DESENTRALİZASYON KAMU SEKTÖRÜNDEKİ HANTALLAŞMAYI ÖNLER Mİ? BİR OECD PANEL VERİLERİ REGRESYON ANALİZİ

Yıl 2007, Sayı: 17, - , 20.06.2015

Ali Riza Özdemir

Öz

Public sector viewed as important with its numerous functions for a long time has recently become the locus of criticisms by many due to its unproductive and excessive size. One of the most emphasized factors which downsizes the public sector and makes it more efficient is the decentralization, moving more weight of this sector towards local administrations. There in fact, exists some predictions of how decentralization, leaving more of the public services and revenue sources to finance them, to sub-national government provides discipline in public sector. In this study, the disciplinary effects of decentralization on the public sector is tested using panel corrected standard errors procedure and the from OECD countries. The results show that decentralized public services and taxes up to some degree, limits the growth of public sector

Anahtar Kelimeler

The Excessive Growth of Public Sector, Fiscal Decentralization. JEL Classification: H11, H77

DESENTRALİZASYON KAMU SEKTÖRÜNDEKİ HANTALLAŞMAYI ÖNLER Mİ? BİR OECD PANEL VERİLERİ REGRESYON ANALİZİ

Öz

Uzun süredir yüklendiği bir çok fonksiyonla ekonomide ağırlığını hissettiren kamu sektörü son yıllarda verimsizliği ve hantallığıyla başta ekonomistler olmak üzere bir çok kesimce eleştiri odağı haline gelmiştir. Kamu sektörünü içinde bulunduğu hantal yapısından kurtarmak ve daha etkin hale getirmek üzere yapılan çalışmaların üzerinde en çok durulanlardan birisi de bu sektörün ağırlığını yerel yönetimlere doğru kaydırarak yeniden yapılandırmak, yani desentralizasyondur. Desentralizasyon yoluyla merkezi yönetim hizmetlerinin ve bunları finanse edecek mali kaynakların bir çoğunu yerel yönetimlere devretmenin kamuda disiplini sağlayacağı yönünde literatürde bir takım öngörüler bulunmaktadır. Bu çalışma da desentralizasyonun kamu sektörünü disipline edici etkileri OECD ülkelerine ait panel verileri ve standart hataları düzeltilmiş panel verileri (PCSE) tahmin prosedürü ile test edilmektedir. Ortaya çıkan tahmin sonuçları özellikle kamu harcamalarının ve belli bir ölçüde de vergilerin merkezi yönetimden yerel yönetimlere kaydırılmasının kamu sektörünün büyüme hızını sınırladığını göstermektedir

Anahtar Kelimeler

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Kaynakça

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