ALTERNATİF OLANAKLAR İLKESİ VE FRANKFURT

Öz

Alternatif Olanaklar İlkesi, kişinin yaptığından başka türlü yapabilirse ahlaken sorumlu olacağını iddia eder. Alternatif Olanaklar İlkesi’nin sonucuna göre özgür irade, ahlaki sorumluluk için zorunlu bir koşul olarak varsayılır. Frankfurt ise Alternatif Olanaklar İlkesi’nin yanlış olduğunu, özgür iradenin ve ahlaki sorumluluğun yanlış anlaşıldığını savunur. Frankfurt, bu iddiasını desteklemek için karşı-örnekler oluşturur. Bu karşı-örnekler ile kişinin yaptığından başka türlü yapabileceği iddia edilir. Bu makalenin amacı, Alternatif Olanaklar İlkesi'ni Frankfurt’un özgür irade ve ahlaki sorumlulukla ilgili düşünceleri çerçevesinde incelemek ve tartışmaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Alternatif Olanaklar İlkesi
• başka türlü yapabilme
• ahlaki sorumluluk
• Frankfurt.

THE PRINCIPLE OF ALTERNATE POSSIBILITY AND FRANKFURT

Abstract

The Principle of Alternate Possibility claim that a person is morally responsible for only if he could have done otherwise. According to The Principle of Alternate Possibility consequence is supposed to free will a necessary condition for moral responsibility. But Frankfurt claim that The Principle of Alternate Possibility is false and free will and moral responsibility problem is falsify. Frankfurt creates a counter-examples to support this claim. In these counter-examples is claimed that a person can do otherwise than what have done. In this article aims to examine and debate the Principle of Alternative Possibilities within the framework of Frankfurt’s ideas on free will and moral responsibility.

Keywords

• Principle of Alternate Possibility
• could have done otherwise
• moral responsibility
• Frankfurt.

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