A DUTCH AUCTION METHOD ANALYSIS AND MARKOV CHAIN APPLICATION ON WEB BASED USED-CAR MARKET

Öz

In this age internet is used as a market platform in which buyers and sellers convene and the price is transparently shared with everyone. The Dutch auction builds up a substantial marketing mechanism particularly for the sale of products which have durability problems. The pricing mechanism in which appeared in web based sales of second hand cars and Dutch auction overlap when some circumstances are considered. On the other hand, in regard to future situation the Markov chain that enables the estimation with sizably limited data makes it possible to analyze the Dutch auction mechanism mathematically. Designed Markov model indicates that price-cutting in web based sales of second hand cars will end after a few times.

Keywords: Dutch Auction, Markov Chains, Used-Car Market.

HOLLANDA TİPİ AÇIK ARTIRMA YÖNTEMİ İLE BİR İNTERNET TABANLI İKİNCİ EL OTOMOBİL PİYASASI ANALİZİ VE MARKOV ZİNCİRİ UYGULAMASI

Öz

Günümüzde internet üzerinden satışlar, alıcılar ile satıcıların buluştuğu, fiyatın şeffaf olarak herkes ile paylaşıldığı bir mecra olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Hollanda Tipi Açık Artırma yöntemi ise özellikle değeri zamana karşı duyarlı metaların satışında oldukça önemli bir pazarlama mekanizması oluşturmaktadır. İnternet üzerinden yapılan ikinci el otomobil satışlarında ortaya çıkan fiyatlama mekanizması ile Hollanda Tipi Açık Artırma yöntemi, bazı durumlar dikkate alındığında örtüşmektedir. Diğer yandan gelecekteki duruma dair oldukça kısıtlı verilerle tahminleme imkânı sunan Markov Zinciri, bu mekanizmanın incelenmesi için önemli bir matematiksel zemin sunmaktadır. Oluşturulan Markov modeli, internet üzerinden gerçekleşen ikinci el otomobil satışlarındaki fiyat indirimlerinin birkaç tekrardan sonra gerçekleşmeyeceğini göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Hollanda Tipi Açık Artırma, Markov Zinciri, İkinci El Otomobil Piyasası.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Hollanda Tipi Açık Artırma, Markov Zinciri, İkinci El

Kaynakça

1. Akyurt, İ. Z. (2005). Markov zincirleri ve trafik sigortası hasarsızlık indirimi veya zamlı prim sisteminin Markov Zinciri ile ifade edilerek analiz edilmesi. Yayınlanmış Yüksek Lisans Tezi. İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü İşletme Anabilim Dalı, İstanbul.
2. Akyurt, İ. Z. (2011). Ülke derecelendirme sisteminin Markov Zinciri İle analizi. Yönetim Dergisi, 22 (69): 45-60.
3. Auction Theory (2014). http://www.myoops.org/cocw/mit/NR/rdonlyres/ Engineering-Systems-Division/ESD-260JFall2003/2CECCCEB-0165-42A3-B86A-B4BBA5A6930B/0/l18ch22auctheory.pdf, (28.04.2014).
4. Auctusdev (2004). http://www.auctusdev.com/auctiontypes.html, (29.04.2014).
5. Bonet, M. J. ve Pesendorfer, M. (2014). Optimal sequential auctions. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 33: 61-71.
6. Buchanan, J. A., Gjerstad, S. ve Porter, D. (2012). Information effects in multi-unit Dutch auctions. Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, Working Paper No.12-08.
7. Byers, J. W., Mitzenmacher, M., ve Zervas, G. (2010). Information asymmetries in pay-per-bid auctions. EC'10 Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Electronic commerce, 7-11 Haziran 2010, Harvard University, Massachusetts.
8. Carare, O. ve Rothkopf, M. (2001). Slow Dutch auction. Management Science, 51 (3): 365-373.

