other result than
that of speeding-up the British-backed Greek plan to gain the control of İzmir.
After the return of the Italian delegation to the Peace Conference, Italy had no
choice than to reluctantly endorse the decision to allow the Greek-led interallied
occupation of İzmir on 15th May 1919.
Although the Greek occupation of the city involved a loss of prestige
of Italy in the eyes of Ottoman public opinion, in the framework of the Greek-
Italian propaganda war the Italian authorities carefully documented the Greek
atrocities against the city’s Muslim population. However, the resignation of the
cabinet led by Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, which led to that of Sidney Sonnino
from the office of Minister Foreign Affairs, opened an even more difficult stage
in the relations between Italy and the other victorious powers. The aggressive
declarations by the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tommaso Tittoni, who
stated that Italy was going to follow an uncompromising policy provoked a harsh
reaction by the United States, Great Britain and France whose representatives
issued a memorandum which strongly condemned Italy’s unilateral attitude.
Faced once again with the concrete danger of international isolation, Tittoni,
reached an agreement with Greek Prime Minister Venizelos which contradicted
the policy Italy had followed so far. Even if the so-called Tittoni-Venizelos
agreement did not stop the ongoing propaganda activities against Greece, it
showed the inconsistency of the Italian colonial claims in Anatolia. In other
words, Italy remained posed between expansionist ambitions and the lack of
military and financial resources to realize them.
Keywords
