Şirket Ağları Üzerinden Sahiplik İlişkilerine Yönelik Stratejilerin Belirlenmesi
Yıl 2020,
Cilt: 21 Sayı: 2, 79 - 91, 01.07.2020
Suat Atan
Çiğdem Baskıcı
Yavuz Ercil
Öz
Çalışmada şirketlerin sahiplik ilişkilerine yönelik stratejilerinin ortaya çıkarılması amaçlanmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda Borsa İstanbul’da BIST işlem gören 515 şirketin 1 Ocak-31 Aralık 2017 yılına ait pay sahipliği bilgileri kullanılmıştır. Bu bilgiler ışığında şirketlerin doğrudan ve dolaylı sahiplik oranlarının hesaplanabileceği 2228 şirket ve 2058 ilişkiden oluşan bir ağ oluşturulmuştur. Ağ üzerinden yapılan hesaplamalar sonucunda 298 şirketin yalnızca doğrudan sahiplik, 63 şirketin ise hem doğrudan hem de dolaylı sahiplik kurdukları tespit edilmiştir. Doğrudan ve dolaylı sahiplik kuran şirketler içerisinde özellikle Koç Holding’in dolaylı sahiplik oranının doğrudan sahiplik oranından daha yüksek olduğu ortaya çıkmıştır. Net Holding ve Doğan Şirketler Grubu çok belirgin bir biçimde doğrudan sahipliği dolaylı sahipliğe tercih etmektedir.
Kaynakça
- Atan, S. ve Emekci, H. (2018). İktisat ve işletme uygulamaları için R ile veri analizi, istatistik, modelleme ve uygulama. Ankara: Seçkin Yayıncılık.
- Baskıcı, Ç. ve Ercil, Y. (2018). ICT sektörünün stratejik yapı analizi: Finans kapitalizminin sorgulanması. 26. Ulusal Yönetim Organizasyon Kongresi. Trabzon.
- Baskıcı, Ç. ve Ercil, Y. (2019a). Çokuluslu şirketlerin doğrudan yabancı yatırım yer seçiminde sektör taşıma kapasitesinin gerekliliği. Istanbul Business Research, 48(1), 144-159.
- Baskıcı, Ç. ve Ercil, Y. (2019b). Taşıma kapasitesinin birleşme stratejilerinde öncül bir gösterge olarak kullanılması. Uluslararası Yönetim İktisat ve İşletme Dergisi, 15(3), 783-796.
- Bastian, M., Heymann, S. ve Jacomy, M. (2009). Gephi: An open source for exploring and manipulating networks. Third International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Socail Media.
- Bena, J. ve Ortiz-Molina, H. (2013). Pyramidal ownership and the creation of new firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 108(3), 798–821.
- Bertrand, M. ve Mullainathan, S. (2003). Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance and managerial preferences. Journal of Political Economy, 111(5), 1043-1075.
- Carrington, P. J. (2014). Crime and social network analysis. J. Scott ve P. J. Carrington içinde, The SAGE handbook of social network (s. 236-255). SAGE Publications.
- Chami, G. F., Molyneux, D. H., Kontoleon, A. A. ve Dunne, D. W. (2013). Exploring network theory for mass drug administration. Trends in Parasitology, 29(8), 370-379.
- Chandler, A. D. (1977). The visible hand: The managerial revolution in American Business. USA: Harvard University Press.
- Çolpan, A. M. ve Hikino, T. (2010). Foundatins of business groups: Towards an integrated framework. A. M. Çolpan, T. Hikino ve J. R. Lincoln içinde, The Oxford handbook of business group (s. 16-66). UK: Oxford University Press.
- Conyon, M. ve Muldoon, M. (2008). Ownership and control: A small-world analysis. J. A. C. Baum ve T. J. Rowley içinde, Network strategy (s. 31-65). UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
- Council, N. R. (2005). Network Science. Washington: National Academies Press.
- Demirağ, I. ve Serter, M. (2003). Ownership patterns and control in Turkish listed companies. Corporate Governance, 11(1), 40-51.
- Fan, J. P. H., Wong, T. J. ve Zhang, T. (2005). The emergence of corporate pyramids in China. Working paper (SSRN 686582).
- Gormley, W. T. ve Balla, S. J. (2018). Bureaucracy and democracy: Accountability and performance. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE.
