An Evaluation On Experimental Philosophy

Öz

Experimental philosophy is an interdisciplinary field that has not come to the fore in our country but has been developing rapidly in the West for the last 15-20 years. Experimental philosophy movement, which started to investigate whether similar differences also occur in philosophical intuitions based on experiments involving East-West comparison in psychology, stated that the results reached by the methods used by traditional desk philosophy for centuries are not reliable because the intuitions may vary according to many factors such as culture, socioeconomic status, gender, age, demographic structure. Experimental philosophy, which was a radical opposition to the entire history and theories of philosophy at first, began to be seen as a way to strengthen traditional philosophy with experimental methods by new research after a while. The recent experimental philosophy, which is also known as the positive program, while making room for intuitions, has taken on a restrictive identity, suggesting investigating which intuition are reliable or not, and to proceed only with the reliable ones. The area is new and also it allows to research very different elements together with many other disciplines, however this feature of it causes some uncertainties. Yet, the rapid increase in number of studies seem to be able to eliminate this confusion with their important findings. Turkey is a country that can be an important opportunity for the field with its geopolitical and cultural position; therefore, experimental philosophy should be introduced in our country and research should be accelerated.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Experimental Philosophy
• Traditional Philosophy
• Analytical Philosophy
• Intuition
• Dilemma
• Experimental Philosophy, Traditional Philosophy, Analytical Philosophy, Intuition, Dilemma

DENEYSEL FELSEFE ÜZERİNE BİR DEĞERLENDİRME

Öz

Deneysel felsefe ülkemizde öne çıkmayan fakat Batıda son 15-20 yıldır hızlı bir şekilde gelişmekte olan disiplinler arası bir alandır. Psikolojide yapılan Doğu-Batı karşılaştırmasını içeren deneyleri temel alarak benzer farklılıkların felsefi sezgilerde de ortaya çıkıp çıkmadığını araştırmaya başlayan deneysel felsefe akımı, geleneksel masa başı felsefenin yüzyıllardır uyguladığı yöntemlerle ulaştığı sonuçların güvenilir olmadığını, çünkü dayandıkları sezgilerin kültür, sosyoekonomik durum, cinsiyet, yaş, demografik yapı gibi birçok unsura göre değişebileceğini ortaya koymuştur. Başta tüm felsefe tarihine ve kuramlarına radikal bir karşı çıkış olan deneysel felsefe, bir süre sonra yeni araştırmalarla geleneksel felsefeyi deneysel metotlarla güçlendirmenin bir yolu olarak görülmeye başlanmıştır. Pozitif program olarak da anılan son dönem deneysel felsefe, sezgilere alan açmakla beraber, hangilerinin güvenilir olup olmadığının araştırılmasını ve sadece güvenilir sezgilerle yola devam edilmesini salık veren kısıtlayıcı bir kimliğe bürünmüştür. Alanın yeni olması ve birçok disiplinle birlikte çok farklı unsurları araştırmaya imkan vermesi bazı belirsizliklere yol açsa da, sayıları hızla artan çalışmalar önemli bulgularıyla bu karışıklığı giderecek nitelikte görünmektedir. Türkiye jeopolitik ve kültürel konumuyla alan için önemli bir fırsat olabilecek bir ülkedir; dolayısıyla deneysel felsefe ülkemizde de bilinmeli ve bu alanda yapılacak deneysel araştırmalara zemin hazırlanmalıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Deneysel felsefe
• Geleneksel Felsefe
• Analitik Felsefe
• Sezgi
• İkilem
• Deneysel felsefe, Geleneksel Felsefe, Analitik Felsefe, Sezgi, İkilem

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