Yapay Eğilimler ve Eğilimsel Bağdaşırcılık Üzerine Bir Deneme

Öz

Teknolojik ilerlemelerin günümüzdeki hızlı seyri, insanın kendi tasarımı olan eserlerle ilişkisini derinlemesine anlamak adına önemli bir araştırma alanı sunmaktadır. İnsanlar tarafından tasarlanan eserler, kullanıcıları üzerinde çeşitli zihinsel ve fiziksel etkilere sahip olabilir. İnsanın eserle etkileşimi, pasif bir rolde değil; aksine insanın içsel eğilimlerini ortaya çıkararak onu yeni yaratımlara açık hale getiren bir potansiyel sergilemektedir. Bu makalede teknolojinin insan yaşamına etkisi, çağdaş felsefeci Kadri Vihvelin'in eğilimsel bağdaşırcılık perspektifi üzerinden incelenecek ve özelliklerin eğilimlere bağlı olduğu bir metafizik sistemin savunusu yapılacaktır. Bu bağlamda, ortaya çıkan eğilimsel bağdaşırcılık olgusu, bağdaşırcılık ve özgürlük kavramlarını teknoloji bağlamında değerlendirmek için yeni felsefi düşüncelerin gelişmesine kapı aralamaktadır. Dolayısıyla, teknolojik aygıtların insan yaşamını şekillendirmesine rağmen, insan-eser etkileşimi sonucunda beklenmeyen ve yeni güçlerin ortaya çıkabileceği vurgulanmaktadır. Makalede, eğilimsel bağdaşırcılık fikri özellikle metin tabanlı yapay zekâ uygulamalarıyla insan etkileşimini ele alarak incelenecektir. Yapay zekânın insanların düşünce örüntüleriyle ortak çalışabilmesi eğilimsel bağdaşırcılığın gözlemlenebilmesi için anlamlı bir örnektir. Sonuç olarak makalenin amacı, insan-eser ilişkisine eğilimsel bir perspektifle yaklaşarak, teknolojinin insan özgürlüğü üzerindeki etkilerini ele almaktır. Ayrıca eğilimsel bağdaşırcılık perspektifi üzerinden teknolojik eserlerin insan özgürlüğüne olumlu bir katkı sağlayabileceği iddiasını savunmaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Eğilimler
• Bağdaşırcılık
• Metafizik
• Özgür İrade
• Yapay Zekâ.

an Essay on Artificial Dispositions and Dispositional Compatibilism

Öz

The rapid pace of technological advancements offers an essential field of research for a deeper understanding of man's relationship with artifacts of her design. These artifacts designed by humans can have various mental and physical effects on their users. The human interaction with the artifact is not passive; on the contrary, it exhibits a potential that reveals the inner dispositions of human beings and makes them open to new creations. In this article, we will examine the impact of technology on human life through the dispositional compatibilism perspective of the contemporary philosopher Kadri Vihvelin, arguing for a system of metaphysics in which ontological properties depend on dispositions. In this context, the emerging phenomenon of dispositional compatibilism opens the door to developing new philosophical ideas for evaluating the concepts of compatibilism and freedom in the context of technology. Thus, it is emphasized that although technological devices shape human life, new and unexpected powers may emerge due to human-artifact interaction. This article will examine the idea of dispositional compatibilism by specifically considering human interaction with text-based AI applications. The ability of AI to collaborate with human thought patterns is a meaningful example of the observation of dispositional compatibilism. In conclusion, the article aims to address the effects of technology on human freedom by approaching the human-artifact relationship from a dispositional perspective. It also aims to defend the claim that technological artifacts can positively contribute to human freedom from the perspective of dispositional compatibilism.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Dispositions
• Compatibilism
• Metaphysics
• Free Will
• Artificial Intelligence.

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