Metaetik Nedir? Ahlaki Bir Hayat Görüşü Sunabilir mi?

Yıl 2025, Sayı: 81, 200 - 227, 15.07.2025

Cemre Demirel

https://doi.org/10.58634/felsefedunyasi.1658395

Öz

Çalışmanın amacı, ahlak felsefesinin muhtemelen en temel dalı olan metaetiği okuyucuya tanıtmak ve metaetiğin ahlaki bir hayat görüşü oluşturmadaki rolünü belirlemektir. Analitik felsefenin en hareketli dallarından biri olmasına rağmen metaetik hakkında çok az Türkçe kaynak bulunması, beni böyle bir makale kaleme almaya itti. Bu uğurda metaetiğin uğraş alanları gösterilecek, kapsamı çizilecek, birbirine rakip teoriler tanıtılacaktır. Metaetik, normatif bir alan değildir, ancak metaetik; normatiflik ile ilgili sorular sorar. Örneğin metaetik “Bu ahlaken kötüdür” gibi bir yargıda bulunmaz fakat “Ahlaken kötü olmak ne demektir?” gibi daha temel sorularla uğraşır. Yani metaetik neyin iyi neyin kötü olduğu ile yahut neyin ahlaken doğru neyin ahlaken yanlış olduğu ile ilgilenmez. Ancak iyilik, kötülük, ahlaki doğruluk, ahlaki yanlışlık gibi niteliklerin bizzat kendileriyle ilgilenir. Metaetik normatif bir alan olmadığı için, bu çalışmada metaetiğin ahlaki bir hayat duruşu belirlemede bir role sahip olup olamayacağı incelenecektir.
Çalışmada, metaetiğin uğraş alanları (I) ahlaki semantik, (II) ahlaki ontoloji, (III) ahlaki epistemoloji ve (IV) ahlak psikolojisi şeklinde dört ana bölüme ayrılacak ve bu alanlardaki tartışmalar incelenerek bir sonuca varılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Metaetik , Ahlak Felsefesi , Ahlaki Semantik , Ahlaki Ontoloji , Ahlaki Epistemoloji , Ahlak Psikolojisi.

Teşekkür

Metaetik alanındaki birikimini benden esirgemeyen ve deyim yerindeyse mentorluğumu üstlenen Sayın Doç. Dr. Necati Murad Omay'a en içten teşekkürlerimi sunarım.

What is Metaethics? Can It Provide a Moral View of Life?

Öz

The aim of this study is to introduce the reader to metaethics, which is arguably the most fundamental branch of moral philosophy, and to determine the role of metaethics in shaping a moral outlook on life. Despite being one of the most dynamic branches of analytic philosophy, the scarcity of Turkish resources on metaethics has motivated me to write such an article. In this endeavor, the areas of inquiry within metaethics will be outlined, its scope will be delineated, and competing theories will be introduced. Metaethics is not a normative field, but it raises questions related to normativity or example, metaethics does not make a judgment like “This is morally bad,” but instead deals with more fundamental questions such as “What does it mean to be morally bad?” In other words, metaethics is not concerned with what is good or bad, or what is morally right or wrong. Rather, it is concerned with the nature of qualities such as goodness, badness, moral rightness, and moral wrongness themselves. Since metaethics is not a normative field, the study will attempt to demonstrate what role it might play in determining a moral stance on life. In this work, the areas of inquiry within metaethics will be divided into four main sections: (I) moral semantics, (II) moral ontology, (III) moral epistemology, and (IV) moral psychology. The discussions within these areas will be examined, and a conclusion will be reached.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Metaetik , Ahlak Felsefesi , Ahlaki Semantik , Ahlaki Ontoloji , Ahlaki Epistemoloji , Ahlak Psikolojisi.

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