ARAP BAHARI SONRASI BİRLEŞİK KRALLIĞIN KÖRFEZ/KÖRFEZ ÜLKELERİ İLE ARTAN İLİŞKİLERİNDEKİ DİNAMİKLERİN NEOREALİST PERSPEKTİFTEN ANALİZ EDİLMESİ

Öz

Arap Baharı sonrası Birleşik Krallık, tarihsel bağlarını ve bölgesel dinamikleri kullanarak, bölgedeki gücünü artırmak için Körfez/Körfez ülkelerine yönelik önemli siyasi, ekonomik ve askeri adımlar atmıştır. Bu bağlamda, bölgedeki askeri varlığını güçlendirmek için stratejik davranarak Bahreyn'de bir askeri (deniz) üssü kurmuş ve Umman'daki üssünü de genişletmiştir. Ayrıca Brexit kararının ardından Birleşik Krallık, artan enerji talebini karşılamak, enerji güvenliğini sağlamak ve ekonomik istikrarını korumak için zengin doğal kaynaklara sahip Körfez ülkelerine yönelmiştir. Üstelik, Rusya-Ukrayna savaşı, birçok Avrupa ülkesinin yanı sıra İngiltere'nin de ticari ilişkilerini etkilemiş ve İngiltere'yi Körfez ülkeleriyle giderek artan bir yakınlaşmaya itmiştir. İlginç bir şekilde Birleşik Krallık, Körfez ülkeleriyle güvenlik/askeri ve ticari anlaşmalar yaparken, uzun zamandır süre gelen siyasi görüş ayrılıklarına rağmen İran ile de ilişkilerini geliştirmeye çalışmıştır. Bu anlatılanlar göz önüne alındığında, sırasıyla Arap Baharı, Brexit kararı ve Rusya-Ukrayna savaşı gibi sistemik zorlamalar/uyaranlar, İngiltere'yi kaçınılmaz olarak Körfez ülkeleriyle bağlarını güçlendirmeye zorlamıştır. Bu araştırma, temelde sistemik uyaranların Birleşik Krallık'ın Arap Baharı sonrası Körfez bölgesi/Körfez ülkeleriyle ilişkilerini nasıl etkilediğini Yeni-Gerçekçi teori perspektifinden incelemektedir. Bilhassa, bu çalışmanın Birleşik Krallık ile Körfez/Körfez ülkeleri arasındaki siyasi, ekonomik ve askeri/güvenlik ilişkilerine ışık tutması beklenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• İşbirliği
• Körfez Ülkeleri
• Enerji Güvenliği
• Güç Politikaları
• Rekabet
• Birleşik Krallık

ANALYSING THE DYNAMICS OF THE UK’S GROWING RELATIONS WITH THE GULF/GULF COUNTRIES IN THE POST-ARAB SPRING FROM THE NEOREALIST PERSPECTIVE

Öz

In the post-Arab Spring, the United Kingdom (UK) took significant political, economic, and military steps toward the Gulf/Gulf countries to increase its strength in the region by exploiting its historical ties and regional dynamics. In this context, it strategically established a military (naval) base in Bahrain and extended its base in Oman to strengthen its military presence in the region. Additionally, after the Brexit decision, the UK approached the Gulf countries, which have immense natural resources, to meet the increasing energy demands, provide energy security and maintain its economic stability. Moreover, the Russia-Ukraine war affected the trade relations of the UK, as well as many European countries, and pushed the UK growingly for rapprochement with the Gulf countries. Interestingly, while making security/military and commercial agreements with Gulf countries, the UK also tried to improve its relations with Iran despite their long-standing political disagreement, which can be analyzed that the UK desired to increase its influence/strength on both sides of the Gulf. Given this background, the systemic challenges/stimuli such as respectively the Arab Spring, the Brexit decision, and the Russia-Ukraine war inevitably forced the UK to maximize its ties with the Gulf countries. This research mainly examines how the systemic stimuli affected the UK’s relations with the Gulf region/Gulf countries in the post-Arab Spring from the perspective of the neorealist theory. Above all, it is expected to shed light on political, economic, and military/security relations between the UK and the Gulf/Gulf countries.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Cooperation
• Gulf countries
• Energy Security
• Power Politics
• Rivalry
• The United Kingdom