- Gürünlü, M. (2018). Propping in the pyramidal business groups in Turkey. The Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance, 29(2), 114-126.
- Hartmann, S. (2011). External embeddedness of subsidiaries influence on product innovation in MNCs. Köln: Josef Eul Verlag Gmbh.
- Jensen, M. C. ve Ruback, R. S. (1983). The market for corporate control: the scientific evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 11(1-4), 5-50.
- La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F. ve Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471-517.
- Li, J., Ren, D., Feng, X. ve Zhang, Y. (2016). Network of listed companies based on common shareholders and the prediction of market volatility. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 462, 508–521.
- Matulich, S. ve Currie, D. M. (2016). Handbook of frauds, scams, and swindless: Failures of ethics in leadership. CRC Press.
- Moebert, J. ve Tydecks, P. (2007). Power and ownership structures among German companies. A network analysis of financial linkages. Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics, 179, Darmstadt University of Technology, Department of Law and Economics. https://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/4745/1/ddpie_179.pdf
- Morck, R., Wolfenzon, D. ve Yeung, B. (2005). Corporate governance, economic entrenchment, and growth. Journal of Economic Literature, 43(3), 655-720.
- Newman, M. E. (2003). The structure and function of complex networks. http://Math.Uchicago.Edu/~Shmuel/Network-Course Readings/Newman,%20SIAM.Pdf (Erişim tarihi: 3.21.2018).
- Pinheiro, C. A. (2011). Social network analysis in telecommunications. John Wiley & Sons.
- Pryke, S. (2012). Social network analysis in construction. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
- Rotundo, G. ve D’Arcangelis, A. M. (2010). Ownership and control in shareholding networks. Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, 5(2), 191- 219.
- Sacristan-Navarro, M. ve Gómez-Ansón, S. (2007). Family ownership and pyramids in the Spanish market. Family Business Review, 20(3), 247-265.
- Wasserman, S. ve Faust, K. (1994). Social network analysis: Method and applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Yılgör, A. G. ve Yücel, E. (2012). İşletmelerin sahiplik yapısının incelenmesi: Sahiplik ve kontrol ayrımı konusunda çıkarımlar. Uluslararası Yönetim İktisat ve İşletme Dergisi, 8(16), 41-57.
- Yurtoğlu, B. B. (2000). Ownership, control and performance of Turkish listed firms. Empirica, 27, 193-222.
- Zhu, S. (2006). The characteristics of ultimate shareholders and informativeness of accounting earnings. China Accounting and Finance Review, 3, 1-30.
Determining Strategies for Ownership Relations by Business Networks
Yıl 2020,
Cilt: 21 Sayı: 2, 79 - 91, 01.07.2020
Suat Atan
Çiğdem Baskıcı
Yavuz Ercil
Öz
The aim of the study is to reveal business strategies for ownership relations. Accordingly, the shareholding information of 515 companies listing in Borsa İstanbul BIST for the period January 1 - December 31, 2017 has been used. In the light of this information, a network of 2228 companies and 2058 relations was established in which direct and indirect ownership rates of companies can be calculated. As a result of the calculations made over the network, it was determined that only 298 companies have direct ownership and 63 companies have both direct and indirect ownership. Indirect ownership ratio of Koç Holding was found to be higher than its direct ownership ratio. Net Holding and Doğan Group prefer distinctly direct ownership rather than indirect ownership
Kaynakça
- Atan, S. ve Emekci, H. (2018). İktisat ve işletme uygulamaları için R ile veri analizi, istatistik, modelleme ve uygulama. Ankara: Seçkin Yayıncılık.
- Baskıcı, Ç. ve Ercil, Y. (2018). ICT sektörünün stratejik yapı analizi: Finans kapitalizminin sorgulanması. 26. Ulusal Yönetim Organizasyon Kongresi. Trabzon.
- Baskıcı, Ç. ve Ercil, Y. (2019a). Çokuluslu şirketlerin doğrudan yabancı yatırım yer seçiminde sektör taşıma kapasitesinin gerekliliği. Istanbul Business Research, 48(1), 144-159.
- Baskıcı, Ç. ve Ercil, Y. (2019b). Taşıma kapasitesinin birleşme stratejilerinde öncül bir gösterge olarak kullanılması. Uluslararası Yönetim İktisat ve İşletme Dergisi, 15(3), 783-796.
