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ON THE INDEPENDENCY OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS

Yıl 2010, Cilt: 11 Sayı: 1, 124 - 137, 01.01.2010

Öz

Within the frame of discussions focusing on the provision of price stability, the central banks that attempt to enhance their independence have increased recently. Scientific studies in this field tend to support this discussion. The Central Bank of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus TRNC has been exceptional case due to the fact that Turkish Lira has been in circulation as a legal tender during the period of dollarization; and there is no relation between its inflation target and monetary policy.

Kaynakça

  • ALESINA, A. & L. H. SUMMERS (1993) Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance: some comparative evidence. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 25/2, pp. 151-162.
  • BADE, R. & M. PARKIN (1984) Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policy, Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario, Canada.
  • BAKA, W. (1994-95) Please respect the national bank. Central Banking, 5, pp. 65- 72.
  • CASU, B., GIRARDONE, C. & MOLYNEUX, P. (2006) Introduction to Banking, Prentice Hall/Financial Times, England.
  • COLEMAN, W. (2001) Is it possible that an independent central bank is impossible? The case of the Australian notes issue board, 1920-1924. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 33/3, pp. 729-748.
  • CUKIERMAN, A. (1992) Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independence- Theory and Evidence, the MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
  • CUKIERMAN, A., S. B. WEBB, & B. NEYAPTI (1992) Measuring the independence of central banks and its effects on policy outcomes. The World Bank Economic Review, 6, pp.353-398.
  • CUKIERMAN A., MILLER G., B., NEYAPTI (2002) Central bank reform, liberalization and inflation in transition economies. An international perspective, Journal of Monetary Economics, 49, pp. 255.
  • DEBELLE, G. & STANLEY FISCHER (1994) How independent should a central bank be. Mimeo, M.I.T.
  • DE HAAN, J. & G. J. VAN ‘T HAG (1994) Variation in central bank independence across countries: some provisional empirical evidence. Policy Choice, 85/(3-4), pp. 335-351.
  • EIJFFINGER, S. C. W. & J. DE HAAN (1996) The political economy of central- bank independence. Special Papers in International Economics, No. 19, Princeton, New Jersey.
  • ELGIE, R. (1998) Democratic accountability and central bank independence: historical and contemporary, national and European perspectives. West European Politics, 21/3, pp. 53-76.
  • GRILLI, V, D. MASCIANDARO, & G. TABELLINI (1991) Political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries. Economic Policy, 6, pp.341-392.
  • HASSEL, R. H. (1990) The European Central Bank: Perspectives for the further development of the European Monetary System, Bertelsmann Foundation, Gütersloh.
  • ISSING, O. (1993) Central bank independence and monetary stability. Occasional Paper no.89, Institute of Economic Affairs.
  • LOUNGANI, P.& N. SHEETS (1997) Central bank independence, inflation, and growth in transition economics. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 29/3, pp. 381-399.
  • MISHKIN, F. S. (2007) The Economics of Money, Banking and Financial Markets, Eight Ed, Pearson/Addison Wesley, United States of America.
  • SPO (2007) 2008 Year Program, TRNC Sate Planning Organization, Nicosia.
  • SYLLA, R. (1998) The Autonomy of Monetary Authorities: the Case of the US Federal Reserve System. in Gianni Toniolo (Ed.), Central Banks’ Independence in Historical Perspective, pp. 17-38, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin.
  • ŞAFAKLI, O. (2003) The analysis of banking and financial crises: case of TRNC. Second Global Conference on Business & Economics, July 5-7, Imperial College South Kensington Campus, London-England
  • TRNC Central Bank (2006) 2006 Year Report, Nicosia.