9. Chen, C. H. ve Ishida, J. (2013). Auctions versus negotiations: The role of price discrimination. The Institute of Social and Economic Research Osaka University. Discussion Paper No. 873
10. Ching, W. K. ve Ng, M. K. (2006). Markov chains: Models, algorithms and applications. Springer Science and Business Media, Inc.
11. Choo, E. (2005). Going Dutch: The Google IPO. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 20 (1): 405-441.
12. Cox, J. C., Roberson, B., ve Smith, V. L. (1982). Theory and behavior of single unit auctions. Research in Experimental Economics, 2: 1-43.
13. Ding, M., Eliashberg, J., Huber, J. ve Saini, R. (2005). Emotional bidders - An analytical and experimental examination of consumers' behavior in a priceline - like reverse auction. Management Science, 51 (3): 352-364.
14. “Dutch Auction”. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dutch_auction, (29.04.2014).
15. Easley, D. ve Kleinberg, J. (2010). Networks, crowds, and markets: Reasoning about a highly connected world. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
16. Ecommerce-digest. http://www.ecommerce-digest.com/auctions.html, (29.04.2014).
17. Feldman, M., Fu, H., Gravin, N. ve Lucier, B. (2013). Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient. The 45th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 1-4 Haziran 2013, Palo Alto, Kaliforniya, ABD.
18. Fibich, G., Gavious, A., ve Sela, A. (2004). Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 115 (2): 309-321.
19. Fink, G. A. (2008). Markov models for pattern recognition: Advances in computer vision and pattern recognition. London: Springer Science and Business Media, Inc.
20. Fluvià, M., Garriga, A., Torrent, R. R. ve Carámbula, E. R. (2012). Buyer and seller behavior in fish markets organized as Dutch auctions: Evidence. Fisheries Research, 127-128: 18-25.
21. Göktürk, O. (2008). Multi unit auctions: A literature review. http://www.ekonomi.gov.tr/upload/bf09ae98-d8d3-8566-4520b0d124e5614d/ osman_gokturk.pdf, (29.04.2014).
22. Katehakis, M. N. ve Puranam, K. S. (2012). On bidding for a fixed number of items in a sequence of auctions. European Journal of Operational Research, 222 (1): 76-84.
23. Klemperer, P. (1999). Auction theory: A guide to the literature. Journal of Economic Surveys, 13 (3): 227-286.
24. Klemperer, P. (2000). Why every economist should learn some auction theory. Economics Series Working Papers. https://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/ doornik/eswc2000/seattle.pdf, (29.04.2014).
25. Krishna, V. (2002). Auction theory. San Diego: Academic Press.
26. Lee, J. (2006). Emprical analysis of wholesale used car auctions. Los Angeles: University of California.
27. McAffe, R. P. ve McMillan, J. (1987). Auctions and bidding. Journal of Economics Literature, 25 (2): 699-738.
28. Milgrom, P. (2004). Putting auction theory to work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
29. Milgrom, P. ve Weber, R. (1982). A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometric, 50 (5): 1089-1122.
30. Mishra, D. ve Parkes D. C. (2009). Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 66 (1): 326-347.
31. Mishra, D. ve Garg, R. (2003). Descending price multi-item auctions. IBM Research Report, Subject: Computer Science, 06.
32. Muchnik, L. ve Solomon, S. (2007). Markov nets and the NatLab platform: Application to continuous double auction. Complexity Hints for Economic Policy, 157-180.
33. Myerson, R. B. (1981). Optimal Auction Design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6 (1): 58-73.
34. Nakajima, D. (2011). First-price auctions, Dutch auctions and buy-it-now prices with Allais paradox bidders. Theoretical Economics, 6 (3): 473-498.
35. Otomotiv Distribütörleri Derneği (2014). Dünya otomotiv üretimi raporu, 2014 1.Çeyrek, İstanbul.
36. Otomotiv Distribütörleri Derneği (2014). Genel değerlendirme raporu Nisan 2014. Sektörel değerlendirme raporu, İstanbul.
37. Öz, E. (2009). İstanbul Menkul Kıymetler Borsası üzerine saklı Markov modeli ile bir tahminleme. Ekonomik Yaklaşım Dergisi, 20 (72): 59-85.
38. Öztürk, A. (2012). Yöneylem araştırması. Bursa: Ekin Yayınevi.
39. Park, S., Durfee, E. H. ve Birmingham, W. P. (2004). Use of Markov chains to design an agent bidding strategy for continuous double auctions. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 22 (1): 175-214.
40. Park, S., Durfee, E. H. ve Birmingham, W. P. (1999). An adaptive agent bidding strategy based on stochastic modeling. 3rd Annual Conference Autonomous Agents, 1-5 Mayıs 1999, Washington, ABD.
41. Parsons, S., Rodriguez, J. A. ve Klein, M. (2011). Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 43 (2): 1-66.
42. Radivojevic, T., Anselmi, J. ve Scalas, E. (2014). Ergodic transition in a simple model of the continuous double auction. Plos One, 9 (2): 88-95.
43. Rasmusen, E. B. (2006). Strategic implications of uncertainty over one's own private value in auctions. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter. 6 (1): 1-22.
44. Riley, J. G. ve Samuelson, W. F. (1981). Optimal auctions. The American Economic Review, 71 (3): 381-392.
45. Schrader, L. F. ve Henderson, D. R. (1980). Auction pricing: Options and implications’. Encyclopedia of Economics and Business: İçinde 1-15. New York, ABD.
46. Scott, F. ve Laran, J. (2009). Implications of expected changes in the seller’s price in name-uour-own-price auctions. Management Science, 55 (11): 1783-1796.
47. Segev, A., Beam, C. ve Shanthıkumar, J. G. (2001). Optimal sesign of internet-based auctions. Information Technology and Management, 2 (2): 121-163.
48. Shachat, J. ve Wei, L. (2012). Procuring commodities: First-price sealed-bid or English auctions?. Marketing Science, 31 (2) : 317-333.
49. Shi, J. ve Chang, A. (2009). Revenue and duration of oral auction. J.Service Science & Management, 2 (4): 368-377.
50. Shneyerov, A. (2012). An optimal slow Dutch auction. https://www.economics.mcmaster.ca/documents/seminars/dutch-1.pdf, (30.05.2014).
51. Sundar, D. K. ve Kumar, K. R. (2001). Learning algorithms for price control in an internet-based Dutch auction. Bangalore: Indian Institute of Management Bangalore.
52. TÜİK (2014). “Motorlu Kara Taşıtları, Mart 2014”. Haber Bülteni. http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=15897, (30.04.2014).
53. Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 16 (1): 8-37.
54. Vries, S. ve Vohra, R. V. (2003). Combinatorial auctions: A survey. INFORMS Journal on Computing, 15 (3): 284-309.
55. Wolfstetter, E. (1999). Topics in microeconomics: Industrial organization, auctions, and incentives. New York, USA: Cambridge University Press.
56. Wurman, P. R., Wellman, M. P. ve Walsh, W. E. (1998). The Michigan internet auctionbot: A configurable auction server for human and software agents. Second International Conference on Autonomous Agents, 10-13 Mayıs 1998, Minneapolis, ABD.