DEMOKRATİK REJİMLERDE POLİTİK PARASAL KONJONKTÜR HAREKETLERİ: TÜRKİYE ÜZERİNE EKONOMETRİK BİR İNCELEME

Yıl 2009, Cilt: 10 Sayı: 2, 204 - 216, 01.07.2009

Seyfettin Erdoğan Hilal Bozkurt

Öz

Demokratik rejimlerde politikacıların temel amacı, iktidarı elde etmek ya da görev sürelerini uzatmaktır. Söz konusu amacın gerçekleşmesi, önemli ölçüde seçmen tercihlerine bağlıdır. Bu durumun farkında olan siyasal iktidarlar, seçim öncesi dönemde seçmen tercihlerini kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda yönlendirmek üzere çok sayıda yönteme başvurabilirler. Para politikasının manipülasyonu söz konusu yöntemlerden biridir. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Türkiye’de para politikasının manipüle edilip edilmediğini araştırmaktır. Çalışmada 1986 - 2005 dönemi esas alınmıştır. Söz konusu dönemde parasal büyüklüklere ilişkin veriler GARCH yöntemi ile test edilmiştir. Elde edilen bulgular, Türkiye’de esas alınan dönemde politik kaynaklı parasal konjonktür hareketlerinin varlığına işaret etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Politik Konjonktür Hareketleri, Fırsatçı Modeller, Nordhaus Modeli

POLITICAL MONETARY CYCLES IN DEMOCRATIC REGIMES: AN ECONOMETRIC INVESTIGATION ON TURKEY

Öz

The main objective of politicians in democratic regimes is to gain political power or to elongate the duration of their power. The realization of this objective is mostly depended upon the choices of the voters. The political powers who are aware of this situation, have many methods that they will use in order to direct the voters’ choices into the way of their own interest, prior to elections. The manipulation of monetary policy is one of these aforementioned methods. The purpose of this study, is to research if monetary policy is being manipulated or not in Turkey. The study has been based upon the period between the years 1986- 2004. In the aforementioned period, the data on monetary aggregates have been tested with the GARCH method. The findings point to the presence of political monetary cycle in the period taken into account in Turkey.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Political Business Cycles , Opportunistic Model , Nordhaus’ Model

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