Araştırma Makalesi

NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN CONTROL-UNREGISTERED EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER INCENTIVE AND PUNISHMENT STRATEGIES

Cilt: 25 Sayı: 2 8 Mayıs 2025
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NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN CONTROL-UNREGISTERED EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER INCENTIVE AND PUNISHMENT STRATEGIES

Öz

Unregistered employment, which has occupied the world economic agenda since the 1970s with the ILO's Kenya report, has become an important problem that needs to be solved as much as unemployment in countries. Policy makers and social planners try to intervene in the wage bargaining processes between workers and employers through a control mechanism and implement policies to prevent unregistered employment. For this reason, in addition to the routine inspections of companies by auditors, they implement penalties and incentives for registered employment. Thus, while the state achieves its goals of increasing tax and premium revenues, they also aim to increase the productivity of workers with the motivation of having a registered job. However, a conflict arises here between the social planner's control function and the employer's low-cost, high-profit behavior motivation. The article deals with this conflict issue and tries to determine the Nash Equilibrium of the parties by analyzing the employer's registered or unregistered employment options against the social controller's punishment and incentive practices in a mixed strategy 2x2 game model. By analyzing the game model, the "best response functions" of the parties were obtained and the best response probabilities of the social planner and the employer against each other were determined through Nash Equilibrium. The effectiveness of penalties and incentives against unregistered employment was analyzed according to counter behaviors.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Kaynakça

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  4. Aydın, G., & Karabacak, H. (2023). Oyun Teorisi Perspektifinden Çatışma Yönetim Stratejilerinin Karşılıklı Etkileşimi ve Denetçilere Yönelik Bir Uygulama. Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Vizyoner Dergisi, 14(38), 607-625.
  5. Bíró, A., Prinz, D., & Sándor, L. (2022). The minimum wage, informal pay, and tax enforcement. Journal of Public Economics, 215, 104728.
  6. Bouev, M., (2005), State Regulations, Job Search and Wage Bargaining: A Study in the Economics of the Informal Sector (April 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn. com/abstract=729307 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ ssrn.729307.
  7. Brotherhood, Luiz and Da Mata, Daniel and Guner, Nezih and Kircher, Philipp and Santos, Cezar, Labor Market Regulation and Informality (December 23, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/ abstract=4674280 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ ssrn.4674280.
  8. Carmichael, F.(2005). A Guide to Game Theory. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil

İngilizce

Konular

Çalışma Ekonomisi, Oyun Teorisi

Bölüm

Araştırma Makalesi

Erken Görünüm Tarihi

20 Şubat 2025

Yayımlanma Tarihi

8 Mayıs 2025

Gönderilme Tarihi

27 Şubat 2024

Kabul Tarihi

7 Şubat 2025

Yayımlandığı Sayı

Yıl 2025 Cilt: 25 Sayı: 2

Kaynak Göster

APA
Çolak, K. (2025). NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN CONTROL-UNREGISTERED EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER INCENTIVE AND PUNISHMENT STRATEGIES. Ege Academic Review, 25(2), 305-320. https://doi.org/10.21121/eab.20250204
AMA
1.Çolak K. NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN CONTROL-UNREGISTERED EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER INCENTIVE AND PUNISHMENT STRATEGIES. eab. 2025;25(2):305-320. doi:10.21121/eab.20250204
Chicago
Çolak, Kerem. 2025. “NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN CONTROL-UNREGISTERED EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER INCENTIVE AND PUNISHMENT STRATEGIES”. Ege Academic Review 25 (2): 305-20. https://doi.org/10.21121/eab.20250204.
EndNote
Çolak K (01 Mayıs 2025) NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN CONTROL-UNREGISTERED EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER INCENTIVE AND PUNISHMENT STRATEGIES. Ege Academic Review 25 2 305–320.
IEEE
[1]K. Çolak, “NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN CONTROL-UNREGISTERED EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER INCENTIVE AND PUNISHMENT STRATEGIES”, eab, c. 25, sy 2, ss. 305–320, May. 2025, doi: 10.21121/eab.20250204.
ISNAD
Çolak, Kerem. “NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN CONTROL-UNREGISTERED EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER INCENTIVE AND PUNISHMENT STRATEGIES”. Ege Academic Review 25/2 (01 Mayıs 2025): 305-320. https://doi.org/10.21121/eab.20250204.
JAMA
1.Çolak K. NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN CONTROL-UNREGISTERED EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER INCENTIVE AND PUNISHMENT STRATEGIES. eab. 2025;25:305–320.
MLA
Çolak, Kerem. “NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN CONTROL-UNREGISTERED EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER INCENTIVE AND PUNISHMENT STRATEGIES”. Ege Academic Review, c. 25, sy 2, Mayıs 2025, ss. 305-20, doi:10.21121/eab.20250204.
Vancouver
1.Kerem Çolak. NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN CONTROL-UNREGISTERED EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER INCENTIVE AND PUNISHMENT STRATEGIES. eab. 01 Mayıs 2025;25(2):305-20. doi:10.21121/eab.20250204