Öz
Dünya ile ilgili yargılar oluştururken, sadece gözlem yapmak ve matematikte kullandığımız tümdengelimsel akıl yürütmelere başvurmak yeterli değildir. Dünya ile ilgili inançlarımız açısından tümevarımsal akıl yürütmeler anahtar konumdadır. Goodman’ın bilmecesi göstermektedir ki kullanılan dil de gözlem yapma ve akıl yürütme yeteneklerimiz kadar önemlidir. Zümrütlerle ilgili deneyimlerimizi yeşil yerine grue yüklemi ile ifade ettiğimizde aynı öncüllerden farklı sonuçlara ulaşmaktayız. Bir nesnenin grue olması onun 2024 öncesinde yeşil, 2024 sonrasında mavi olduğu anlamına gelmektedir. Şu ana kadar gördüğümüz zümrütlerin grue olduklarını söylemek de yeşil olduklarını söylemek de doğrudur. Ancak, bir genelleme yapmamız gerektiğinde bu iki yüklem bizi doğruluk koşulları farklı olan önermelere götürmektedir. Yeşil gibi tümevarımda kullanılabilecek yüklemleri, grue gibi tümevarımda kullanılamayacak yüklemlerden ayırmanın bir yolu var mıdır? Gärdenfors, çözüm olarak, yüklemlerimizin topolojik bir modelini öne sürmektedir. Yüklemler topolojik yapının belirli bölgelerine karşılık gelmektedirler. Eğer karşılık gelinen bölge konveks ise yüklem tümevarımsal akıl yürütmede kullanılmaktadır. Bu çalışmada Gärdenfors’un modelinin Goodman’ın ortaya attığı sorunu çözmediği iddia edilmektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler
Tümevarımın yeni bilmecesi Nelson Goodman Peter Gärdenfors Dil seçimi Rudolf Carnap
Kaynakça
- Carnap, R. (1935). Philosophy and Logical Syntax. London: Routledge.
- Carnap, R. (1947). On the Application of Inductive Logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, s. 133-148.
- Elgin, C. (1995). Unnatural Science. The Journal of Philosophy, s. 289-302.
- Gärdenfors, P. (2000). Conceptual Spaces. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Gärdenfors, P. (2005). The Dynamics of Thought. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Gärdenfors, P. (2017). The Geometry of Meaning Semantics Based on Conceptual Spaces. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Goodman, N. (1946). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Goodman, N. (1972). Problems and Projects. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Hájek, A. (2019). Interpretations of Probability. E. Zalta (Dü.) içinde, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford Univerity. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/probability-interpret adresinden alındı
- Hawthorne, J. (2021). Inductive Logic. E. Zalta (Dü.) içinde, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
- Hume, D. (2016). İnsanın Anlama Yetisi Üzerine Bir Soruşturma. (F. Aydar, Çev.) İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür.
- Lewis, D. (1983). New Work For a Theory of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, s. 343-377.
- Mill, J. S. (1846). System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers.
- Peirce, C. S. (1955). The General Theory of Probable Inference. J. Buchler içinde, Philosophical Writings of Peirce (s. 190-217). New York: Dover Publications.
- Quine, W. (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review, 20-43.
- Quine, W. (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Quine, W. V. (1969). Natural Kinds. W. Quine içinde, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (s. 114-138). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Sider, T. (2001). Four Dimensionalism An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Stalnaker, R. (1979). Anti-Essentialism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, s. 343-355.
Öz
Anahtar Kelimeler
Kaynakça
- Carnap, R. (1935). Philosophy and Logical Syntax. London: Routledge.
- Carnap, R. (1947). On the Application of Inductive Logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, s. 133-148.
- Elgin, C. (1995). Unnatural Science. The Journal of Philosophy, s. 289-302.
- Gärdenfors, P. (2000). Conceptual Spaces. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Gärdenfors, P. (2005). The Dynamics of Thought. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Gärdenfors, P. (2017). The Geometry of Meaning Semantics Based on Conceptual Spaces. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Goodman, N. (1946). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Goodman, N. (1972). Problems and Projects. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Hájek, A. (2019). Interpretations of Probability. E. Zalta (Dü.) içinde, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford Univerity. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/probability-interpret adresinden alındı
- Hawthorne, J. (2021). Inductive Logic. E. Zalta (Dü.) içinde, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
- Hume, D. (2016). İnsanın Anlama Yetisi Üzerine Bir Soruşturma. (F. Aydar, Çev.) İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür.
- Lewis, D. (1983). New Work For a Theory of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, s. 343-377.
- Mill, J. S. (1846). System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers.
- Peirce, C. S. (1955). The General Theory of Probable Inference. J. Buchler içinde, Philosophical Writings of Peirce (s. 190-217). New York: Dover Publications.
- Quine, W. (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review, 20-43.
- Quine, W. (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Quine, W. V. (1969). Natural Kinds. W. Quine içinde, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (s. 114-138). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Sider, T. (2001). Four Dimensionalism An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Stalnaker, R. (1979). Anti-Essentialism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, s. 343-355.
Öz
Anahtar Kelimeler
Kaynakça
- Carnap, R. (1935). Philosophy and Logical Syntax. London: Routledge.
- Carnap, R. (1947). On the Application of Inductive Logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, s. 133-148.
- Elgin, C. (1995). Unnatural Science. The Journal of Philosophy, s. 289-302.
