GLOBAL CONSTRAINT: EXTENDING POWER TRANSITION THEORY TO INCLUDE GREAT POWER INTERFERENCE

Öz

This paper investigates the influence of the great power hierarchy on minor power dyad conflict relations. The paper`s importance lies in providing a theoretical framework for studying great power interference in dyadic relations among minor powers within the power transition theory. Power transition theory assumes great power non-interference in war and peace dynamics among small power dyads. Building on the previous power transition based models of multiple hierarchy and regional hierarchy constraint, the global constraint model introduces the impact of the international system on the absence and existence of war among small powers within regions. Global constraint, the proposed explanatory variable, refers to the impact of the five most powerful states in the international system, and is operationalized as the ratio of arms transfers to the weaker dyad nation to that of the stronger one by the great powers

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Power transition theory, war onset, great power interference, arms transfers

GLOBAL CONSTRAINT: EXTENDING POWER TRANSITION THEORY TO INCLUDE GREAT POWER INTERFERENCE

Öz

Bu makale büyük güçler hiyerarşisinin diğer devletler arasındaki çatışma ilişkilerine etkisini incelemektedir. Güç geçişi teorisi içinde büyük devletlerin görece daha az güçlü devletler arasındaki ilişkilere olan etkisini incelemek için teorik bir yapı oluşturduğu için önemlidir. Güç geçişi teorisi büyük devletlerin diğer devletler arasındaki savaşbarış ilişkilerinde müdahalede bulunmadığını varsaymaktadır. Küresel kısıtlama modeli güç geçişi teorisi temelli çoklu hiyerarşiler ve bölgesel kısıtlama modellerine dayanmaktadır. Modelin farklılığı uluslararası sistemin bölgesel aktörler arasında savaş olup olmayacağına etkisinin incelenmesidir. Açıklayıcı değişken olarak küresel sınırlama uluslararası sistemdeki en güçlü beş devletin etkisine işaret etmektedir. Bu etki büyük güçlerin güçsüz taraf ve güçlü tarafa yaptıkları silah transferi oranı ile ölçülecektir

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Güç geçişimi teorisi, savaş başlangıcı, büyük güçlerin müdahaleleri, silah transferi

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