New Stage in the Regulation of Global Public Goods: Regulatory Capitalism

Öz

The theoretical abstract structure of the regulations emerges as a phenomenal reality, with the phenomenon of regulator capitalism. In this context, regulator capitalism refers to the transformation of the relationship between society and the state into a business-state relationship with a different division of labor structure. This indicates that global regulators play an active role in the provision of global public goods and services. In the study, the public organization model transformed by regulator capitalism is handled as a transition from bureaucracy to regulocracy. This failure of regulator capitalism is examined in the framework of the regulator capture in this study. While regulocracy refers to the social layer of the new system, which consists of experts and has universal solutions, the regulator capture states that the regulating companies will evolve into the regulator position after a while. While this structure of regulatory capitalism reveals a new division of labor, it also obscures the accountability of public services between society and the state. Such ambiguity has caused representative democracy to be replaced by indirect representative democracy. As a result, the public sector has moved away from public financial management principles such as transparency and accountability.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Public Goods
• Regulatory Capitalism
• Regulocracy
• Regulatory Capture

Küresel Kamusal Malların Regülasyonunda Yeni Aşama: Regülatör Kapitalizmi

Öz

Regülasyonların teorik soyut yapısı, fenomen bir gerçeklik olarak, regülatör kapitalizmi olgusuyla pratikte karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Bu kapsamda regülatör kapitalizmi, toplum ve devlet arasındaki ilişkinin, farklı bir iş bölümü yapısıyla, iş dünyası ve devlet ilişkisine dönüşmesini ifade etmektedir. Bu ise küresel kamusal mal ve hizmetlerin sunumunda küresel regülatörlerin etkin rol oynadığını ifade etmektedir. Çalışmada, regülatör kapitalizminin dönüştürdüğü kamusal örgütlenme modeli bürokrasiden regülokrasiye geçiş şeklinde ele alınmıştır. Regülatör kapitalizminin getirdiği bu başarısızlık çalışmada, regülatör tuzağı çerçevesinde incelenmiştir. Regülokrasi, yeni sistemin uzmanlardan oluşan ve evrensel çözüm yolları bulunan toplumsal katmanını ifade ederken regülatör tuzağı ise regüle eden firmaların bir zaman sonra regüle edici konumuna evrilmesini belirtmektedir. Regülatör kapitalizminin bu yapısı bir taraftan yeni bir iş bölümünü ortaya çıkarırken diğer yandan da toplum ile devlet arasındaki kamusal hizmetlerin hesap verilebilirliğini de belirsizleştirmektedir. Böyle bir muğlaklık ise temsili demokrasinin yerini dolaylı temsili demokrasinin almasına neden olmuştur. Neticede kamu kesimi, şeffaflık hesap verilebilirlik gibi kamu mali yönetim ilkelerinden uzaklaşmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Kamusal Mallar
• Regülasyon Kapitalizmi
• Regülokrasi
• Regülatör Tuzağı

Kaynakça

1. Bernstein, M.H. (1972). Independent regulatory agencies: A perspective on their reform. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 400(1), 14-26. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716272400001
2. Biggar, D.R. (1999). Relationship between regulators and competition authorities (SSRN Working Paper No. 185090). Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=185090
3. Braithwaite, J. (1999). Accountability and governance under the new regulatory state. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 58 (1), 90–97. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/1467-8500.00077
4. Braithwaite, J. (2008). Regulatory capitalism — How it works, ideas for making it work better. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
5. Braithwaite, J. (2021). Regulatory capitalism, extinctions, and China (SSRN Working Paper No. 3767372). Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3767372
6. Braudel, F. (1982). Civilization and capitalism 15th-18th century: The wheels of commerce. New York: University of California Press.
7. Braun, D. (1993). Who governs intermediary agencies? Principal-agent relations in research policy-making. Journal of Public Policy, 13(02), 135-162. Retrieved from https://www.cambridge.org/
8. Cardoso, R.L. (2008). Accounting regulation and regulation of accounting: Theories and The Brazilian case of convergence to IFRS (SSRN Working Paper No. 1288068). Retrieved from https://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/bitstream/handle/10438/27299/SSRN-id1288068.pdf?sequence=1

