Contract Design: Tour Operator-Hotel Allotment Contracts

Öz

Based on the adaptation view of contract design, this study aims to explain the eff ects of environmental uncertainty as a transactional variable and trust as a relational variable on the degree of completeness in tour operator-hotel allotment contracts. The results obtained from the Turkish tourism industry show that the degree of contractual completeness is related to environmental uncertainty and trust. Trust gives rise to a more complete contract design in uncertain business environments by increasing knowledge sharing between the partners. In conclusion, this study extends the work of Saussier (2000) and hence contributes to the literature by providing evidence for the moderating eff ect of trust on the relationship between environmental uncertainty and contractual completeness

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Contractual completeness, environmental uncertainty, trust, transaction cost theory, relational governance view

Sözleşme Tasarımı: Tur Operatörü-Otel Kontenjan Sözleşmeleri

Öz

Sözleşme tasarımının uyarlanma bakış açısına dayanan bu çalışma, bir işlem maliyeti değişkeni olarak çevresel belirsizlik ve ilişkisel bir değişken olarak güvenin tur operatörü-otel kontenjan sözleşmelerinin eksiksizlik derecesi üzerindeki etkilerini araştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Türk turizm endüstrisinden elde edilen bulgular çevresel belirsizlik ve güvenin sözleşmenin eksiksizlik derecesiyle ilişkili olduğunu göstermektedir. Güven, çevresel belirsizliğin yüksek olduğu iş çevrelerinde, ilişki tarafl arı arasında bilgi paylaşımını arttırarak daha eksiksiz bir sözleşme tasarımına olanak tanımaktadır. Sonuç olarak, bu çalışma, güvenin çevresel belirsizlik ve sözleşmenin eksiksizlik derecesi arasında biçimleyici bir etkiye sahip olduğuna destek sağlayarak Saussier’in (2000) çalışmasını genişletmekte ve bu suretle literatüre katkı sağlamaktadır

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Sözleşmenin eksiksizliği, çevresel belirsizlik, güven, işlem maliyeti teorisi, ilişkisel yönetişim bakış açısı

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