THE NEW INSIGHTS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND INCOME: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM ADVANCED ECONOMIES

Yıl 2019, , 1776 - 1796, 15.10.2019

Onur Özdemir

https://doi.org/10.17755/esosder.554336

Cited By: 1

Öz

This paper replicates the data set of Acemoglu et al. (2008) to investigate
the relationship between the level of income and the degree of democracy in
terms of advanced economies over the period 1960-2000. The study extends the
initial findings of Acemoglu et al. (2008) in terms of econometric procedures
by using the system-GMM and allowing for
more flexible – non-linear – specifications for the effect of income on
democracy. The empirical results provide evidence
of positive and non-linear effect from income to democracy for advanced
economies even after controlling for country-specific effects. In addition,
with the same data set that of Acemoglu et al. (2008), we find that the
coefficients of log GDP per capita are positive
and statistically significant in most specifications by way of using the
system-GMM method, in contrast to the results provided by Acemoglu et al.
(2008). Furthermore, an interesting
result is the square term of log GDP per capita which is negative and
statistically significant. This outcome indicates that while the initial stages
of an increase in log GDP per capita have a positive impact on democracy, the
latter stages show that this positive correlation turns into a negative possibly
due to the changing dynamics of the power of income segments in the society.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Democracy, Income, Difference-GMM, System-GMM, Non-Linear Specification

THE NEW INSIGHTS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND INCOME: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM ADVANCED ECONOMIES

Öz

Bu makale,
Acemoglu vd. (2008)’nin veri setini kullanarak gelir seviyesi ve demokrasi
düzeyi arasındaki ilişkiyi 1960-2000 dönemi için gelişmiş ülkeler açısından
araştırmaktadır. Çalışma Acemoglu vd. (2008)’nin önsel çıkarımlarını sistem-GMM
ve gelirin demokrasi üzerindeki etkisi adına esnek – doğrusal olmayan – spesifikasyon
kullanımına olanak sağlayarak ekonometrik yöntemler açısından genişletmektedir.
Ampirik sonuçlar, ülkeye-özgü etkilerin hesaba katıldığı durumlarda bile,
gelişmiş ekonomiler için gelirden demokrasiye doğru pozitif ve doğrusal olmayan
bir etkinin varlığına dair çıktılar sunmaktadır. Ayrıca Acemoglu vd. (2008)
tarafından kullanılan aynı veri seti çerçevesinde, Acemoglu vd. (2008)’nin
sonuçlarına karşıt olarak, kişi başına gelirin logaritmik katsayısının
sistem-GMM yöntemi kullanımı aracılığıyla çoğu spesifikasyon için pozitif ve
istatistiksel olarak anlamlı çıktığına ulaşılmıştır. Buna ek olarak, ilgi
çekici sonuç kişi başına gelirin logaritmik katsayı karesinin negatif ve
istatistiksel olarak anlamlı çıkmasıdır. Bu çıktı kişi başına düşen GSYH’deki
artışın ilk aşamalarının demokrasi üzerinde olumlu bir etkisi olmasına karşın,
toplumdaki gelir bölüşümündeki gücün değişen dinamiklerine büyük oranda bağlı
olarak ileri aşamalarında negatif bir duruma dönüştüğünü göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Demokrasi, Gelir, Fark-GMM, Sistem-GMM, Doğrusal-Olmayan Spesifikasyon

Kaynakça

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