Politik İstikrarın Bedeli: Yükselen Piyasa Ekonomilerinde Politik İstikrar, Gelir Eşitsizliği ve Dijitalleşme Bağlantısı

Öz

Gelir eşitsizliği, Adam Smith’in piyasa mekanizmalarından Karl Marx’ın sistemik eleştirisine kadar iktisadi düşüncede temel bir tartışma konusu olmaya devam etmektedir. Amartya Sen tarafından “özgürlük kısıtlaması” olarak yeniden tanımlanan bu olgu, dijitalleşmeyle birlikte yeni boyutlar kazanmıştır. Bu çalışma, eşitsizliğin kurumsal yapıları şekillendiren çok boyutlu bir faktör olduğu varsayımıyla, siyasi istikrar, gelir eşitsizliği ve dijitalleşme arasındaki dinamik etkileşimleri incelemektedir. Bu çalışmada 23 gelişmekte olan piyasa ekonomisine ait 1996–2023 dönemi verileri kullanılarak, Dumitrescu–Hurlin nedensellik testi ile etki-tepki fonksiyonları (IRF) ve varyans ayrıştırma (FEVD) analizleriyle desteklenen bir panel vektör otoregresyon (Panel VAR) modeli uygulanmıştır. Bulgular, dijitalleşmenin gelir eşitsizliği üzerinde doğrudan yıkıcı bir etkisi olmadığını göstermektedir. Ayrıca, eşitsizliğin siyasi istikrarsızlığı tetiklediğini öne süren Göreli Yoksunluk Teorisi’nin hipotezi de bu örneklem kapsamında desteklenmemektedir. Buna karşılık, siyasi istikrarın gelir eşitsizliğini artırdığı ve eşitsizliğin varyansının %29,1’inin siyasi istikrar şoklarıyla açıklandığı tespit edilmiştir. Bu sonuç, kapsayıcı olmayan kurumsal yapılarda siyasi istikrarın, ekonomik elitlerin gelir dağılımını kendi lehlerine şekillendirmelerini kolaylaştırarak eşitsizliği derinleştirebileceğine işaret etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Gelir Eşitsizliği
• Dijitalleşme
• Politik İstikrar
• Göreli Yoksunluk Teorisi
• Beceri Yanlı Teknolojik Değişim Hipotezi

THE PRICE OF POLITICAL STABILITY: THE NEXUS OF POLITICAL STABILITY, INCOME INEQUALITY AND DIGITALIZATION IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES

Abstract

Income inequality remains a foundational debate in economic thought, ranging from Adam Smith’s market mechanisms to Karl Marx’s systemic critique. Redefined by Amartya Sen as a "freedom constraint," this phenomenon has gained new dimensions through digitalization. This study examines the dynamic interactions between political stability, income inequality, and digitalization, assuming inequality is a multidimensional factor shaping institutional structures. Using data from 23 Emerging Market Economies (1996-2023), a Panel Vector Autoregression (Panel VAR) model was applied, supported by Dumitrescu-Hurlin causality, Impulse Response Functions (IRF), and Variance Decomposition (FEVD) analyses in this study. Findings indicate that digitalization does not have a direct disruptive effect on income inequality. Furthermore, the Relative Deprivation Theory’s hypothesis—that inequality triggers political instability—is not supported in this sample. Conversely, political stability was found to increase income inequality, explaining 29.1% of its variance. This suggests that within non-inclusive institutions, political stability can facilitate economic elites in shaping distribution to their advantage, thereby deepening inequality.

Keywords

• Income Inequality
• Digitalization
• Political Stability
• Relative Deprivation Theory
• Skill-Biased Technological Change Hypothesis

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