Kaynakça

1. ALTIN, O. (2018), Avrupa Birliği Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası Bağlamında Ortadoğu Çıkmazı, Social Sciences Studies Journal. Vol: 4, No. 23, 4742-4750, https://dx.doi.org/10.26449/sssj.933.
2. BASHIR, N. (25 July 2019), UK Navy to escort tankers through Strait of Hormuz amid Iran crisis, CNN. Retrieved May 10, 2022, from https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/25/middleeast/uk-tankers-hormuz-gbr-intl/index.html.
3. BÖLME, S. M. and Çavuşoğlu, E. (2019), Yeni İngiliz Kolonyalizmi: Çekilme Sonrası İngiltere’nin Basra Körfezi’ndeki Nüfuz Politikası (1971-1991), Uluslararası İlişkiler, Çevrimiçi Erken Yayım, 1-15, DOI: 10.33458/uidergisi.660656.
4. BROOKE-HOLLAND, L. (2021), Integrated Review 2021: The defence tilt to the Indo-Pacific October. Retrieved May 13, 2022, from https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9217/CBP-9217.pdf.
5. ÇAVUŞOĞLU, E. (2018), Arap-İsrail Sorunu Ekseninde İngiltere’nin Post -Kolonyal Körfez Politikası (1971-1991), FSM İlmi Araştırmaları Insan ve Toplum Bilimleri Dergisi, Sayı 11, 1-27.
6. DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE. (30 September 2021), The UK’s trade agreements. Retrieved May 9, 2022, from https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/-uks-trade-agreements.
7. DEVANNY, J and BERRY, P. (2021), Gulf Security is Our Security, UK Gulf Strategy, 2010-2020. Defence Studies, 21:2, 141-161, 141-161, DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2021.1874244.
8. DUMBRELL, J. (2006), A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations from Cold War to Iraq, Second Edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillian.