KUZEY KIBRIS TÜRK CUMHURİYETİ’NDE KKTC MERKEZ BANKASI’NIN BAĞIMSIZLIĞI

Yıl 2010, Cilt: 11 Sayı: 1, 124 - 137, 01.01.2010

Öz

Genel eğilim olarak fiyat istikrarını artırma yönünde odaklaşan tartışmalar çerçevesinde, Merkez Bankaları son zamanlarda bağımsızlıklarını artırma yönünde girişimde bulunmaktadırlar. Bu alanda gerçekleştirilen bilimsel çalışmalar ise bu tartışmaları destekler nitelik taşımaktadır. KKTC’de dolarizasyon kapsamında kanuni para olarak Türk Lirası’nın TL kullanılması ve dolayısıyla enflasyon hedefi ile para politikası ilişkisinin ortadan kalkması gerçeğinden hareketle Merkez Bankası bağımsızlığında KKTC istisnai bir vaka olarak ele alınmıştır

Kaynakça

  • ALESINA, A. & L. H. SUMMERS (1993) Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance: some comparative evidence. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 25/2, pp. 151-162.
  • BADE, R. & M. PARKIN (1984) Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policy, Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario, Canada.
  • BAKA, W. (1994-95) Please respect the national bank. Central Banking, 5, pp. 65- 72.
  • CASU, B., GIRARDONE, C. & MOLYNEUX, P. (2006) Introduction to Banking, Prentice Hall/Financial Times, England.
  • COLEMAN, W. (2001) Is it possible that an independent central bank is impossible? The case of the Australian notes issue board, 1920-1924. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 33/3, pp. 729-748.
  • CUKIERMAN, A. (1992) Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independence- Theory and Evidence, the MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
  • CUKIERMAN, A., S. B. WEBB, & B. NEYAPTI (1992) Measuring the independence of central banks and its effects on policy outcomes. The World Bank Economic Review, 6, pp.353-398.
  • CUKIERMAN A., MILLER G., B., NEYAPTI (2002) Central bank reform, liberalization and inflation in transition economies. An international perspective, Journal of Monetary Economics, 49, pp. 255.
  • DEBELLE, G. & STANLEY FISCHER (1994) How independent should a central bank be. Mimeo, M.I.T.
  • DE HAAN, J. & G. J. VAN ‘T HAG (1994) Variation in central bank independence across countries: some provisional empirical evidence. Policy Choice, 85/(3-4), pp. 335-351.
  • EIJFFINGER, S. C. W. & J. DE HAAN (1996) The political economy of central- bank independence. Special Papers in International Economics, No. 19, Princeton, New Jersey.
  • ELGIE, R. (1998) Democratic accountability and central bank independence: historical and contemporary, national and European perspectives. West European Politics, 21/3, pp. 53-76.
  • GRILLI, V, D. MASCIANDARO, & G. TABELLINI (1991) Political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries. Economic Policy, 6, pp.341-392.
  • HASSEL, R. H. (1990) The European Central Bank: Perspectives for the further development of the European Monetary System, Bertelsmann Foundation, Gütersloh.
  • ISSING, O. (1993) Central bank independence and monetary stability. Occasional Paper no.89, Institute of Economic Affairs.
  • LOUNGANI, P.& N. SHEETS (1997) Central bank independence, inflation, and growth in transition economics. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 29/3, pp. 381-399.
  • MISHKIN, F. S. (2007) The Economics of Money, Banking and Financial Markets, Eight Ed, Pearson/Addison Wesley, United States of America.
  • SPO (2007) 2008 Year Program, TRNC Sate Planning Organization, Nicosia.
  • SYLLA, R. (1998) The Autonomy of Monetary Authorities: the Case of the US Federal Reserve System. in Gianni Toniolo (Ed.), Central Banks’ Independence in Historical Perspective, pp. 17-38, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin.
  • ŞAFAKLI, O. (2003) The analysis of banking and financial crises: case of TRNC. Second Global Conference on Business & Economics, July 5-7, Imperial College South Kensington Campus, London-England
  • TRNC Central Bank (2006) 2006 Year Report, Nicosia.
Toplam 21 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil İngilizce
Bölüm Araştırma Makalesi
Yazarlar

Okan Veli Şafaklı Bu kişi benim

Hüseyin Özdeşer Bu kişi benim

Yayımlanma Tarihi 1 Ocak 2010
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2010 Cilt: 11 Sayı: 1

Kaynak Göster

APA Şafaklı, O. V., & Özdeşer, H. (2010). ON THE INDEPENDENCY OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS. Doğuş Üniversitesi Dergisi, 11(1), 124-137.