9. Carpenter, D. and Moss, D.A (2013). Preventing regulatory capture: Special interest influence and how to limit it. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10. Carrapico, H. and Farrand, B. (2017). Dialogue, partnership and empowerment for network and information security: The changing role of the private sector from objects of regulation-to-regulation shapers. Crime, Law and Social Change, 67(3), 245-263. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-016-9652-4
11. Coglianese, C. (2012). Measuring regulatory performance: Evaluating the impact of regulation and regulatory policy (OECD Working Paper No. 1) Retrieved from https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?repid=rep1&type=pdf&doi=47319685d34eb420539054e461496732715207a2
12. Den Hertog, J.A. (1999). General theories of regulation. Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 223-270. Retrieved from https://dspace.library.uu.nl/
13. Den Hertog, J.A. (2010). Review of economic theories of regulation (Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute Working Paper No. 10-18). Retrieved from https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/309815
14. Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper & Row.
15. Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity. London: Hamish Hamilton.
16. Gilardi, F. (2005). The institutional foundations of regulatory capitalism: The diffusion of independent regulatory agencies in Western Europe. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598(1), 84-101. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716204271833
17. Gilardi, F. and Maggetti, M. (2011). The independence of regulatory authorities. In D. Levi-Faur (Ed.), Handbook on the politics of regulation (pp. 1-21). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
18. Guardiancich, I. and Guidi, M. (2016). Formal independence of regulatory agencies and varieties of capitalism: A case of institutional complementarity? Regulation & Governance, 10(3), 211-229. https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12080
19. Jordana. J. (2005). Globalizing regulatory capitalism. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598(1), 184-190. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716204272780
20. Jordana, J. and Levi-Faur, D. (2005). The diffusion of regulatory capitalism in Latin America: Sectoral and national channels in the making of a new order. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598(1), 102-124. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716204272587
21. Knieps, G. (2015). Network economics principles – strategies – competition policy. Berlin: Springer.
22. Krylova, Y. (2018). From Kleptocracy to “regulocracy”: Administrative barriers to doing business in Russia. United Kingdom: Routledge.
23. Lange, L.M. (2021). The reliance on private sector involvement in The European AI approach: An application of the networked regulatory capitalism framework. Dutch: University of Twente.
24. Lazer, D. (2006). Global and domestic governance: Modes of interdependence in regulatory policymaking. European Law Journal, 12(4), 455-468. https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2006.00327.x
25. Levi-Faur, D. (2005). The global diffusion of regulatory capitalism. Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598, 12–32. https://doi.org/10.1177/000271620427237
26. Levi-Faur, D. (2009). Regulatory capitalism and the reassertion of the public interest. Policy and Society, 27(3), 181-191. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2008.10.002
27. Levi-Faur, D. (2011). Regulatory networks and regulatory agencification: Towards a single European regulatory space. Journal of European Public Policy, 18(6), 810-829. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2011.593309
28. Levi-Faur, D. (2012). From “big government” to “big governance”. In D. Levi-Faur (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of governance (pp. 3-18). https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199560530.001.0001
29. Levi-Faur, D., Gilardi, F. and Jordana, J. (2005). Regulatory revolution by surprise: On the citadels of regulatory capitalism and the rise of regulocracy. Paper presented at the 3rd ECPR Conference. Budapest, Hungary. Retrieved from http://regulation.upf.edu/ecpr-05-papers/dlevifaur.pdf
30. Levi-Faur, D. and Jordana, J. (2005). Regulatory capitalism: Policy irritants and convergent divergence. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598(1), 191-197. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716204272793
31. Lobel, O. (2004). The renew deal: The fall of regulation and the rise of governance in contemporary legal thought. Minnesota Law Review, 89, 342-367. Retrieved from https://heinonline.org/ Majone, G. (1996). Regulating Europe. United Kingdom: Psychology Press.
32. Morrison, A.B. (1988). How independent are independent regulatory agencies. Duke University School of Law, 2(3), 252-256. Retrieved from https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/
33. Nichols, G. and Ralston, R. (2015). The legacy costs of delivering the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games through regulatory capitalism. Leisure Studies, 34(4). 389-404. https://doi.org/10.1080/02614367.2014.923495
34. Noll, R.G. (1989). Economic perspectives on the politics of regulation. In R. Schmalensee and R. Willig (Eds.), Handbook of industrial organization (pp. 1253-1287). https://doi.org/10.1016/S1573-448X(89)02010-8
35. Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and theory of groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
36. Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. (1992). Reinventing government, reading. Mass: Addison Wesley.
37. Parker, D. and Kirkpatrick, C. (2012). Measuring regulatory performance. The economic impact of regulatory policy: A literature review of quantitative evidence (OECD Working Paper No. 3). Retrieved from https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?repid=rep1&type=pdf&doi=9e0fa608048b8952715b936de1470e82cd7164eb
38. Parker, C. and Nielsen, V. (2009). The challenge of empirical research on business compliance in regulatory capitalism. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 5, 45-70. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.093008.131555
39. Peltzman, S. (1976). Toward a more general theory of regulation. Journal of Law and Economics, 19(2), 211-240. https://doi.org/10.1086/466865
40. Posner, R. (1974). Theories of economic regulation (NBER Working Paper No. 41). Retrieved from https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w0041/w0041.pdf
41. Raco, M. (2014). Delivering flagship projects in an era of regulatory capitalism: State-led privatization and The London Olympics 2012. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 38(1), 176-197. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.12025
42. Ramsay, I. (2006). Consumer law, regulatory capitalism and the 'new learning' in regulation. Sydney Law Review, 28(1), 9-35. Retrieved from https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/1025
43. Scott, B.R. (2006). The political economy of capitalism. Harvard: Harvard Business School.
44. Scott, C. (2017). The regulatory state and beyond: Regulatory theory. Australia: ANU Press.
45. Shamir, R. (2008). Corporate social responsibility: Towards a new market-embedded morality? Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 9(2), 371–394. https://doi.org/10.2202/1565-3404.1190
46. Stigler, G.J. (1971). The theory of economic regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2(1), 3-21. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3003160
47. Swyngedouw, E. (2009). The antinomies of the post political city: In search of a democratic politics of environmental production. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 33(3), 601-620. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2009.00859.x
48. Tan, T. (2002). Bağımsız idari otoriteler veya düzenleyici kurullar. Amme İdaresi Dergisi, 35(2), 11-37. Erişim adresi: http://repository.bilkent.edu.tr/
49. Thatcher, M. (2002). Regulation after delegation: Independent regulatory agencies in Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 9(6), 954-972. https://doi.org/10.1080/1350176022000046445