Comparison of Firm Level Corporate Governance Indices - Literature Review

Yıl 2021, Cilt: 3 Sayı: 2, 115 - 135, 28.08.2021

Öznur Gülen Ertosun Gökhan Özer

https://doi.org/10.38009/ekimad.917819

Cited By: 1

Öz

Corporate governance has become an important issue in the markets and then related literature especially due to the crisis and the scandals. In this study, it aims to summarize the academic and commercial corporate governance indexes of the firm level in the literature as a whole and to contribute to the literature by revealing the barriers to the formation of a single corporate governance mechanism in the light of the main studies in the field. A qualitative study was conducted for this purpose; by exaiming the academic and commercial corporate governance indices at the firm level in the literature, the differences and discussions on the corporate governance indexes were summarized. These findings reveal that, due to the reasons stated at the end of the study, it does not seem possible to standardize on corporate governance yet.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Corporate Governance, Academic Corporate Governance Index, Commercial Corporate Governance Index, Firm Level Indices, Firm Performance.

Firma Düzeyinde Kurumsal Yönetim İndekslerinin Karşılaştırılması- Literatür İncelemesi

Öz

Kurumsal yönetim, özellikle yaşanan kriz ve skandalların etkisi ile piyasalarda ve sonrasında ilgili literatürde önem kazanan bir konu haline gelmiştir. Bu çalışma literatürde yer alan firma düzeyindeki akademik ve ticari kurumsal yönetim indekslerini bir bütün olarak özetlemek ve alandaki başlıca çalışmalar ışığında tek bir kurumsal yönetim mekanizması oluşmasının önündeki engelleri ortaya koyarak literatüre katkı sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu amaca yönelik olarak nitel bir çalışma yapılmış, literatürde yer alan firma düzeyindeki akademik ve ticari kurumsal yönetim indeksleri incelenerek aralarındaki farklar ve kurumsal yönetim indekslerine yönelik var olan tartışmalar özetlenmiştir. Bu bulgular çalışmanın sonunda ifade edilen gerekçelerden dolayı kurumsal yönetime dair standartlaşmanın henüz mümkün görünmediğini ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Kurumsal Yönetim, Akademik Kurumsal Yönetim İndeksleri, Ticari Kurumsal Yönetim İndeksleri, Firma Düzeyinde İndeksler, Firma Performansı.

Kaynakça

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