- Bastian, M., Heymann, S. ve Jacomy, M. (2009). Gephi: An open source for exploring and manipulating networks. Third International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Socail Media.
- Bena, J. ve Ortiz-Molina, H. (2013). Pyramidal ownership and the creation of new firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 108(3), 798–821.
- Bertrand, M. ve Mullainathan, S. (2003). Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance and managerial preferences. Journal of Political Economy, 111(5), 1043-1075.
- Carrington, P. J. (2014). Crime and social network analysis. J. Scott ve P. J. Carrington içinde, The SAGE handbook of social network (s. 236-255). SAGE Publications.
- Chami, G. F., Molyneux, D. H., Kontoleon, A. A. ve Dunne, D. W. (2013). Exploring network theory for mass drug administration. Trends in Parasitology, 29(8), 370-379.
- Chandler, A. D. (1977). The visible hand: The managerial revolution in American Business. USA: Harvard University Press.
- Çolpan, A. M. ve Hikino, T. (2010). Foundatins of business groups: Towards an integrated framework. A. M. Çolpan, T. Hikino ve J. R. Lincoln içinde, The Oxford handbook of business group (s. 16-66). UK: Oxford University Press.
- Conyon, M. ve Muldoon, M. (2008). Ownership and control: A small-world analysis. J. A. C. Baum ve T. J. Rowley içinde, Network strategy (s. 31-65). UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
- Council, N. R. (2005). Network Science. Washington: National Academies Press.
- Demirağ, I. ve Serter, M. (2003). Ownership patterns and control in Turkish listed companies. Corporate Governance, 11(1), 40-51.
- Fan, J. P. H., Wong, T. J. ve Zhang, T. (2005). The emergence of corporate pyramids in China. Working paper (SSRN 686582).
- Gormley, W. T. ve Balla, S. J. (2018). Bureaucracy and democracy: Accountability and performance. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE.
- Gürünlü, M. (2018). Propping in the pyramidal business groups in Turkey. The Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance, 29(2), 114-126.
- Hartmann, S. (2011). External embeddedness of subsidiaries influence on product innovation in MNCs. Köln: Josef Eul Verlag Gmbh.
- Jensen, M. C. ve Ruback, R. S. (1983). The market for corporate control: the scientific evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 11(1-4), 5-50.
- La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F. ve Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471-517.
- Li, J., Ren, D., Feng, X. ve Zhang, Y. (2016). Network of listed companies based on common shareholders and the prediction of market volatility. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 462, 508–521.
- Matulich, S. ve Currie, D. M. (2016). Handbook of frauds, scams, and swindless: Failures of ethics in leadership. CRC Press.
- Moebert, J. ve Tydecks, P. (2007). Power and ownership structures among German companies. A network analysis of financial linkages. Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics, 179, Darmstadt University of Technology, Department of Law and Economics. https://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/4745/1/ddpie_179.pdf
- Morck, R., Wolfenzon, D. ve Yeung, B. (2005). Corporate governance, economic entrenchment, and growth. Journal of Economic Literature, 43(3), 655-720.
- Newman, M. E. (2003). The structure and function of complex networks. http://Math.Uchicago.Edu/~Shmuel/Network-Course Readings/Newman,%20SIAM.Pdf (Erişim tarihi: 3.21.2018).
- Pinheiro, C. A. (2011). Social network analysis in telecommunications. John Wiley & Sons.
- Pryke, S. (2012). Social network analysis in construction. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
- Rotundo, G. ve D’Arcangelis, A. M. (2010). Ownership and control in shareholding networks. Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, 5(2), 191- 219.
- Sacristan-Navarro, M. ve Gómez-Ansón, S. (2007). Family ownership and pyramids in the Spanish market. Family Business Review, 20(3), 247-265.
- Wasserman, S. ve Faust, K. (1994). Social network analysis: Method and applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Yılgör, A. G. ve Yücel, E. (2012). İşletmelerin sahiplik yapısının incelenmesi: Sahiplik ve kontrol ayrımı konusunda çıkarımlar. Uluslararası Yönetim İktisat ve İşletme Dergisi, 8(16), 41-57.
- Yurtoğlu, B. B. (2000). Ownership, control and performance of Turkish listed firms. Empirica, 27, 193-222.
- Zhu, S. (2006). The characteristics of ultimate shareholders and informativeness of accounting earnings. China Accounting and Finance Review, 3, 1-30.