Güç Paylaşımını Yeniden Düşünmek: Ayrılıkçı Elitler Karşısında Oydaşmacılığın Sınırları

Öz

Güç paylaşımı, bölünmüş toplumlarda çatışma sonrası devlet inşası süreçlerinde etkili bulunan bir yaklaşım olarak öne çıkmaktadır. Arend Lijphart, güç paylaşımının bir türü olarak geliştirdiği oydaşmacı demokrasi modelinin derin bölünmelere sahip toplumlarda barış ve istikrarlı demokrasi tesisi için en uygun seçenek olduğunu savunmaktadır. Lijphart, oydaşmacı demokrasinin tüm grupların temsiline olanak tanıdığını, siyasi elitler arasında işbriliği zemini oluşturduğunu ve orantılı temsil, veto hakkı gibi mekanizmalarla istikrar ve barışı sağlayabildiğini öne sürmüştür. Bu çalışmada, güç paylaşımı modelinin siyasi elitler arasında iş birliğini öngören varsayımları eleştirel biçimde ele alınmıştır. Güç paylaşımı yaklaşımı, siyasi, askeri ve ekonomik kazançlar elde eden siyasi elitlerin iş birliğine yöneleceğini öngörse de güç paylaşımının sunduğu kazanımların ayrılıkçı elitler tarafından kötüye kullanılabileceği ihtimali yeterince hesaba katılmamıştır. Savaş sonrasında güç paylaşımına dayalı bir siyasi yapının oluşturulduğu Bosna Hersek örneği incelendiğinde, Dayton sistemi ile elde edilen kazanımların Bosnalı Sırp elitleri ayrılıkçı eğilimlerden vazgeçirmekte etkili olmadığı görülmektedir. Güç paylaşımı düzenlemelerine rağmen, Milorad Dodik liderliğindeki Sırp Cumhuriyeti yönetimi tarafından bağımsızlık yönünde bir söylem ve politika takip edilmeye devam etmektedir. Bosna örneğinin derinlemesine incelenmesiyle elde edilen bulgular, güç paylaşımı yaklaşımının ayrılıkçı elitlerin tutum ve politikalarına dair ampirik veriler ışığında yeniden gözden geçirilmesi gerektiğini ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Bosna-Hersek
• Güç paylaşımı
• Siyasi elitler
• Sırp Cumhuriyeti
• Ayrılıkçılık

Rethinking Power-Sharing: The Limits of Consociationalism in the Face of Secessionist Elites

Öz

Power-sharing has emerged as a prevalent approach in post-conflict state-building efforts in divided societies. Arend Lijphart, who introduced the concept of consociational democracy as a form of power-sharing, argues that it offers the most viable path to achieving peace and stable democracy in deeply divided societies. He suggests that consociational democracy ensures representation for all groups, provides elite cooperation, and provides mechanisms like proportional representation and veto power to maintain stability and peace. However, this study critically examines the assumptions of the power-sharing model regarding elite cooperation. The power-sharing model assumes elites will be content with the gains from sharing power and act cooperatively, but it doesn't account for how secessionist leaders might exploit these arrangements to advance their agendas. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the post-war political settlement is predicated on power-sharing arrangements. However, the gains of the Dayton system proved ineffective in mitigating the secessionist tendencies of the Bosnian Serb elites. Despite the power-sharing arrangements, the Republika Srpska administration led by Milorad Dodik continues to push for independence. Findings from an in-depth analysis of Bosnia show that the power-sharing approach needs to be refined in line with empirical evidence on the attitudes and policies of secessionist elites.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Bosnia and Herzegovina
• Power-sharing
• Political elites; Republika Srpska
• Secessionism

Kaynakça

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