The Effect of Energy (Oil and Natural Gas) Factor in Civil Wars: The Case of Syria

Öz

The aim of this study is to evaluate the role and impact of Syria's oil and natural gas reserves on the civil war. For this reason, in this study, the effects of hydrocarbon resource areas on the war strategies followed by the countries and groups involved in the Syrian civil war, how the energy struggle in the reserve areas affects the war process, the financial impact of oil and natural gas resource areas on the warring groups and the role of conflict intensity and increasing casualties will be discussed. In this direction, a comprehensive literature study was conducted on the subject, scientific publications and reports of international energy organizations were used. The distribution of Syrian energy resources and the groups involved in the war have been tried to be given with maps, and the UCDP data set was used to determine the casualties caused by the parties involved in the civil war. The oil and natural gas fields in Syria have not only led to an increase in the level of conflict between the actors who want to seize control in the civil war, but also have played an effective role in establishing cooperation between illegal organizations and the countries involved in the war in Syria. In Syria, conflicts between terrorist organizations such as DAESH, PYD/YPG/SGD, regime forces, countries that support different groups and dissident groups have been more intense, especially in areas where there are energy resource areas. Syrian oil and natural gas resource areas have not only prolonged the duration of the civil war, but also caused the conflict to intensify. Resource areas have become one of the most important sources of finance for different factions of the war in the country.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Civil war
• energy
• Syria
• oil
• political geography

İç Savaşlarda Enerji (Petrol ve Doğal Gaz) Faktörünün Etkisi: Suriye Örneği

Öz

Çalışmanın amacı, Suriye’nin petrol ve doğal gaz rezerv alanlarının iç savaş üzerindeki rolü ve etkisini değerlendirmektir. Bu nedenle çalışmada, hidrokarbon kaynak alanlarının Suriye iç savaşına dâhil olan ülke ve grupların izledikleri savaş stratejilerine etkileri, rezerv alanlarındaki enerji mücadelesinin savaş sürecini nasıl etkilediği, petrol ve doğal gaz kaynak alanlarının savaşan gruplara finansal tesiri ve çatışma yoğunluğu ile zayiatları arttırmadaki rolü tartışılacaktır. Bu doğrultuda, konu ile ilgili kapsamlı bir literatür çalışması yapılmış, bilimsel yayınlar ve uluslararası enerji kuruluşlarının raporlarından yararlanılmıştır. Suriye enerji kaynaklarının ve savaşa dâhil olan grupların dağılımı haritalarla verilmeye çalışılmış, iç savaşa müdahil olan tarafların neden olduğu can kayıplarının tespiti için UCDP veri seti kullanılmıştır. Suriye petrol ve doğal gaz alanları, iç savaşta kontrolü ele geçirmek isteyen aktörler arasındaki çatışma düzeyinin artmasına yol açmakla kalmamış aynı zamanda illegal örgütlerle Suriye’deki savaşa müdahil olan ülkeler arasında iş birliklerinin yapılmasında da etkin rol oynamıştır. Suriye’de DEAŞ, PYD/YPG/SDG gibi terör örgütleri, rejim güçleri, farklı gruplara destek veren ülkeler ile muhalif gruplar arasındaki çatışmalar özellikle enerji kaynak sahalarının olduğu yerlerde daha yoğun yaşanmıştır. Suriye petrol ve doğal gaz kaynak alanları, yaşanan iç savaşın süresini uzatmakla kalmamış, aynı zamanda çatışmanın daha fazla şiddetlenmesine neden olmuştur. Rezerv/üretim alanları, ülkedeki savaşan farklı gruplar için önemli finans kaynaklarından biri haline gelmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• İç savaş
• Enerji
• Suriye
• petrol
• siyasi coğrafya

Kaynakça

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