PHILLIPS “EĞRİ”'SİNİN DOĞRUSAL OLMAYAN YAPISI ÜZERİNE

Öz

It is quite important to determine the structure of Phillips curve in macroeconomic policy analysis since it has an information about the trade-off between output and inflation. The aim of this paper is to analyse both the theoretical explanations on nonlinear Phillips curve and their policy implications. In the related literature, it is claimed that the structure of Phillips curve is affected by many factors such as capacity constraints, average inflation, inflation volatility, nominal wage rigidity, imperfect competition, degree of trade openness, financial globalization, central bank independency and exchange rate regime. According to the factors in question nonlinear Phillips curve is modelled as convex, concave or locally linear with a kink. Moreover, the policy implications of nonlinear Phillips curve are different. In contrast to linear Phillips curve, existence of nonlinear Phillips curve implies that the output cost of disinflation depends on the stage of the business cycle, positive and negative demand shocks have different effects on inflation and the timing of policy implication fighting against inflation is an issue for policy authority

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Phillips Curve, Nonlinearity

PHILLIPS “EĞRİ”'SİNİN DOĞRUSAL OLMAYAN YAPISI ÜZERİNE

Öz

Üretim-enflasyon arasındaki ödünleme ilişkisi hakkında bilgi içeren Phillips eğrisinin yapısının belirlenmesi, makroekonomik politika analizlerinde büyük önem taşımaktadır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, gerek Phillips eğrisinin doğrusal olmayan yapısı üzerine yapılan teorik açıklamaları gerekse politika önermelerini ele alarak bütüncül bir doğrusal olmayan Phillips eğrisi analizi yapmaktır. İlgili literatürde çok sayıda unsurun Phillips eğrisinin eğimini etkilediği ileri sürülmektedir. Bu unsurlar arasında kapasite kısıtının varlığı, ortalama enflasyon oranı, enflasyon değişkenliği, parasal ücret katılığı, eksik rekabet koşulları, dışa ticarete açıklık derecesi, finansal küreselleşme, merkez bankası bağımsızlığı ve döviz kuru rejimi bulunmaktadır. Ele alınan faktörlere göre, Phillips eğrisi dışbükey, içbükey veya kırıklı yapıda modellenmektedir. Ayrıca, doğrusal olmayan yapıdaki Phillips eğrisi, doğrusal Phillips eğrisine göre farklı politika önerileri içermektedir. Doğrusal Phillips eğrisinin aksine, doğrusal olmayan Phillips eğrisinin varlığında, ekonominin hangi safhada olduğuna bağlı olarak enflasyonu düşürmenin üretim maliyeti değişmekte, pozitif ve negatif talep şokları enflasyon üzerinde farklı sonuçlar doğurmakta ve enflasyonla mücadelede uygulanacak politikaların zamanlaması politika otoritelerinin dikkate alması gereken bir unsur olarak ön plana çıkmaktadır

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Phillips Eğrisi, Doğrusal Olmayan Yapı

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