Rusya–Ukrayna Savaşı, Enerjinin Silahlaştırılması ve Türkiye’nin Enerji Merkezi Olma Hedefi

Öz

Rusya’nın 24 Şubat 2022’de Ukrayna’yı işgal etmesi, Avrupa’da 1973 OAPEC ambargosundan bu yana yaşanan en şiddetli enerji şokunu tetiklemiştir. Moskova’nın enerjiyi silah olarak kullanması, Avrupa Birliği’nin (AB) Rus hidrokarbonlarına olan uzun vadeli bağımlılığının kritik bir stratejik zafiyet olduğunu açıkça ortaya koymuştur. Bu çalışma, Rusya–Ukrayna Savaşı’nın Türkiye’nin bölgesel bir enerji merkezi (hubı) olma hedefini nasıl etkilediğini incelemekte ve bu hedefin geçici bir fırsat penceresinden ziyade kalıcı bir stratejik gerçeğe dönüşmesi için gereken koşulları değerlendirmektedir. Enerjinin silahlaştırılması (silah olarak kullanılması), Türkiye’nin jeostratejik rolü ve Avrupa enerji güvenliği konularını içeren üç farklı literatürü bütüncül bir teorik çerçevede bir araya getiren çalışma, 2022 sonrası süreçte Türkiye’nin mevcut transit işlevleri ile enerji merkezi olma hedefleri arasındaki boşluğu incelemektedir. Çalışma, enerji jeopolitiği ve enerji güvenliği konularını, Keohane ve Nye’ın karmaşık karşılıklı bağımlılık teorisi ile enerjinin silah olarak kullanılması (silahlaştırılması) perspektiflerine dayanarak analiz etmektedir. Savaşın Avrupa’nın alternatif güzergâhlara olan talebini artırarak Avrupalı aktörlerle bir dizi yeni ikili anlaşmanın önünü açtığını ve Türkiye’nin jeostratejik değerini yükselttiğini savunan çalışma, 2022 sonrasında gelişen koşulların Türkiye’nin bir enerji merkezi olma potansiyelini güçlendirdiğini vurgulamaktadır. Bununla birlikte, enerji piyasasının büyük oranda BOTAŞ’ın hâkimiyetindeki yoğunlaşmış yapısı, yerli üretimin sınırlı olması, tedarikçilerden kaynaklanan riskler, enerji piyasasındaki liberalleşmenin yetersizliği ve bölgesel jeopolitik dalgalanmalar gibi yapısal eksiklikler, Türkiye’nin mevcut durumda tam teşekküllü bir enerji merkezinden ziyade büyük bir enerji transit ülkesi konumunda olduğunu göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Rusya–Ukrayna savaşı
• enerji jeopolitiği
• karmaşık karşılıklı bağımlılık
• enerjinin silahlaştırılması
• enerji merkezi Türkiye.

Russia–Ukraine War, the Weaponisation of Energy, and Türkiye’s Ambition to Become an Energy Hub

Öz

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 triggered the most severe energy shock in Europe since the 1973 OAPEC oil embargo. Moscow’s weaponization of energy has clearly demonstrated that the European Union’s long-term dependence on Russian hydrocarbons constitutes a critical strategic vulnerability. This study examines how the Russia–Ukraine War has affected Türkiye’s ambition to become a regional energy hub and assesses the conditions required for this ambition to evolve from a temporary window of opportunity into a durable strategic reality. Bringing together three strands of literature—energy weaponization, Türkiye’s geostrategic role, and European energy security—within an integrated theoretical framework, the study explores the gap between Türkiye’s existing transit functions and its aspirations to become an energy hub in the post-2022 period. It analyses energy geopolitics and energy security through the lenses of Keohane and Nye’s theory of complex interdependence and the conceptualization of energy as a tool of coercion. The study argues that the war has intensified European demand for alternative energy routes, paving the way for new bilateral agreements with European actors and enhancing Türkiye’s geostrategic significance. In this context, it highlights that conditions since 2022 have strengthened Türkiye’s potential to develop into an energy hub. Nevertheless, structural constraints—including a highly concentrated energy market in which BOTAŞ remains dominant; limited domestic energy production; supplier-related risks; insufficient market liberalization; and regional geopolitical volatility—suggest that Türkiye remains primarily a major energy transit country rather than a fully fledged energy hub.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Russia–Ukraine war
• energy geopolitics
• complex interdependence
• weaponisation of energy
• Türkiye as an energy hub.

Kaynakça

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