9. HORTON, J., PALUMPO, D. and BOWLER, T. (2022), Dünya Rus petrolüne ne kadar bağımlı?, BBC NEWS, 9 March 2022. Retrieved May 7, 2022, from https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-60674748.
10. HOUSE OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEEH. (8 December 2020), No prosperity without justice: the UK’s relationship with Iran. Fifth Report of Session 2019-2021. Retrieved May 9, 2022, from https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/3987/documents/40221/default/.
11. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. (28 April 2022), Progress on UK free trade agreement negotiations. Retrieved May 9, 2022, from https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9314/.
12. JOHNSON, B. (2016), Beyond Brexit: a Global Britain, The UK Government, 2 December 2016. Retrieved June 25, 2022, from https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/beyond-brexit-a-global-britain.
13. KENT, M. (1994), Moguls and Mandarins Oil, Imperialism and the Middle East in British Foreign Policy, London: Frank Crass and Co. Ltd.
14. LABS, E. J. (1997), Beyond victory: Offensive realism and the expansion of war aims, Security Studies, 6:4, 1-49, DOI: 10.1080/09636419708429321.
15. LEECH, P. and GASKARTH, J. (2015), British Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 26:1, 139-160, DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2015.999631.
16. LOFT, P. (2021), The Gulf in 2021, House of Commons Library, Commons Library Research Briefing. Retrieved May 10, 2022, from https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9284/CBP-9284.pdf.
17. MAGUIRE, S. and VICKERS, R. (2013), Constructing Britain’s response to the Arab uprisings: A comparison of Bahrain and Libya, Paper presented to the annual BISA conference, 21 June 2013.
18. MEARSHEIMER, J. J. (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company.
19. MEARSHEIMER, J. J. (2021), The Inevitable Rivalry: America, China, and the Tragedy of Great-Power Politics, Foreign Affairs.
20. MEHDI, S. Z. (2022), Iran releases 2 Britons after UK pays $530 dept, Anadolu Agency. Retrieved May 9, 2022, from https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-releases-2-britons-after-uk-pays-530-debt/2537121.
21. MOUSAVIAN, S. H. (2016), EU-Iran Relations After Brexit, Survival, 58:5, 83-94, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2016.1231533.
22. ONLEY, J. (2009), Britain and the Gulf Shaikhdoms, 1820-1971: The Politics of Protection, Center For International And Regional Studies (CIRS), Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar.
23. QATRJOULI, A. (2022), Qatar to pump £10 billion in UK’s economy over five years, Doha News, 25 May 2022. Retrieved June 25, 2022, from https://dohanews.co/qatar-to-pump-10-billion-in-uks-economy-over-five-years/.
24. REUTERS. (5 April 2018), UK opens permanent military base in Bahrain. Retrieved May 9, 2022, from https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-uk-bahrain-idUKKCN1HC2NR.
25. ROBERTS, D. B. and ALMAHRI, S. G. (2021), The UK’s Integrated Review and the Gulf States. In Joe Devanny and John Gearson (Eds.). The Integrated Review In Context: A Strategy Fit for the 2020s?. Centre for Defence Studies.
26. SEVİM, C. (2012), Küresel Enerji Jeopolitiği ve Enerji Güvenliği, Journal of Yasar University, 26(7), 4378-4391.
27. SHARFI, M. H. (2018), UAE-UK Relations in the Context of Brexit, Contemporary Arab Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3, 135-154.
28. SMITH, S. C. (2004), Britain’s Revival and Fall in the Gulf: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial States, 1950-71, New York: RoutledgeCurzon.
29. SMITH. S. C. (2015), Britain’s Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf: A Pattern Not a Puzzle, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 44:2, 328-351, DOI: 10.1080/03086534.2015.1123541.
30. STANFIELD, G., STOKES, D., and KELLY, S. (2018), UK Strategy in the Gulf and Middle East after American Retrenchment, Insight Turkey, Vol. 20, No. 4, 231-248.
31. STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTES (SIPRI). (2022), World military expenditure passes $2 trillion for the first time. Retrieved June 21, 2022, from https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2022/world-military-expenditure-passes-2-trillion-first-time.
32. SNYDER, G. H. (2002), Mearsheimer’s World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security, International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1, 149-173.
33. ŞENEL, Ş. (2016), 19. Yüzyılda İngiltere’nin Basra Bölgesindeki Faaliyetleri, Gazi Akademik Bakış, 9(18), 187-207.
34. THE CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, (2022), Retrieved May 7, 2022, from https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/united-kingdom/#economy.
35. THE UK GOVERNMENT, FOREIGN, COMMONWEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT OFFICE. (20 December 2021), Gulf Cooperation Council-United Kingdom Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. 20 December 2021: joint communique.
36. THE UK GOVERNMENT. (30 March 2016), Multi-million pound joint venture announced between Britain and Oman, 30 March 2016. Retrieved June 24, 2022, from https://www.gov.uk/government/news/multi-million-pound-joint-venture-announced-between-britain-and-oman.
37. THE UK GOVERNMENT. (5 September 2016), UK upgrades diplomatic relations with Iran. Retrieved May 9, 2022, from https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-upgrades-diplomatic-relations-with-iran#:~:text=The%20UK%20has%20appointed%20an,been%20appointed%20Her%20Majesty's%20Ambassador.
38. THE UK GOVERNMENT. (9 December 2016), Foreign Secretary speech: “Britain is back East of Suez”. Retrieved May 10, 2022, from https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-speech-britain-is-back-east-of-suez.
39. THE UK GOVERNMENT. (19 February 2019), UK and Oman sign historic Joint Defence Agreement, 21 February 2019. Retrieved June 24, 2022, from https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-oman-sign-historic-joint-defence-agreement.
40. THE UK GOVERNMENT. (12 September 2020), Defence Secretary announces investment in strategic Omani port. 12 September 2020. Retrieved June 24, 2022, from https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-secretary-announces-investment-in-strategic-omani-port.
41. THE UK GOVERNMENT. (8 October 2021), UK prepares for trade deal with Gulf Cooperation Council. Retrieved May 9, 2022, from https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-prepares-for-trade-deal-with-gulf-cooperation-council.
42. THE UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE. (2019), Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2018-19. 22 July 2019.
43. THE UK PARLIAMENT. (2011), British foreign policy and the ‘Arab Spring’: the transition to democracy, 8 December 2011. Retrieved June 26, 2022, from https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmfaff/writev/arab/as07.htm.
44. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (WTO). (2022), Russia-Ukraine conflict puts fragile trade recovery at risk. Retrieved May 7, 2022, from https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres22_e/pr902_e.htm.
45. ULRICHSEN, K. C. (2022), Qatar-U.K. ties after the blockade and Brexit: What next?, Analyses. Aljazeera Centre For Studies. Retrieved May 13, 2022, from https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/analyses/qatar-uk-ties-after-blockade-and-brexit-what-next.
46. UPADHYAY, D. K and SIDDIQUIS, F. R. (2017), The UK and Gulf: A ‘New Chapter’ in Partnership, Indian Council of World Affairs. Retrieved May 7, 2022, from https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=1770&lid=767.
47. VAGNEUR-JONES, A. (2017), Global Britain in the Gulf: Brexit and relations with the GCC, Fondation pourla Recherche Strategique. Retrieved May 9, 2022, from https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/notes/2017/201713.pdf.
48. WALTZ, K. N. (1979), Theory of International Politics, Reading, Massachusetts and London: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
49. WALTZ, K. N. (2000), Structural Realism after the Cold War, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, 5-41.
50. YALÇIN, H. B. (2015), Uluslararası Sistem ve İstikrar: Kavramsal Bir Değerlendirme, Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi, 10(1), 209-229.
51. YENIGUN, C. and AL-MAMARI, S. Z. S. (2021), Brexit’s Impacts on the Arabian Gulf, Journal of Contemporary Issues in Business and Government, Vol. 27, No. 3.
52. YÜCE, S. (2016), Britanya’nın Ortadoğu Politikası ve Gertrude Bell, First Edition, İstanbul: Nizamiye Akademi.
53. YÜCE, S. (2022), Understanding Iraq’s Persistent Domestic Instability: A Revisit to the 2003 Iraq War and the Effect of the US Foreign Policy, Afro Eurasian Studies, 8(3), 249-260. DOI: 10.33722/afes.1096847.
54. YÜCE, S. and AMOUR, P. O. (2022), Russia is Back to the Balancing Game, Gazi Akademik Bakış Dergisi, 14(28), 43-66.