- Gärdenfors, P. (2000). Conceptual Spaces. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Gärdenfors, P. (2005). The Dynamics of Thought. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Gärdenfors, P. (2017). The Geometry of Meaning Semantics Based on Conceptual Spaces. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Goodman, N. (1946). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Goodman, N. (1972). Problems and Projects. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Hájek, A. (2019). Interpretations of Probability. E. Zalta (Dü.) içinde, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford Univerity. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/probability-interpret adresinden alındı
- Hawthorne, J. (2021). Inductive Logic. E. Zalta (Dü.) içinde, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
- Hume, D. (2016). İnsanın Anlama Yetisi Üzerine Bir Soruşturma. (F. Aydar, Çev.) İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür.
- Lewis, D. (1983). New Work For a Theory of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, s. 343-377.
- Mill, J. S. (1846). System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers.
- Peirce, C. S. (1955). The General Theory of Probable Inference. J. Buchler içinde, Philosophical Writings of Peirce (s. 190-217). New York: Dover Publications.
- Quine, W. (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review, 20-43.
- Quine, W. (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Quine, W. V. (1969). Natural Kinds. W. Quine içinde, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (s. 114-138). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Sider, T. (2001). Four Dimensionalism An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Stalnaker, R. (1979). Anti-Essentialism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, s. 343-355.
Öz
Anahtar Kelimeler
Kaynakça
- Carnap, R. (1935). Philosophy and Logical Syntax. London: Routledge.
- Carnap, R. (1947). On the Application of Inductive Logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, s. 133-148.
- Elgin, C. (1995). Unnatural Science. The Journal of Philosophy, s. 289-302.
- Gärdenfors, P. (2000). Conceptual Spaces. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Gärdenfors, P. (2005). The Dynamics of Thought. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Gärdenfors, P. (2017). The Geometry of Meaning Semantics Based on Conceptual Spaces. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Goodman, N. (1946). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Goodman, N. (1972). Problems and Projects. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Hájek, A. (2019). Interpretations of Probability. E. Zalta (Dü.) içinde, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford Univerity. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/probability-interpret adresinden alındı
- Hawthorne, J. (2021). Inductive Logic. E. Zalta (Dü.) içinde, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
- Hume, D. (2016). İnsanın Anlama Yetisi Üzerine Bir Soruşturma. (F. Aydar, Çev.) İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür.
- Lewis, D. (1983). New Work For a Theory of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, s. 343-377.
- Mill, J. S. (1846). System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers.
- Peirce, C. S. (1955). The General Theory of Probable Inference. J. Buchler içinde, Philosophical Writings of Peirce (s. 190-217). New York: Dover Publications.
- Quine, W. (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review, 20-43.
- Quine, W. (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Quine, W. V. (1969). Natural Kinds. W. Quine içinde, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (s. 114-138). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Sider, T. (2001). Four Dimensionalism An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Stalnaker, R. (1979). Anti-Essentialism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, s. 343-355.
Öz
Observation and deduction alone are not enough to make judgments about the world. Inductive reasoning is key to our beliefs about the world. Goodman’s riddle shows that language is just as important as our ability to observe and reason. When we express our experiences with emeralds with the predicate grue instead of green, we arrive at different conclusions from the same premises with the same reasoning. An object is grue if and only if it is green before 2024, and blue after 2024. It is true to say that the emeralds we have seen so far are both grue and green. However, when we make inductions, these two predicates lead us to propositions with different truth conditions. Is there a way to separate predicates that can be used inductively, such as green, from those that cannot be used inductively, such as grue? To overcome this problem, Gardenfors proposes a topological model of our predicates. Predicates correspond to certain regions of the topological structure. If the corresponding region is convex, the predicate is used in inductive reasoning. In this study, it is claimed that Gardenfors’ model does not solve the problem posed by Goodman.
Anahtar Kelimeler
New riddle of induction Nelson Goodman Peter Gärdenfors Language choice Rudolf Carnap
Kaynakça
- Carnap, R. (1935). Philosophy and Logical Syntax. London: Routledge.
- Carnap, R. (1947). On the Application of Inductive Logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, s. 133-148.
- Elgin, C. (1995). Unnatural Science. The Journal of Philosophy, s. 289-302.
- Gärdenfors, P. (2000). Conceptual Spaces. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Gärdenfors, P. (2005). The Dynamics of Thought. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Gärdenfors, P. (2017). The Geometry of Meaning Semantics Based on Conceptual Spaces. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Goodman, N. (1946). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Goodman, N. (1972). Problems and Projects. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Hájek, A. (2019). Interpretations of Probability. E. Zalta (Dü.) içinde, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford Univerity. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/probability-interpret adresinden alındı
- Hawthorne, J. (2021). Inductive Logic. E. Zalta (Dü.) içinde, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
- Hume, D. (2016). İnsanın Anlama Yetisi Üzerine Bir Soruşturma. (F. Aydar, Çev.) İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür.
- Lewis, D. (1983). New Work For a Theory of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, s. 343-377.
- Mill, J. S. (1846). System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers.
- Peirce, C. S. (1955). The General Theory of Probable Inference. J. Buchler içinde, Philosophical Writings of Peirce (s. 190-217). New York: Dover Publications.
- Quine, W. (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review, 20-43.
- Quine, W. (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Quine, W. V. (1969). Natural Kinds. W. Quine içinde, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (s. 114-138). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Sider, T. (2001). Four Dimensionalism An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Stalnaker, R. (1979). Anti-Essentialism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, s. 343-355.
Ayrıntılar
| Birincil Dil | Türkçe |
|---|---|
| Konular | Felsefe |
| Bölüm | Araştırma Makalesi |
| Yazarlar | |
| Yayımlanma Tarihi | 8 Eylül 2024 |
| Gönderilme Tarihi | 22 Şubat 2023 |
| Yayımlandığı Sayı | Yıl 2024 Sayı: 25 |