Platon’da ‘Doğru İnanç ve Tekilleşme (Individuation)’ Olarak Bilgi

Yıl 2018, Sayı: 14, 235 - 258, 14.12.2018

Eda Çakmakkaya

Öz

Platon, Devlet’in beşinci kitabında, nesnenin farklı tipleri üzerinde farklı şekilde işleyen iki farklı bilişsel yetiyi birbirindenayırır: bilgi ve inanç. Devlet’in altıncı kitabında ise, Platon’un bu açıklaması üzerinde değişiklik yaparak, farklı koşullar altındabilgi ya da inanç olarak davranan tek bir biliş yetisiolduğunu iddia ettiğini ileri süreceğim. Doğru inancın bilgiye dönüştüğü bu koşulların, nesnenin doğasını ve ontolojik statüsünü ortaya çıkaran, inancın nesnesinin tekilleşmiş (individuation) açıklamasınınhükmü olduğunu göstereceğim. Platon doğru inancın nesnesinin tekil açıklamasının birçok alternatif yolunu araştırır. Çalışmamı doğru inancın bilgiye dönüşmesinin koşulunu yerine getirecek olan tekilleşmenin teleolojik açıklamasının Platonik taslağı ile sonlandıracağım.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Platon, Epistemoloji, Bilgi, Tekilleşme

Knowledge as 'True Belief Plus Individuation' in Plato

Öz

In RepublicV, Plato distinguishes two differentcognitive powers, knowledge and belief, which operate differently on different typesof object. I argue that in Republic VI Plato modifies this account, and claims that there is a singlecognitive power, which under different circumtancesbehaves either as knowledge or as belief. I show that the circumtances which turn true belief into knowledge are the provision of an individuation accountof the object of belief, which reveals the ontological status and the nature of the object. Plato explores many alternative candidates of individuation accounts of objects of true belief, which he discards. I conclude with a Platonic sketch of a teleological account of individuationwhich would satisfy his requirements of turning true belief into knowledge. 

Anahtar Kelimeler

Plato, Epistemology, Knowledge, Individuation

Kaynakça

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